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Egyptian women’s activists are widely regarded as pioneers in calling for women’s 
rights in the Arab world. However, the struggle for women’s rights in Egypt is a 
complex one that has led to many achievements, but has also involved numerous 
setbacks. The media has been central throughout this struggle and all of this has 
always taken place in a highly politicized environment, which involved changes in the 
state’s approach to women’s rights.      
Thus, this study investigates the interplay between women, media and politics in 
Egypt. It uses theories of authoritarianism that have been used to describe the nature 
of the incumbent Egyptian regime, as well as notions pertaining to the corporatist 
tactics it resorts to in order to analyze the manner in which the state deals with 
women’s activists and their access to the media. This involves a particular emphasis 
on the privately owned media which has flourished in Egypt in recent years. Also, 
because the Egyptian government is directly and actively involved in ‘women’s 
issues’, the study uses the notion of state feminism to analyze its efforts in this regard 
and how they relate to media treatment of women and their rights. In addition, the 
study draws on theories of post and neo colonialism to analyze how efforts in the area 
of women’s rights by both the government and activists relate to the international 
framework, which promotes a specific version of women’s rights. 
This is done by interviewing female members of political parties, NGOs and a 
governmental women’s organization, as well as using archival research to analyze the 
information available in the publications of these organizations. Other methods 
employed in this study are critical discourse analysis to analyze media treatment of 
women’s political empowerment, in addition to focus groups to investigate Egyptian 
female audiences’ reception of political drama. 
As a result, the study breaks new ground in theorizing the relationship between the 
state and women’s activists and thus explains the activists’ media access. It also 
develops the notion of state feminism and relates it to the media. Finally, the study 
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 of February 2009, the talk show 90 Dekika (90 Minutes) aired on the 
privately owned Egyptian satellite channel Al Mehwar (see Chapter 6 for details 
about both the channel and the program) devoted about half of its airtime to discuss 
amending the personal status law, which regulates marriage, divorce and child 
custody. The speakers were Seham Nigm the President of the NGO „Women and 
Law‟, Dr. Abdalla Al Naggar, a religious scholar and Tarek Imam Allam, President of 
the „Freedom NGO: Friends of Men and the Family‟. The following is an excerpt of 
the discussion:  
Nigm: Women‟s NGOs believe that they should play a role in the much talked 
about efforts to change this law. Our goal is to create a public debate about … 
the drawbacks of the existing law not only from women‟s point of view, but 
also from that of men  and children as well as organizations which are active 
in changing things to the better for families and those which support equality 
and justice. We met up with women, men and children all over Egypt who 
suffer due to the existing law and we also surveyed the views of women‟s 
rights organizations, legal experts and media personnel. We organized 
workshops in order to come up with the drawbacks of the existing law and 
proposed amendments [to the law] which can protect the Egyptian family and 
do not favor one side over the other in order to keep Egyptian families intact 
and ensure that their members respect one another.  
Presenter: At the end of the day, its called the personal status law and not the 
women‟s law.  
Nigm: Family law … we were surprised that the [new] law was not made 
public, but was quickly sent to parliament without allowing the public to 
express their views [on it]. Nor were different institutions in society, such as 
the religious establishment and human rights organizations given a chance to 
express their views. It was a top-down decision …  
Al Naggar: We support any changes that help in … [keeping families intact] 
and that provide objective and reasonable solutions - and not ones that are 
based on whims - to any problems. God is the one who set the guidelines for 
marriage and for the familial institution. Therefore, our point of reference is 
God, the Prophet … and Sharia and not views which may be influenced by 
  21 
emotions, investigative journalism stories and [people‟s] diverging opinions 
… 
Allam: „Freedom NGO: Friends of Men and the Family‟ is the first such NGO 
in Egypt. Some people opposed its establishment, that is why we were sued 
but we won the court case. Some people falsely claim that they are members 
of our organization and call it a National Council for Men, we are in the 
process of suing them. The NGO specializes in issues to do with men, in other 
words it opposes the unjust laws that feminize society. With all due respect to 
Mrs. Suzanne Mubarak [the first lady] and the National Council for Women 
[see Chapter 5 for details about this organization], some people are trying to 
tailor laws so that they lead to the feminization of society at the expense of 
men. Our first priority is opposing such laws. We call upon Mrs. Suzanne 
Mubarak to transform the National Council for Women into a National 
Council for the Family in order to avoid discrimination on the basis of men, 
women, children, disabled people …  
Presenter: [interrupting] Why don‟t you establish a National Council for 
Men? 
Allam: The President is the only one that has the right to do so. 
Presenter: Why don‟t you call for this? 
Allam: Our NGO is concerned about the family … You pick and chose 
particular aspects of religion to your [women‟s] advantage, give us some 
things to our advantage. But unfortunately laws are being tailored to give 
women and not men … 
Presenter: Do you believe that men are oppressed in [this] society? 
Allam: I am against both men who oppress women and women who oppress 
men … We established this NGO because most of the existing ones are 
concerned about either women or children, but we would like the National 
Council for Women to be transformed into a National Council for the Family. 
We can then join Mrs. Suzanne Mubarak and express our views to the benefit 
of society as a whole and not that of women only.  
Nigm: I would like to stress that religion is indeed the point of reference, just 
like Dr. Abdulla stated. 
 
Many important issues in this conversation must be highlighted. These include how 
the speakers framed their arguments and the point of reference that they used while 
addressing women‟s rights. Other points that should be noted are how some of them 
  21 
referred to specific people while they talked about women‟s rights, their ideas about 
how laws are changed as well as the calls for men‟s rights that were expressed. All of 
these are indications for critical issues to do with women‟s political empowerment in 
relation to the media in Egypt, which will be examined in this study.  
 
1.1 Egyptian Women’s Political Participation:  
Egyptian women‟s participation in politics is extremely limited. There are currently 
only three female cabinet ministers and women represent less than 2% of parliament 
members. Such meagre levels of participation are perplexing given that Egyptian 
women first demanded political rights as early as 1924. These demands came after the 
involvement of the women‟s movement with the nationalist movement, which let 
women down once nationalist goals were achieved.  
In many post-colonial countries, the women‟s movement was closely intertwined with 
the nationalist movement. Egypt is no exception. The first instance of women‟s 
political activity was in the form of opposing the British occupation of Egypt. They 
formed the Wafdist Women‟s Central Committee (WWCC) in 1919 which was a 
parallel organization to the Wafd or Delegation [see 1.2 for details about the Wafd]. 
Through it, they organized and engaged in activities such as demonstrations as well as 
boycotting British goods and banks. At one point, the male leaders of the Wafd were 
exiled. This led to a greater role for women whereby they took over some of their key 
roles such as expanding support for the Wafd, managing finances and preserving 
popular morale. All of this was welcomed by the male leaders of the Wafd, many of 
whom expressed their gratitude to Wafdist women and described their activities as 
crucial in the nationalist struggle. Some male leaders even vowed to work on “the 
liberation of women” (Badran 1986: 112, 118-121, 125-6, 129).  
But even before Egypt became nominally independent, there were signs that the male 
leaders of the Wafd would not live up to their promises. For example, they did not 
consult and even completely disregarded the views of the WWCC during crucial steps 
and negotiations towards achieving independence. Sadly, when nominal independence 
was achieved in 1923, the male leaders of the Wafd produced a constitution which 
gave suffrage to men only. They also prevented women from attending the 
inauguration of parliament, except as wives of senior government officials (Badran 
1986: 120, 122, 130). In other words, women‟s contributions were welcomed during 
times of national crisis - opposing foreign occupation - but after independence was 
achieved, men expected women to return to their traditional roles. This triggered 
women to publicly claim suffrage for the first time in 1924, to initiate and organize a 
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women‟s movement and establish the Egyptian Feminist Union (EFU). However, the 
EFU decided to focus on struggling for other women‟s rights such as education and 
setting a minimum age for marriage by law as well as charity work and postponed 
actively struggling to attain suffrage for some time (Badran 1988: 26-8, 31).  
Things only changed in the 1940s when a new younger and more radical generation of 
women‟s activists emerged who believed that it was high time that the women‟s 
movement focused on attaining women‟s political rights. Thus, they transformed this 
cause from a marginal one into the women‟s movement‟s priority. One of their tactics 
was establishing women‟s political parties, such as al-hizb al-nisai al-masri (The 
Egyptian Feminist Party). One particular activist, Doria Shafik, adopted militant 
tactics to achieve this cause. In 1951, she gathered 1500 women‟s activists and led 
them in storming the Egyptian Parliament demanding women‟s political rights. They 
spent three hours chanting slogans such as „down with Parliament without women‟ 
which prevented legislators from doing their work. They only dispersed after a senior 
parliamentary figure promised to support their demands. In 1952, Shafik acted as if 
women were entitled to suffrage and submitted her registration papers to run for 
parliament. However, her papers were refused, so she filed a law suit to amend the 
election law to enable women to enjoy suffrage (Nelson 1996: 181). Later that year, a 
coup d‟etat took place leading to a radical transformation of the Egyptian government. 
Yet in 1954, newspapers reported that the Constitutional Assembly would convene 
but it did not mention that any women would take part in this. It was then that Shafik 
resorted to an even more extreme measure in demanding women‟s political rights. She 
went on a hunger strike that lasted for eight days during which other women‟s 
activists joined her. Shafik‟s stance also received widespread coverage by both the 
local and international media. She only ended the hunger strike after the government 
sent a representative to convey to her that the new Egyptian constitution would entitle 
women to full political rights. Shafik insisted that he put this message in writing 
before she ended the hunger strike (Nelson 1996: 193-204). 
Two years later, in 1956, Egyptian women finally obtained full political rights and 
only a year later two women managed to join parliament (NCW nd: 24). Despite this, 
the number of female MPs remained extremely low. At some points in time, at least in 
numerical terms, women‟s level of political participation was much higher than in 
2008. In 1979, President Sadat passed a law by Presidential decree that reserved 30 
parliamentary seats for women as well as 20% of seats in local People‟s Councils. 
This led to women representing 8.93% of parliament. However, ten years later, under 
President Mubarak, the High Constitutional Court nullified that law on the grounds 
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that it entailed preferential treatment for women and therefore was not in line with the 
constitutional principle of equality (Hatem 1992: 240, 242-5). This led to a sharp 
decrease in female representation in parliament which amounted to 3.2% in 1987 and 
thereafter it decreased even further so that it ranged from 2.02% to 2.5% (NCW nd: 
24, Arab Women‟s Union c. 2006: 142). In 2008, the government and the ruling party 
decided to re-introduce a women‟s parliamentary quota. As will be shown in detail 
during the course of this study, they decided to add 64 additional seats to parliament 
which only women will be allowed to run for. However, prior to this, the constitution 
was amended and a clause was added stipulating that the government had the right to 
resort to measures to increase women‟s political representation. The measures in 
question were not specified in the constitution but were to be regulated by law.  
The historical account of Egyptian women‟s political participation shows that it can 
not be explained using a linear progression in which women struggled until they 
attained suffrage, after which their participation in politics increased gradually; far 
from it. There have been many ups and downs, high hopes that were followed by 
disappointments and even achievements that were followed by backlashes. Clearly, 
the issue is extremely complicated and one of the main aims of this study is to dissect, 
analyze and explain this phenomenon.  
 
1.2 Egyptian Politics:  
Women‟s participation in politics seems to be rather challenging in a country ruled by 
authoritarianism, such as Egypt. Although Egyptian politics is characterized by  multi-
partism and Presidential and parliamentary elections, much research has documented 
that the multiparty system which is in place does not function properly and that all 
elections are rigged (Kassem 2004: 1, 3, 41, 66-7; Fahmy 2002: 2; Kienle 2001: 29, 
31). This study takes these integral issues into consideration while analyzing Egyptian 
women‟s meagre   political participation.  
It is also important to take historical elements pertaining to the Egyptian political 
system into consideration. From 1923 up until the early 1950s, Egypt was nominally 
independent and the political system was a multiparty semi-parliamentary monarchy. 
The party which dominated Egyptian politics throughout this period was the Wafd. 
Wafd literally means delegation and it was initially established in 1918 as a national 
delegation and not a political party during the British occupation of Egypt (Abdel 
Kader 1987: 80-1). It was formed in order to travel to London to meet the British 
government and present national demands regarding Egypt‟s independence. However, 
they were prevented from travelling and so started working on forming a permanent 
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organization to represent the nation. They also began to demand an end to the British 
protectorate in addition to other nationalist demands. The Wafd‟s popularity began to 
grow and so the British decided to exile its three main leaders. But eventually, the 
Wafd managed to achieve nominal independence for Egypt in 1923, and it became a 
political party which dominated Egyptian politics until 1952. It was a secular, 
moderate and liberal party (Abdel Khader 1987: 79, 85, 87).  
In the early 1950s, a socialist regime came to power under the leadership of the late 
President Gamal Abdel Nasser. It banned all forms of pluralist organizations, 
including political parties. Thus, Egypt became a one-party state, in which the ruling 
party - the Arab Socialist Union - was the only party to be found. The situation 
remained unchanged until late President Sadat introduced a controlled multiparty 
system. In 1976, he dissolved the Arab Socialist Union and created three political 
parties, namely the centrist National Democratic Party - which became and remains to 
date the ruling party, the leftist National Progressive Union, commonly known as 
Tagammu, and the rightist Socialist Liberal Organization. Since 1977 and to date the 
regime reserves the right to authorize political parties, which is one of many other 
measures used to cripple and control opposition parties. This has led to the emergence 
of a very limited number of largely co-opted opposition parties. In this environment, 
the Wafd has re-emerged in the form of the Neo Wafd Party (Kienle 2001: 28-31, 68-
9; Stacher 2004: 220-1, 224). 
 
1.3 Egyptian Media and Women’s Involvement in It: 
Egyptian women‟s activists have always used the media to call for women‟s rights. 
That is why an integral element of this study is examining how efforts to politically 
empower Egyptian women relate to and are treated by the Egyptian media.    
Although an active women‟s movement did not exist in the early 1890s, some women 
established „women‟s journals‟ in which debates about women‟s rights took place 
between different female writers as well as female readers whose contributions were 
published on a regular basis. The issues debated included women‟s participation in the 
pubic sphere in the form of paid work, marriage and divorce as well as veiling and 
seclusion. But the central demand was women‟s right to education and most 
arguments revolved around improving women‟s status within the family. It is 
noteworthy that at this phase suffrage was not one of the rights being discussed. One 
of the reasons behind this may have been that at the time voting was of little if any 
significance anyway due to the British occupation of Egypt (Baron 1994: 2, 3, 6, 13, 
142, 192-3). In later years, such women‟s journals were largely affiliated to women‟s 
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organizations. For example, the „Egyptian Feminist Union‟ published L’Egyptienne 
(The Egyptian) and later Al Masriya (The Egyptian Female) (Abdel Kader 1987: 96) 
and Shafik‟s Bint al-Nil Union (Daughter of the Nile Union) published Bint el-Nil 
(Daughter of the Nile) and La Femme Nouvelle (The New Woman). In these two latter 
publications, demanding women‟s suffrage was to be found on a regular basis (Nelson 
1991: 312). To a lesser extent, some activists also contributed articles to mainstream 
publications in which they called for women‟s rights. Malak Hifni Nassef was the first 
to do so in the early 1900s, when she contributed articles to a newspaper affiliated to a 
political party (Ahmed 1992: 171-2). Another example was Fatma Nimat Rashid who 
in the 1940s and 50s, contributed numerous articles in several mainstream 
publications, largely on suffrage (Khater and Nelson 1988: 468). 
Since 2000, Egypt has been experiencing a proliferation of privately owned print and 
broadcast media. They are widely perceived as a manifestation of an unprecedented 
level of media freedom in the Egyptian media by the public. Whether or not this is 
indeed the case and whether or not they provide more space for women‟s activists to 
voice their opinions are thoroughly investigated in this study.  Prior to doing so, a 
brief overview of the changes in media ownership over the years is necessary. 
Privately owned newspapers flourished in Egypt in the period between 1923 and the 
early 1950s. Things changed drastically after Nasser‟s socialist government came to 
power in the 1950s. It brought an end to private media ownership by „nationalizing‟ 
media outlets in 1960. Thereafter, all of the media in Egypt became government 
owned. This included television which was first introduced in Egypt during the Nasser 
era. The situation changed slightly under the Sadat regime. He allowed opposition 
political parties to issue their own newspapers. Other than that, all other media outlets 
continued to be fully controlled by the government. A more drastic change took place 
in early 2000s under the Mubarak regime.   
This began with the emergence of a limited number of privately owned newspapers, 
such as Al Osbou (A Week) and Sout Al Ouma (The Voice of the Nation) and was 
shortly followed by a small number of privately owned satellite channels, namely 
Dream TV and Al Mehwar. But since then, the number of privately owned newspapers 
and satellite channels has mushroomed. Examples of other privately owned 
newspapers include Al Masry Al Youm (The Egyptian Today), Nahdet Masr (Egypt‟s 
Development), Al Dostor (The Constitution) and Al Shorouq (Sun Rise), while 
examples of the privately owned satellite channels include Al Hayat (Life), O TV, ON 
TV and Melody. All of these media outlets are largely owned by prominent Egyptian 
businessman. The privately owned satellite channels have introduced a new form of 
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programming to Egyptian audiences whose popularity can not be exaggerated; a live 
talk show aired at night on weekdays. In addition, the reporting and opinion columns 
of the privately owned newspapers are widely perceived as far more objective and 
more critical of the government than those of government owned newspapers.  
 
1.4 Constructions of Womanhood in Egypt: 
Women‟s political empowerment in relation to the media can not be studied without 
taking into consideration constructions of womanhood and perceptions of women‟s 
rights and those who call for them. In Egypt the notion of women‟s rights and those 
who call for them are largely perceived in a negative manner. This is largely because 
during the colonial era, colonizers argued that women‟s status and the manner in 
which women were treated in Egypt, just like in other colonized countries, was the 
main reason behind Egypt‟s backwardness. In addition, because some Egyptians 
justified women‟s status at the time in Islamic discourse, the colonizers propagated 
that Islam oppresses women. They also acted upon these ideas and sought to change 
Egyptian women‟s status in order to make it resemble the status of British women. 
Furthermore, some Egyptians at the time began to criticize Egyptian women‟s status 
and call for it to be changed in a manner and using arguments that were very similar 
to those of the colonizers. This had a lasting negative impact on the idea of women‟s 
rights in Egypt because it came to be perceived as a Western colonial invention to 
undermine Egyptian culture and any one who advocates these ideas because they 
came to be perceived as agents of the colonizers (Badran 1995: 4, 12, 13, 16, 166; 
Ahmed 1992: 151-2, 154, 156, 167). 
In recent years, different groups of people have addressed women‟s rights using rather 
different approaches. Some of them defend women‟s rights using secular and human 
rights discourse. Many of them receive funding from Western governments and/or 
organizations. But it is important to note that Al Ali (2004: 48-9) argues that they are 
not brainwashed by the West or follow it blindly. Despite this, many Egyptians 
perceive them as agents of neo-colonialism who are implementing a Western agenda 
that seeks to undermine Egyptian culture. A second group of people argue that 
women‟s role should be confined to the private sphere in which they perform the 
traditional roles of wives and mothers. They argue that these roles are the only 
culturally indigenous ones and perceive confining women to these roles as part and 
parcel of preserving the indigenous culture. This second group perceive the mere idea 
of women‟s rights as culturally inappropriate and do not bother to develop their own 
version of women‟s rights (Badran 1995: 4, 12, 13, 16, 166; Ahmed 1992: 151-2, 154, 
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156, 167). A third group of people could be described as Islamic modernists. They 
defend women‟s rights but they do so using Islamic discourse. They argue that the 
Quran and Sunna (the Prophet‟s tradition) should be reinterpreted to suit modern 
times and they also draw on the lives of prominent women during the Prophet‟s 
lifetime and shortly after it to argue that Islam grants women far more rights than 
currently accorded them in Egypt. But it is important to note that this last group is not 
a homogenous one (Cooke 2001: 59-60, 62).  
 
1.5 The Study’s Objectives:  
As stated previously, Egyptian women‟s activists have always used the media to 
address, discuss and call for women‟s rights. In fact, women‟s empowerment is 
related to the media for several reasons. One of them is the argument that the media is 
one of the elements of the apparatus which defines the roles of women and men in 
society (Sakr 2004a: 4). Another is the proposition that media treatment of women 
both reflects and reinforces societal views of women (Sakr 2004a: 1). That is why an 
integral element of this study is to determine whether or not and to what extent 
women‟s activists who address women‟s political empowerment have access to the 
media. Furthermore, the study will also examine whether or not the media is currently 
playing an enabling role in women‟s political empowerment.  
Thus, the study‟s main research question investigates how the Egyptian media‟s 
treatment of women‟s political empowerment reflects and interacts with factors which 
influence women‟s political empowerment. In this regard, it is important to note that 
the Egyptian media is largely controlled by Egypt‟s authoritarian regime. Sakr (2007: 
6-7) has previously argued, its content consequently tends to reflect the agenda of the 
ruling elite and not the wishes of its viewers or the public at large. She further argues 
that any calls for change within the media usually come about as a result of divisions 
within the ruling elite and not due to pressure from below. These observations are 
relevant to this study because, as will be shown during the course of this study, the 
state is an integral player in whether or not women obtain rights. That is why the 
state‟s role in whether or not measures are taken to politically empower women is 
examined in this study. In addition, how its role is reflected in the media is also 
analyzed.  
One of the factors which influences women‟s political empowerment is women‟s 
activism in the political party arena. Consequently, this form of activism is examined 
in this study, in addition to looking into whether or not these women have access to 
the media. But because there are numerous restrictions on political parties in a country 
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ruled by authoritarianism, as will be shown during the course of this study, NGOs 
may perform some of the functions usually accorded to political parties. That is why 
women‟s activism in the NGO arena is also examined in relation to the media. In 
addition, the study analyzes how language is used as a site of struggle in Egyptian talk 
shows and newspapers when women‟s political empowerment is addressed. Finally, 
female audience‟s reception of drama serials which address women‟s political 
participation is also analyzed. This particular form of media content is included due to 
its popularity among the Egyptian public, especially women. 
All of this will enable me to achieve the objectives of the study, which include 
determining whether or not the ongoing efforts by the various different players are 
leading to women‟s empowerment. This is in addition to finding out whether or not 
the media plays an enabling role in this regard.  
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Chapter 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW &  
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Since this study is about women‟s political empowerment in relation to the media, it is 
important to identify how women‟s political empowerment can come about prior to 
examining whether or not and if so how the media is being utilized in this regard. It is 
the contention of this study that women‟s political empowerment can only take place 
in a holistic manner in which numerous structures are transformed. These include 
power structures, which are related to formal and informal political activity in Egypt. 
But elements of the international arena also come into play. That is why some 
elements of the power structure in the international arena may also need to be 
reconsidered. Another important structure is the cultural one, which includes media 
treatment of women and their rights as well as cultural perceptions of the role of 
women in the private and public spheres. Furthermore, an element of the societal 
structure is a crucial factor, namely whether or not and how members of society are 
involved in the efforts to empower women. Consequently, various different 
theoretical elements related to these structures will be examined in this chapter in 
order to build on them in the rest of the study.  
Prior to investigating women‟s political empowerment, one must understand the 
nature of the regime in which women‟s political empowerment is being sought. That 
is why this chapter begins with an attempt to locate women in Egyptian politics. This 
entails critically examining the different theories that have been adopted to describe 
the nature of the Egyptian regime. This is followed by an overview of another area of 
politics - informal politics – because it is likely to be useful in analyzing the role of 
the first lady in women‟s rights and how the state addresses them. Since this study 
investigates female audience‟s reception of drama serials‟ treatment of women‟s 
political participation, this is followed by a critical examination of different theories 
pertaining to the drama serials industry and its audiences.   
The Egyptian government has been engaging in „state feminism‟ ever since the 1950s. 
Examining the incumbent Egyptian regime‟s state feminist approach is an integral 
part of this study. Consequently, a deconstruction of various scholars‟ contributions to 
the area of state feminism is included. Also, since women‟s NGOs are the main 
vehicle of women‟s activism in Egypt, this chapter includes a critical examination of 
the arguments made by previous researchers regarding whether or not channelling 
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activism through NGOs can have an impact. Although this study is entirely about 
Egypt, it is not possible to examine  efforts to politically empower Egyptian women 
without taking elements of the international arena into consideration. This is because 
the different players in Egypt who are involved in women‟s political empowerment 
interact with the United Nations and receive funding from Western governments and 
organizations. Thus, an overview of the different ways in which this interaction is 
perceived is provided.  
During the British colonization of Egypt, the colonizers adopted far more direct forms 
of intervention in Egyptian women‟s status. This had a lasting impact on the nature of 
the Egyptian feminist movement as well as on Egyptian society‟s perception of 
feminism and feminists. It is not advisable to study women‟s activism and women‟s 
political empowerment in contemporary Egypt without obtaining an understanding of 
all of this. Thus, an overview of all of these issues is provided. Towards the end of the 
chapter, an initial attempt to define empowerment is included. The chapter ends with 
an outline of the questions that will be addressed in this study.   
 
2.1 The Challenges of Locating Women in Egyptian Politics:  
Since this study is about Egyptian women‟s political empowerment in relation to the 
media, the first structure that must be critically examined is the power structure. This 
includes politics in the formal sense, i.e. the nature of the Egyptian regime and the 
political environment, as well as power within the informal one, which refers to power 
related to the familial institution.  
 
2.1.1 Formal Politics: 
There is a consensus among researchers who have examined the Egyptian regime: 
they all describe it as authoritarian. They have developed several theoretical 
underpinnings to describe the concentration of power within it, the different tactics 
used by the regime and the extent to which dissent and opposition are tolerated. But it 
is important to note that none of these studies were primarily about women, which is 
an important gap that this study aims fill.  
Mai Kassem (2004: 1), for example, has described the incumbent Egyptian regime as 
„personal authoritarian‟ in which all branches of government are loyal to the 
President. Indeed, the incumbent Egyptian President has been in power for nearly 
three decades and so it is difficult to argue against the idea that he must be extremely 
powerful and preside over all of the governmental institutions. But Kassem (2004: 4) 
also argues that the regime resorts to internal patronage to build supporters among 
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party members by granting them access to state resources. Jason Brownlee (2007: 
123, 131) adds another element to this policy by arguing that the regime ensures that 
the losses to be incurred by breaking away from the party and engaging in political 
activity elsewhere are far greater than the gains to be made by excelling in the party‟s 
ranks. But if all of these tactics are necessary to maintain the support and loyalty of 
members of the ruling party, then clearly the President is not fully in control, 
otherwise he would not have had to go to such great lengths to maintain their loyalty 
and support. If there were no limits whatsoever to his power, then this implies that 
when it comes to governmental decisions on women‟s rights, he is the sole decision 
maker who decides that women shall be granted any particular right at any point in 
time and any particular fashion, and that all of the other branches of government 
simply implement the President‟s decision. However, it is difficult to believe that 
these decisions are made in such a simplistic fashion. Also, given the aforementioned 
tactics that are used to maintain loyalty within the ruling party, it seems that its role 
and power is being downplayed or underestimated by scholars.  
Another example is Holger Albrecht‟s argument that the Egyptian regime is a 
„liberalized authoritarian‟ one. He (2007: 60-61) describes this as a situation in which 
the regime adopts some measures that are associated with democracy, such as the 
existence of legal opposition forces and elections taking place at all levels. However, 
in reality a combination of measures are in place to ensure that those in power 
maintain their grip on it. One of the main reasons behind this liberal approach to 
authoritarianism is for the regime to gain a certain level of political legitimacy in the 
international arena. In fact, several legal opposition parties are to be found in Egypt 
and elections do take place at all levels. However, all elections are rigged and the 
same group of people have been in power for a very long time.  
Ellen Lust-Okar provides a deeper insight into the political scene in Egypt, which may 
help to resolve apparent contradictions between the notions of „personal‟ and 
„liberalized‟ authoritarianism. She argues (2007: 40-2, 47-8) that the Egyptian regime 
has created „a divided structure of contestation‟ by allowing some opposition forces 
more freedom than others. Secular politicians - both liberal and leftist - are more 
tolerated by the regime and are allowed to form political parties, while Islamist forces 
are far less tolerated and therefore not allowed to do so. She believes that the main 
reason behind this is that the regime does not perceive the secular opposition as a 
threat, while the complete opposite is the case when it comes to the Islamist one. 
However, she adds that the regime weakens the secular opposition by co-opting their 
political parties and giving them something in return for concessions on their side, 
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such as giving them some political posts in return for their refraining from calling for 
regime change. Such deals are said to be made in Egypt, whereby some secular 
opposition political parties are „allowed‟ to win in a very small number of 
constituencies during parliamentary elections, so that as MPs they pose no threat 
whatsoever to the regime because those few seats can not allow for any form of 
impact on voting within parliament. Thus, these legal secular opposition forces are 
restricted in their activism and prefer to act away from the excluded Islamic 
opposition. Lust-Okar argues (2007: 40-1) that in contrast, the Islamic opposition is 
not bound by such implicit agreements with the state and does not have to limit its 
demands and refrain from calling for regime change. However, it prefers to act at the 
same time as the secular legal opposition because this makes it less likely that the 
regime will crack down on them. She further argues (2007:42) that at the beginning of 
an economic crisis, the legal secular opposition tends to be the one more actively 
calling for moderate changes. But as the crisis deepens, the illegal Islamic opposition 
gains momentum and is supported by a larger number of people. Therefore, in the 
latter stage it is the one more actively seeking changes that are far more radical than 
the ones which the legal secular opposition would like to come about. Thus, at this 
stage the secular opposition tends to back off and remains silent.   
Meanwhile, Bianchi (1989: 8, 20, 23-4) has argued that the situation in Egypt is one 
of unruly corporatism in which rather than crushing - or attempting to crush - its 
opponents all together, the regime has opted for co-existing with its opponents. Thus, 
both corporatized structures and pluralist ones are to be found among Egyptian 
political parties and NGOs, but neither of them have achieved hegemony. But at the 
same time, these pluralist entities are merely a manifestation of fake pluralism in 
which the entities are weakened and financially dependent while their leaders are co-
opted. This make it easy for the regime to manipulate them in a manner that serves its 
own interests. Bianchi‟s model, reached in an earlier phase of the Mubarak regime 
than the other theorizations discussed here, has elements in common with those of 
both Lust-Okar and Albrecht.  
The study will investigate which of the aforementioned theories is more useful in 
explaining the political scene in Egypt when it comes to women‟s political 
participation in the form of political parties and women‟s NGOs. It will also 
investigate whether any of these theories can be used to describe the privately owned 
media that has proliferated in Egypt in recent years. These could be a manifestation of 
liberalized authoritarianism, whereby it looks as if these media outlets are free from 
government control, but in reality certain tactics are used to ensure that the 
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government fully controls them. On the other hand, it could be that „a divided 
structure of contestation‟ is in place whereby some media outlets enjoy more freedom 
than others. Finally, it could be that unruly corporatism is in place, whereby some of 
these privately owned media outlets are truly free while others are coopted by the 
state.  
  
2.1.2 Informal Politics: 
Politics is very often narrowly defined to only include presidential authority, 
legislative bodies, ministerial cabinets, political parties, syndicates, trade unions and 
NGOs. But Waylen (1996: 8) argues that when it comes to developing countries 
examining the extent of women‟s participation in such formal political institutions is 
insufficient and that a broader definition of politics must be adopted in order to see the 
complete picture. Although women‟s meager participation in formal political 
institutions is indeed problematic, however, some women seem to possess other 
powers that must be acknowledged. Some scholars have argued that the family is a 
very important and highly politicized institution in Egypt. They further argue that the 
family must be included in any definition or examination of politics. Tucker (1993: 
xiii), for example, argues that in Egypt the distinction between the public and private 
spheres is not clear cut but is blurred on many fronts.  This is likely to have an impact 
on the role of the Egyptian first lady, Suzanne Mubarak, the president‟s wife. She 
actively promotes women‟s rights and seems to play a significant role in 
governmental decisions and policy regarding women‟s rights. It is the intention of this 
study to analyze her role in some detail.  
Scholars have examined the roles played by first ladies in other parts of the world. 
Joseph (2001: 38), for example, describes their political participation as informal and 
organized around their husbands. She argues that first ladies enjoy access to 
considerable resources and they are very often entitled to numerous unwritten powers. 
Another important role played by first ladies, argues Nelson (1974: 558-9), is that 
they have considerable influence over the decisions that their husbands make.  
But if indeed first ladies operate according to unwritten rules and have access to 
considerable resources it is possible that their informal political activity can be more 
far reaching rather than revolving entirely around their husbands. In other words, they 
may engage in informal political activity that is not directly related to their husbands, 
especially when it comes to their activities pertaining to women‟s rights. Also, the 
extent to which they influence the decisions that their husbands make needs to be 
problematized. For example, is it limited to offering advice on matters their husbands 
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are addressing, or can they initiate something, such as suggesting the amendment of a 
particular law? More importantly, in a country ruled by authoritarianism like Egypt, 
first ladies may play a greater and more influential role, especially if the regime is 
indeed personal authoritarian, as argued by Kassem. In that case, the first lady may be 
entitled to more powers, given that her husband‟s powers are far less restricted than in 
a democratic system. The powers that the first lady enjoys are likely to be far more 
brazen in the area of women‟s rights, particularly because the Egyptian regime 
engages  in a form of state feminism, as will be shown later.   
 
2.1.3 Media, Authoritarian Politics and Female Audiences: 
Egypt has a vibrant entertainment industry which produces tens of drama serials every 
year. The government tightly controls the industry and key personnel within it seem to 
believe that drama serials brainwash viewers. That is why female characters within 
this cultural structure are examined in this study in relation to the issues of political 
empowerment. 
One of the tactics the state uses to control the drama serials industry is similar to one 
of the observations made by Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky in another context. 
They (1994: xii) describe as a process whereby the right-thinking people are 
appointed and what is acceptable and unacceptable is gradually internalized among 
personnel working in the industry, so that they come to unconsciously engage in self-
censorship. Indeed, the Egyptian government ensures that only those in line gradual 
internalization with its policies and views are appointed to committees that are 
responsible for all aspects pertaining to drama serials, such as funding, production and 
selecting which drama serials are screened during prime time. For example, the 
Egyptian Radio and Television Union‟s Board of Trustees (ERTU) consists of thirty 
people as well as the heads of different sectors in ERTU. In 2001, three of the board 
members were former ministers, two were deputy ministers, two were former 
ambassadors, five were high ranking officials in other governmental institutions, five 
were former general directors of television or radio, four were high ranking faculty 
members in government owned universities and several were members of the ruling 
National Democratic Party (ERTU Annual Book 2001-2002: 17). However, in a 
country ruled by authoritarianism, such as Egypt, it is likely that other more direct 
forms of intervention are also used. One such tactic is a mechanism to ensure that 
absolutely nothing deviates from the official line. An official censoring committee 
views all drama serials before they are screened and cuts out any scenes that happen 
to deviate from the official line before the drama serials are aired. 
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As a result, the end products propagate more or less the same ideas in a manner that 
resembles Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer‟s (1997: 121) argument that cultural 
products are standardized and mass produced. They appear to change but the same 
clichés are featured over and over again, and it is not difficult to determine from the 
opening scenes how the events will unfold, which characters will be rewarded and 
which ones will be punished towards the end. Even their length is rigid, fixed and 
must adhere to particular set and predetermined regulations. Indeed, the narratives and 
plots  of Egyptian drama serials as well as the characters that they feature are not very 
different. The same themes are recurrent and the same values are almost always 
upheld, more often than not the evil and wicked character is punished towards the end 
of the drama serial, while the benevolent character is rewarded after being subject to 
injustice throughout. Also, love almost always prevails so that the male and female 
protagonists who belong to different socio-economic backgrounds end up living 
happily ever after, and their parents - who had opposed their union in marriage 
throughout the drama serial - come to realize that they were totally wrong towards the 
end of it. Even the length of any drama serial is rigid. Every episode must last for 
exactly 45 minutes and the series must consist of around 30 episodes. However, an 
issue that has not been thoroughly investigated is whether or not audiences realize that 
cultural products are standardized and mass produced and what they make of this. 
As previously stated, influential figures within the drama serials industry seem to 
believe that drama serials have a massive impact on viewers which can be analyzed 
using John Carey‟s construct of „the masses‟. For example, former director of 
ERTU‟s film and serial production sector, Mamdouh al-Laythi said that drama serials 
are used to culture the uneducated and uncultured by “educat[ing] them, teach[ing] 
them the basics of morality and religious duty, … [and] inculat[ing] the spirit of 
patriotism, morality, religion, courage and enterprise.” Furthermore, Al-Laythi goes 
as far as describing the impact of drama serials on their audiences by saying “it works 
like magic.” In addition, prominent script writer, Usama Anwar „Ukasha describes the 
audience of drama serials as “the broadest, most responsive, and most deeply 
influenced audience” (Abu-Lughod 2005: 11, 232). However, Carey (1992: 21, 23-24, 
71) argues that the masses is an imaginary construct of invisible and unknowable 
people, that the elite reshape to suit their whims. But the crucial argument that never 
changes is that the alleged masses are not as intelligent, knowledgeable or humane as 
them - the elite. 
Indeed, several researchers have argued that viewers are not passive. According to 
Stuart Hall‟s encoding/decoding model, viewers can arrive at a preferred, negotiated 
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or oppositional reading of a soap opera (Ruddock 2001:124-126). An additional 
element that may play an important role in the type of reading viewers arrive at is 
whether or not they discuss soap operas with other people, who these people are and 
the nature of the discussions. 
In fact, research conducted in the Egyptian context directly challenges the views 
upheld by those behind drama serials and provides evidence to support the argument 
that Egyptian viewers are far from brainwashed by drama serials. Research conducted 
by Leila Abu-Lughod (2005: 235-236, 237, 238) revealed that, for example, the 
emphasis on women‟s independence and the glorification of women‟s education 
portrayed through the lives of most of the major female characters in „Ukasha‟s 
prominent serial Hilmya Nights, did not have an impact on impoverished women. In 
fact, urban women who worked as servants were attracted by two other female 
characters in the drama serial who defied “the moral system which keeps good women 
quiet.” In addition, they were only affected by moral messages when they were related 
to their own lives. They were, for example, affected by how one of the female 
characters who‟s mother did not care for as a child ended up leading a miserable and 
unstable life. Similarly, rural women‟s discussion of another drama serial, Love in a 
Diplomatic Pouch, centered around things they could relate to, things that were not far 
from their own lives. These included divorces, thwarted matches, arguments and 
absences. However, their conversations were devoid of important women‟s issues in 
the drama serial, such as psychological problems, mothers being hurt by their 
children‟s unemotional attitude towards them, men freaking out of marriage for fear 
of losing their freedom and wealthy and well educated drug addicts resorting to 
psychiatrists. In other words, these women were clearly not brainwashed by the drama 
serials.  
Despite all of this research which discredits the idea that soap operas shape viewers 
ideas, some women‟s rights activists in various different parts of the world are 
concerned about women‟s representation in soap operas and actively call for positive 
female characters to be featured in soap operas. This study examines the efforts of 
three Egyptian women‟s organizations in this area, paying particular attention to 
drama serial representation of women‟s political activity. It is noteworthy that drama 
serials are rather different from soap operas. They consist of around 30 episodes 
which are aired on a daily basis until the drama serial comes to an end. After that, 
another drama serial is aired. Another difference between soap operas and drama 
serials is that the narratives of the latter tend to be very simple; each drama serial 
addresses just one dilemma throughout the 30 episodes and it is solved in the last one 
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or two episodes. Lotz (2006: 11) has looked into the work of a similar organization in 
the US and she is quite critical of analyzing soap operas treatment of women by using 
what she calls a „role model framework‟. She argues that this approach emanates from 
the idea that constantly featuring women in stereotypical roles reinforces in viewers‟ 
minds that these are the only roles fit for women. Thus, it entails using content 
analysis to investigate things like the ratio of female characters to the ratio of male 
ones in soap operas and determining whether or not and how often the female 
characters fall under the categories of housewives, sex objects, mothers and love 
interests. Lotz (2006:11, 172) describes this approach as too simplistic and as one that 
does not allow for the richness of the plots of soap operas to be taken into 
consideration. Furthermore, it does not provide any indication for viewers‟ reception 
of these characters and dismisses audiences as inactive.  
As previously stated, who viewers discuss soap operas with and the nature of these 
discussions is a factor that can have an impact on viewers‟ reception of soap operas. 
In fact, several researchers have argued that soap operas are a much talked about 
subject among women. Dorothy Hobson (1989: 156, 161) argues that women tend to 
discuss soap operas with female co-workers and family members, especially 
daughters and mothers. She also argues that these discussions are used to follow up on 
episodes some of the women have missed, while Lisbet Van Zoonen (2004: 118-119) 
argues that these conversations are used to enable women not to lose track of the soap 
operas‟ complicated narratives. Meanwhile, Ien Ang (cited in Ruddock 2001: 143) 
argues that soap operas are used to discuss sensitive  personal issues which might 
otherwise not be discussed. However, these conversations may also serve a variety of 
other functions, such as passing time, a diversion not to talk about other more 
important and pressing issues or a pretext to discussing taboos.  
Another aspect which will be investigated through the study of female audiences‟ 
reception of drama serials is whether or not women perceive their familial roles – 
especially childrearing – in a politicized manner. For, as previously stated, Tucker has 
argued (1993: xiii) that the distinction between the public and private spheres is not 
clear cut. Rather, the relationship between the two is blurred on many fronts. In 
addition, Singerman (1995: 189) argues that marriage is the institution through which 
one generation passes its assets to the next. Accordingly, it is central to the extent that 
many people spend their entire lives saving money in order to afford marrying their 
children off. In this sense, objections to economic policies that lead to inflation can be 
perceived as potentially political because they undermine people‟s ability to save 
money for this cause and even threaten the entire institution of marriage (Singerman 
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1994: 178). She (2006: 8) also argues that the role of women in upbringing is greatly 
valorized by all members of society in various different ways. Nationalists seem to 
glorify their role in raising the upcoming generation which is trusted with bringing 
prosperity and development to their country, while Islamists seem to uphold mothers 
for raising a generation which will preserve indigenous culture, restore Islamic values 
and guard society against „Westernization.‟ Booth (2001: 301) argues that perceiving 
child rearing in this manner makes it difficult to perceive it as an activity that is 
confined to the private sphere. This study will explore audience responses to drama 
serial representations of women as a means of investigating whether Egyptian women 
themselves perceive their role in upbringing in a politicized manner. In addition, a 
question that must be asked is whether - if indeed the distinction between the private 
and public spheres is blurred and the familial roles that women play are politicized - 
this is leading people to believe that women are fit for playing political roles in the 
public sphere since they play very similar roles in the private sphere? If for example, 
women are seen as playing integral roles in resolving disputes within families, does 
this lead people to believe that they can become MPs and resolve disputes in an 
electoral constituency?  And if that is not the case, then why is that so?   
Therefore, this study will investigate Egyptian middle-class female audiences‟ 
reception of one drama serial which addressed women‟s political participation, with a 
particular emphasis on the female characters featured in them. By doing so, it will test 
the argument that viewers are not brainwashed by drama serials among a group of 
women from a different background than the ones who  participated in Abu-Lughod‟s 
study. Furthermore, it will focus on drama serials‟ treatment of women‟s political 
participation as well as female audiences‟ reception of it, which was not a focal point 
in Abu Lughod‟s study. It will also look into the functions of conversations about 
drama serials among this particular group of women.  
  
2.2 Theories of the State and State Feminism:  
The state and women‟s NGOs seem to play a role in women‟s political empowerment 
in Egypt. However, they both co-operate with an international framework consisting 
of the United Nations and powerful Western countries. This study will investigate the 
interaction between these different players in relation to the media, while bearing in 
mind power structures within the international framework and their ramifications. 
Furthermore, the study will look into whether or not Egyptian society is involved in 
the efforts to empower women. If that is not the case, the study will explore the 
problems that arise as a result of excluding the societal structure from these efforts. 
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2.2.1 Manifestations of State Feminism in Egypt: 
The Egyptian state has been directly involved in what it describes as women‟s issues 
ever since colonialism came to an end. The study examines the incumbent regime‟s 
approach in this regard in some detail. However, it does so by deconstructing the state 
and examining the structures, agents and institutions that it consists of and the 
interplay between them in the area of women‟s rights in relation to the media.  
Philip Abrahams (1988: 77, 79, 81) argues that the state consists of several institutions 
that are divided, confused and volatile and who only come together and cooperate 
with one another for very brief periods of time to arrive at a unified stance in order to 
address a specific pressing issue. Similarly, Shirin Rai (1996: 5) argues that the state 
is not a totality or a unified and coherent powerful structure, but several institutions 
which exist within a political economic, cultural and legal framework and the 
relationship between them is characterized by both cooperation and tension, so that 
their actions impact one another, they often act with each other but at other times they 
act against each other. Thus, although laws may be changed granting women rights, 
these laws may go unimplemented due to the lack of the necessary infrastructural 
power to do so. In addition, its implementation in any given case is largely dependent 
on individual agents - one judge or a small group of judges - and not the whole 
institutional structure or the entire judicial system, and so a lot depends on the 
judge(s) in question. Furthermore, Johanna Kantola and Hanne Marlene Dahl (2005: 
62) argue that any government is not fully capable of implementing its vision in the 
manner it pleases because it has inherited structures from its predecessors that have 
been created as a result of struggles and resistance between discourses over a long 
period of time during which some discourses have dominated and sedimented. But the 
other discourses are unlikely to have disappeared altogether, some of them may very 
well be present in some of the state institutions or be upheld by some agents within 
the state.  None of this can be changed overnight to make way for the immediate 
implementation of the discourse adopted by the incumbent government.  
In a country ruled by authoritarianism, things may be slightly different. Things are 
likely to be more centralized and so it is possible that even though the state is not a 
unified and coherent entity, the number of people who truly possess decision making 
power are a handful of people and so there is little space for the other institutions to 
do much. They simply do as they are told. It also follows that if two institutions act 
against each other, in an authoritarian context a more powerful institution - or 
individual for that matter - may impose things on them or force one of them to change 
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its policies. There is also something missing from Abrams‟ analysis. If indeed the 
different institutions only come together and produce a unified stance when the need 
arises, he does not explain how they reach this unified stance. For example, it could 
be that some institutions are more powerful than others and so they impose aspects of 
that unified stance on them. But it could also be that some institutions make some 
concessions in return for undisclosed benefits.  
While analyzing the incumbent regime‟s approach to women‟s rights, the study will 
attempt to arrive at a definition for it. It could be argued that its approach should be 
described as state feminism, since the state is supposedly enabling women to attain 
their rights. Mervat Hatem (1992: 231) defines state feminism as the state‟s use of its 
institutions and policies to provide a fertile environment for women to join the public 
arena, in addition to its efforts to bring an end to structural inequalities against 
women. However, the term does not refer to an ideological or legal commitment on 
the part of the state to women‟s rights. Hatem‟s definition of state feminism is 
incomplete because the state can engage in other types of activities that can also be 
described as state feminism. Her definition also places more emphasis on women‟s 
rights in the public sphere than the private one. In addition, it does not relate state 
feminism to the international context; i.e. it does not address whether or not the 
government cooperates with international organizations and other governments in its 
state feminist approach. Whether or not the notion of state feminism is applicable in 
the Egyptian context will be determined during the course of this study.  
At the same time, some of the advantages and disadvantages of women‟s rights being 
addressed by the Egyptian state will be identified. As previously stated, the Egyptian 
regime is authoritarian which is a factor that may lead to some complications. In fact,  
Emma Murphy (2003: 170, 175-6) argues that there are several problems with the 
practice of state feminism when the state in question is an authoritarian one. She 
argues that in such cases the women‟s rights which are addressed are selected by the 
regime and are addressed in the manner that the regime sees fit. This top-down 
approach means that women are entirely dependent on the benevolence of the state, so 
that if the state withdraws its support for women, the rights it has granted them may 
be nullified or they may simply go unimplemented. She further argues (2003: 176) 
that this approach merely changes some of the laws pertaining to women and leaves 
the societal structures that undermine and disadvantage women unchanged. 
Consequently, these structures may not allow women to enjoy the rights the state has 
officially granted them.  
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Also, a potential problem that Murphy does not address is the impact of an 
authoritarian government‟s state feminist approach not only on society‟s perception of 
women and their rights but also on media treatment of women‟s rights, especially if 
that regime is unpopular and more so if its state feminist policy is practised in 
collaboration with Western governments, including former colonial powers.  
One of the important manifestations of the incumbent regime‟s approach to women‟s 
rights has been the creation of a National Council for Women (NCW), which is 
directly affiliated to the Presidential establishment. Its role in relation to the media 
will be analyzed in great detail. Murphy (2003: 176) argues that the membership of 
such an organization may be confined to women belonging to the middle and upper 
classes who may be rather detached from women who are less privileged and fail to 
comprehend their problems and aspirations. Thus, the body in question may end up 
only addressing the problems of middle and upper class women and may not only fall 
short of addressing the problems of poorer women, but may actually approach them in 
an erroneous manner and end up making their lives even more difficult. In addition, if 
the state‟s policies in any arena have a negative impact on women, she suggests that it 
is highly unlikely that the governmental women‟s organization will address these 
issues.  
Melinda Adams has closely examined a women‟s organization created by an 
authoritarian regime in Cameroon. She (2007: 1777-8, 181) argues that the 
authoritarian government of Cameron did not establish a national machinery out of a 
genuine interest in women‟s cause, on the contrary it did so due to four reasons that 
have nothing to do with being interested in women‟s advancement. The first reason is 
because doing so is a non-costly method of obtaining international legitimacy 
whereby the international community, the UN and other governments would perceive 
the Cameroonian government in a positive manner if it champions women‟s rights 
and acts in a manner that is similar to numerous other governments and in the manner 
promoted by the UN. Secondly, the existence of  such a machinery in an era where 
foreign and international donors are actively funding organizations addressing 
women‟s rights, means that a governmental institution can and does attract much of 
that funding which otherwise would have been granted to non-governmental 
institutions which the government is not in full control of. The third reason is that 
such a national machinery can be used by the government to establish patronage 
networks. Finally, the state can and does use the national machinery to channel 
activism to the areas it chooses and in order to achieve the goals it pleases. Thus, 
Adams (2007: 192-3) concludes that the Cameroonian state has used an 
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internationally valued mechanism to achieve its own interests and not to serve 
women, stressing that the Cameroonian national machinery does not address the 
structures that undermine women but rather maintains the existing power relations.  
A feature of women‟s organizations created by the state that has not been addressed 
by these scholars is that the identity of the person who heads the organization and the 
level of popularity of the authoritarian regime in power is likely to have an impact on 
media treatment of women‟s rights.  
Another crucial issue is whether or not the existence of a governmental women‟s 
organization like NCW has an impact on the formation or workings of an independent 
women‟s movement. Murphy (2003: 176) argues that the existence of such a 
governmental women‟s organization and the attainment of women‟s rights through 
the state in this top-down manner, does not allow for the formation of a women‟s 
movement. This is highly problematic if the state halts its feminist policies because 
women will lack the skills and knowledge of effective means of attaining their rights. 
In fact, Karen Beckwith  (2007: 321) argues that one of the objectives of the creation 
of a governmental women‟s organization maybe to preempt the emergence of an 
independent and unified feminist movement by confining women‟s activism to an 
institution established by the state. As will be shown during the course of this study, a 
unified and coherent women‟s movement does not seem to exist in Egypt. Thus, the 
study will reveal whether or not NCW inhibits the formation of such a movement.  
 
2.2.2 Civil Society Activism in Egypt: 
As previously stated, women‟s NGOs seem to be one of the players in women‟s rights 
in Egypt. The nature of their work, their relationship with the state and their 
effectiveness are all examined in this study in relation to the media.  
Maha Abdel Rahman has examined how non-women‟s NGOs are run in Egypt, the 
relationship between NGOs as well as the relationship between NGOs and the state. 
Some of her findings might be applicable to women‟s NGOs. She (2004: 3-4) argues 
that non-women‟s NGOs are not a homogenous entity, they have different interests 
that sometimes coincide with one another but may also run against the interests of 
other NGOs working in the same field. At the same time, the interests of some NGOs 
may be similar to those of the state, while those of other NGOs may be completely 
different and in opposition to those of the state. In addition, she suggests (2004: 4) 
that NGOs influence the state and are influenced by the state, but that the state 
successfully utilizes civil society as a whole in a manner that achieves its own 
interests. Abdel Rahman (2004: 161-2) contends that in many cases just one of the 
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NGO‟s board members is in charge of running it, while the other board members are 
completely inactive and are merely in place in order to fulfill the criteria of obtaining 
and maintaining an NGO license, and they simply approve the decisions taken by the 
board member who is in charge. Significantly, she argues that this phenomenon has 
not evolved due to authoritarianism within the NGO structure or due to the 
authoritarian nature of the person who is in charge of the NGO. For many of those 
solely in charge of NGOs expressed their dissatisfaction with their work load and 
stated that they assumed responsibility after realizing that the other board members 
were rather passive.  
Therefore, Abdel Rahman argues that non-women‟s NGOs do not have a unified 
stance vis-à-vis the state, some are on good terms with the state while others are not. 
If her observation is applicable to women‟s NGOs, this is likely to have implications 
on whether or not various women‟s NGOs co-operate with the state, the form of such 
co-operation and its outcome. Abdel Rahman‟s study also suggests that non-women‟s 
NGOs are run like a one man show. If women‟s NGOs are run in a similar manner, 
this may have implications on media treatment of the activism of women‟s NGOs. For 
example, the media may end up focusing on the Presidents of the women‟s NGOs and 
their persona instead of highlighting their activism.  
Meanwhile, Islah Jad has examined the effectiveness of women‟s NGOs work. She  
(2004: 6-7) argues that the effectiveness of women‟s NGOs is likely to be severely 
limited by the very nature of NGO's work. Jad contends (2004: 6-7, 11) that 
advocating gender equality through NGOs depoliticizes it and addresses women‟s 
rights on a one by one basis using short term projects. Furthermore, it addresses them 
in isolation from social, economic and political problems which they are entangled 
with. This approach, especially when followed in a country ruled by authoritarianism, 
does not lead to fundamental changes nor does it address the structures that 
disempower women. She also argues (2004: 10) that the fragmentation of women‟s 
activists into various different NGOs makes it difficult for a women‟s movement to 
emerge. This is because these NGOs are on an equal footing and they compete with 
one another on various fronts, including for funds and media attention. All of this 
makes collaboration between NGOs extremely difficult. NGOs rely heavily on the 
media, conferences and lectures to put their message across. These tools are used to 
educate a particular target audience or to advocate a particular issue for a short period 
of time, such as, the duration of a particular project. Jad questions (2004: 8) whether 
such a tactic can have a lasting impact when it comes to women‟s rights. Furthermore, 
while doing so, NGOs do not attempt to mobilize women at the grassroots level to 
  37 
achieve structural change, but merely to improve the skills of a small group of women 
in a particular area or to provide some women with particular services. In other words, 
they do not try to create a mass movement at the grassroots level that advocates 
women‟s rights. This is very problematic because women are unlikely to be 
empowered in the absence of such a movement.  
But Jad does not take state feminism into consideration in her analysis. Nor does she 
investigate whether addressing women‟s rights through political parties is more or less 
effective than addressing them through women‟s NGOs. These are gaps that this study 
will fill.   
 
2.2.3 International Negotiations on Women’s Political Rights: 
This study closely examines the interplay between the United Nations, the Egyptian 
government and Egyptian women‟s NGOs and how this relates to the Egyptian 
media‟s treatment of women‟s political rights. This interaction can be perceived from 
more than one angle. As will be shown, this is closely associated with theories of post 
and neo colonialism. In other words, it is one of the components of the cultural 
structure but it is also intertwined with power structures.  
It could be argued that both the UN‟s promotion of women‟s rights as well as Western 
funding of Egyptian women‟s NGOs are the latest tactic through which powerful 
Western countries interfere into Egyptian affairs. This phenomenon first emerged 
during colonialism. Timothy Mitchell (1998: 166, 168) argues that at the time 
Orientalism was used to perceive Egyptian culture not only as different from British 
culture but as its inferior. He adds that such discourse was infiltrated into the press, 
government reports and many other fields and that it was used as a justification to 
change different aspects of Egyptian culture. More specifically, when it comes to 
women‟s rights, Leila Ahmed (1992: 151-152, 154) argues that the colonizers 
propagated that women‟s status and the manner in which they were treated in the 
countries they occupied was the main reason behind the backwardness of those 
countries. But they did not content themselves with stating this, they engaged in 
measures to change women‟s status in the manner they saw fit. In other words, 
colonizers used women‟s rights to justify undermining and changing the indigenous 
cultures of the countries they occupied. In addition, since many of the injustices 
inflicted on women in the colonized countries at the time were justified by some in 
Islamic discourse, the colonizers also propagated that Islam oppresses women. 
Consequently, Ahmed (1992: 167) argues, these colonial measures and the picture 
they painted of women in the countries they occupied resulted in a long lasting 
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negative perception of women‟s activism even after independence. Today, most 
Egyptian women‟s NGOs rely heavily on funding from governments or organizations 
in Europe and North America. Many people perceive these foreign funded NGOs as 
agents of Western cultural imperialism, whereby they are tools of „the West‟ to 
undermine Egyptian culture and change some of its aspects so that they resemble 
Western culture. The conclusions of many researchers in this area fuel rather than 
suppress such arguments and even provide evidence to support the idea that NGOs‟ 
dependence on foreign funding works to the detriment of their supposed beneficiaries. 
Alan Fowler (1992: 9-10), for example, goes as far as arguing that such NGOs are 
entirely dependent on foreign donors who set their agenda to the extent that the 
projects that they engage in are completely detached from the local communities they 
are supposed to be serving. Similarly, Maha Abdel Rahman (2004: 183-5) has 
conducted research in the Egyptian context and has argued that many NGOs tailor 
their projects so that they appeal to donors, even though the NGO personnel are fully 
aware of the fact that these projects are not very beneficial in the Egyptian context and 
are redundant. At the same time, the UN has produced the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), an 
international bill of rights which grounds women‟s rights in human rights discourse 
that states are then expected to accept. Some people perceive this as an erosion of 
state sovereignty and as imposing an approach to women‟s rights that is alien to 
Egyptian culture. 
However, this process can equally be perceived in a very different manner. Women‟s 
NGOs from various parts of the world have been networking and lobbying the UN to 
address women‟s rights and have also helped shape the UN‟s stance on women. These 
included Egyptian NGOs as well as NGOs from the Arab world at large (Karl 1995: 
122-5, 131, 140; Hijab 1998: 49-51). The Egyptian government was not entirely 
removed from all of this networking and lobbying. For example, preparatory 
conferences were held prior to both the Nairobi 1985 and Beijing 1995 Conferences in 
which all Arab governments as well as numerous women‟s NGOs based in various 
Arab countries were represented. It was largely due to the  efforts of these NGOs that 
the plan of action at the preparatory conferences culminated in grounding women‟s 
rights in secular discourse  rather than Arab-Islamic heritage, which had been the case 
in the plan of action that was produced during the preparation for the Nairobi 
conference ten years earlier. Therefore, according to this line of thought, the UN is not 
imposing anything on Egypt because both Egyptian women‟s NGOs as well as the 
Egyptian government were involved in formulating these conventions. But an 
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important counter argument to this is that secular women‟s NGOs in Egypt and the 
Arab and Muslim world at large were the ones who extensively participated in the 
international networking efforts of women‟s NGOs and in lobbying the UN and 
having an impact on its approach to women. This was largely made possible by 
Western donors funding of these secular women‟s NGOs which enabled them to 
participate in international conferences on women, while denying funding to women 
with an Islamist orientation. In fact, it could be argued that women with an Islamist 
orientation have always been at a disadvantage in this regard (Ezzat 2001:246-7).  
The Egyptian government‟s implementation of CEDAW can also be perceived as the 
consequence of an entirely different process. David Armstrong (1998: 470-1) argues 
that “a state is a unit in [an] international society” and thus, its actions can only be 
fully understood in this international context. Indeed, John Meyer et. al (1997: 144-5) 
observe that different sovereign states with very different cultures contain strikingly 
similar institutions. In addition, these structures tend to change in a similar manner 
during the same period of time. Examples of such structures are ministries, the 
judiciary, the police establishment and educational institutions. It is through sovereign 
states‟ membership of institutions like the United Nations, argue Jacqui True and 
Michael Mintron (2001: 40-1), and the manner in which states become party to 
international conventions and treaties such as the Beijing Platform for Action that 
states are socialized into methods of good governance. At the same time, state 
representatives interact with their counter parts on a regular basis in different venues 
and are exposed to the internal policies of other states. Thus, they are introduced to 
successful methods of addressing internal and domestic issues and tend to imitate one 
another by adopting similar methods and policies in what could be described as a peer 
effect (Armstrong 1998: 473; True and Mintron 2001: 40). Therefore, the Egyptian 
government‟s implementation of UN conventions on women could be perceived as 
the result of a combination of socialization into methods of good governance and a 
peer effect.  
However, it could also be argued that governments all around the world consist of 
very similar institutions because powerful Western countries have imposed their 
system of governance on less powerful ones. It could also be argued that the Egyptian 
government is implementing UN conventions on women in order to obtain 
international legitimacy. But it may also be doing so because members of the 
Egyptian government are very Westernized and believe in the same version of 
women‟s rights that are being promoted by the UN. So the question to be addressed 
by this study is where the balance of power really lies in the interplay between 
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Egyptian women‟s NGOs, Western donors, the Egyptian government and the UN 
regarding women‟s political advancement in Egypt, and how this balance of power is 
reflected in media treatment of such advancement.  
  
2.2.4 Responses to Western Intervention:  
Margot Badran (1995: 21) argues that one of the factors influencing the manner in 
which a particular society views feminism is its history. As previously stated, during 
the British occupation of Egypt, the colonizers proclaimed that they would liberate 
Egyptian women from the oppressive Egyptian culture that they lived under and they 
promoted the adoption of aspects of Western culture (Baron 2005: 218). This had a 
very important and critical impact on the formation of the women‟s movement, how 
women‟s rights were framed and using what discourse. In addition, it had an impact 
on Egyptian society‟s perception of women‟s rights and those who call for them. 
Although this impact emerged during the colonial period, it has lingered on until 
today. Scholars seem to perceive five different types of responses to this phenomenon, 
all of which seem to be present to-date. They can be perceived as manifestations of an 
ideological structure which addresses women‟s status and role in society.  
The first of these, according to Badran (1995: 12, 166), are secular nationalists who 
more often than not were members of the elite and were Western educated. According 
to Ahmed (1992: 156), they deprecated women‟s status and the manner in which they 
were treated in their countries describing it as backward and oppressive. In fact, the 
discourse they adopted to voice these criticisms and the changes they called for were 
largely similar to those of the colonizers. These arguments were initially voiced by 
men, but shortly after that most of the pro-women activists who emerged under 
colonialism, belonged to this group; they were secular nationalists who grounded their 
feminist discourse in secular terms and more often than not called for the adoption of 
European laws and ways of life. These female activists, also co-operated with 
Western feminist organizations (Ahmed 1992: 154, 176-7). Their calls, according to 
Sarah Graham-Brown (2001: 25-26), were only appealing to a small segment of 
women and the gains that they made were only enjoyed by that same small segment. 
Meanwhile, poor and rural women - who represented the majority of women - were 
largely removed from all of this. In the end, the calls of these female activists coupled 
with the support that they received from the colonizers tainted feminism and feminists 
even further in the eyes of many natives of the post-colonial countries, including 
Egypt. This type of discourse is still advocated by some groups in Egypt. Nadje Al Ali 
(2004: 48-9) notes that many of the Egyptian women‟s activists who do so are not 
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brainwashed by the West or follow it blindly. In fact, many of them are critical of the 
foreign policy of countries like the United States in the Middle East and they also 
criticize aspects of Western culture. But at the same time, Hatem argues (1992: 247-
248) that these feminists receive funding from Western organizations and countries 
and some of them also receive disproportionate Western media attention. Thus, these 
feminists are consistently accused of being agents of the West, according to Badran 
(1995: 31), and the negative perception of feminism lingers on. It is perhaps not 
surprising that in this environment, many Egyptian women‟s activists shy away from 
being called feminists, while others are unsure about which equivalent Arabic term to 
use because they all have negative connotations, such as being Westernized and man 
hating, argues Al Ali (2000: 4-5).  
The second type of response is a conservative one that defended the status quo 
regarding women‟s status because it was seen as part and parcel of defending the 
indigenous culture against the colonizers. According to Badran (1995: 13), issues like 
whether the manner in which women were treated was fair or unjust and whether or 
not it was in accordance with Islam were not questioned by this particular group, who 
confined their arguments to declaring that the culturally authentic role of women was 
that of wife and mother. Badran (1995: 13, 116) argues that proponents of such 
discourse more often than not came from members of the middle class, and they 
dismissed feminism as a whole as alien to the indigenous culture and a colonial tool to 
destruct it. Thus, they made no attempt to offer an alternative. This particular stance 
regarding the notion of feminism and feminists is very much alive today. According 
to Minoo Moallem (1999: 320), threats to indigenous cultures and the need to identify 
oneself as opposed to the „other‟ are currently heightened, and therefore many people 
in post-colonial countries are holding onto what they perceive as indigenous and 
rejecting what they perceive as a Western infiltration into their culture. According to 
Farida Shaheed (1995: 80), many customs, practices as well as laws that are 
unfavorable to women are still justified by some in religious discourse and any calls 
to changing them are dismissed as being culturally and religiously inappropriate. 
Furthermore those calling for such changes are dismissed as implementing a Western 
agenda and undermining the indigenous culture. In fact, such accusations discourage 
many women from venturing to call for such changes, particularly because countering 
these accusations is invariably difficult due to the complicated entanglement between 
religion and custom.  
The third response came from a group whom Badran (1995: 4) identifies as Islamic 
modernists. They call for changes in women‟s status and treatment, but ground their 
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arguments in Islamic discourse. They argued that men had abused some of their 
Islamic rights and they propagated the use of ijtihad to reinterpret the Quran and 
Sunna of the Prophet (his tradition) in a manner that addressed contemporary issues 
and suited modern times. At present, this discourse is gaining momentum in post-
colonial countries. Cooke shows (2001: 60, 62) that many women‟s rights activists are 
indeed engaging in ijtihad. Another important tactic that they employ is focusing on 
the lives of the many important and influential women during the Prophet‟s lifetime to 
demonstrate that Islam condones women playing a much larger role in the public 
sphere and enjoying far more rights than presently accorded them. They critique local 
structures and customs as well as global factors and structures which they perceive as 
inflicting injustice upon women. By grounding their criticism of the status-quo as well 
as the solutions that they offer in Islamic discourse, they are far less easily dismissed 
as undermining the indigenous culture and religion or of falling pray to accusations of 
being agents of the West. But, according to Miriam Cooke (2001: 59-60) it is 
important to note that Islamic modernists are not a single, coherent and unified group. 
Nor do they propagate identical ideas.  
Some years after these three responses were voiced, two more responses emerged 
again, during the colonial occupation. One of these is referred to by some scholars as 
Islamic fundamentalism. According to Badran (2002: 162, 165-166, 186), it was 
founded by a woman who broke away from secular women‟s activism to advocate 
women‟s rights within the Sharia. Stemming from the belief that Sharia regulates all 
aspects of life, propagators of this discourse saw no need to and thus did not develop a 
separate and clear cut discourse for women‟s activism. In addition, they tended to 
support equity rather than equality between men and women. According to Cooke 
(2001: 90), they also consistently propagated that women‟s role should be confined to 
the private sphere, but they highly valorize the importance of this role. However, both 
Booth, (2001: 296, 298) and Cooke (2001: 87) argue that Islamic fundamentalists 
advocate that only some exceptional women should be temporarily active in the 
public sphere to advocate the Islamic cause, until it is achieved. Again this discourse 
is alive today, though with some important changes. The first of these is that, 
according to El-Gawhary (2001: 102), its proponents do not contest women‟s right to 
play a role in the public sphere, arguing that women should have the right to chose. At 
the same time, they advocate a blur between the private and public spheres, arguing 
that “private is political … in the Islamic sense of solidarity and the importance of 
social infrastructure and grassroots politics” (El-Gawhary 2001: 101). It is important 
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to note that the relationship between proponents of this discourse and other Islamic 
activists is contentious today as it was in the past.  
The other response which emerged in Egypt was, according to Badran, (2002: 168) a 
socialist approach to women‟s rights. But it was short lived and did not gain many 
followers, probably because the organization established by its propagators was 
forcefully closed only one year after its establishment in an effort to curtail 
communist discourse as a whole. Again such discourse is still propagated today, 
largely by members of a leftist political party. However, it is not popular and its 
supporters and sympathizers are few in number.  
In recent years, long after colonialism came to an end, what may be regarded as 
radical women‟s activism has emerged in Egypt. Its proponents argue that women are 
oppressed due to the complex interplay of a plethora of factors. According to K. 
Badran (2002: 281-83), patriarchy and class are at the core of them, but so is 
capitalism and what they refer to as religion‟s abuse by fundamentalists. In addition, 
according to Hatem (1992: 248), they heavily criticize marriage as an institution. 
Finally, according to Badran, (2002: 187) they focus heavily on what they describe as 
women‟s sexual oppression. In the words of its main propagator, Nawal el Saadawi (i, 
6), the oppression and exploitation of women, as well as the social pressures they are 
subjected to “constitute an integral part of the political, economic and cultural system” 
caused by the historical accumulation of the dominance of the upper class over the 
poor class and men over women. She further argues that women can only be 
emancipated if they are free from political, economic, cultural and sexual exploitation 
(6). This discourse is criticized in various manners. Some criticize it on the grounds 
that the ideas that it advocates are completely alien to the indigenous culture, while 
others, argues Badran (2002: 187), accuse it of furthering a Western agenda. Still 
others go as far as accusing its propagators of apostasy. Although this discourse is 
unpopular, it is propagated by a small number of people and its supporters and 
sympathizers are limited, it receives a considerable amount of media attention both in 
the West as well as in Egypt. In the latter case this is largely due to two factors. The 
first is the controversy it stirs, some of which culminate in court cases and self-
imposed exile by its main propagator. The second is that it provides excellent material 
for sensationalist media, attracting many audiences and thus advertisers. Meanwhile, 
the Western media focus on this discourse and its main propagator due to the 
aforementioned reasons of using Western notions of women‟s activism to evaluate 
women‟s activism in other cultures. Its main propagator, Saadawi , has been granted 
awards and honorary degrees by several Western institutions and is invited to lecture 
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in several arenas. In the end, all of this culminates in tainting women‟s activism in the 
eyes of many Egyptians. 
This study will investigate which of these approaches to women‟s rights are gaining 
momentum in Egypt and which ones are losing out. It will also investigate which ones 
are voiced in various kinds of media outlets and how the current regime‟s state 
feminist approach relates to all of this.  
 
2.3 Implications and Summary: 
2.3.1 Features of Women’s Political Empowerment:  
Needless to say a study about the political empowerment of women must include an 
initial attempt at defining empowerment. Kabeer (1999: 436-7) defines empowerment 
as a process of structural change in society whereby those who are denied the right to 
make their own choices are enabled to do so. She also notes that having a choice in 
particular matters - those that have a profound impact on livelihood - is more 
important than others. Thus, for example, having a choice in whether or not to own 
property and who to marry are more crucial than having a choice in  less crucial 
matters. Kabeer (1999: 440-1) also notes that in order to achieve empowerment, not 
only is it necessary to ensure that such choices are available for women but that the 
women themselves perceive them as attainable. In fact, Egypt is replete with 
examples of women's rights enshrined in both laws and religion which are 
nevertheless off limits for women not only because they are deemed as unacceptable 
by society, but also because many women themselves do not perceive them as some 
of their rights. This brings us to one of the important obstacles to women's 
empowerment. In Egypt, like in many other societies, women are socialized into 
accepting their subordinate status so that they come to perceive it as the way things 
should be. Many of these women even end up playing integral roles in preserving the 
status-quo rather than even attempting to challenge it, by for example, favoring their 
sons over their daughters. But even if a small number of women make individual 
efforts to challenge some of the injustices that they face in their own personal lives, 
this can not lead to the structural change in society that is essential for women's 
empowerment to occur. Such transformations can only be achieved by activism in the 
public sphere by a large number of women whose relationship is characterized by 
solidarity.  
Kabeer (1999: 437-8) also argues that in order for women to be empowered, they 
must have access to resources such as money and employment. But it is important to 
note that in many societies access to such resources is regulated by laws, customs and 
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traditions. If any of these impede women's access to resources, then changing the 
laws, customs and/or traditions in question is an integral pre-requisite to achieve 
empowerment. Indeed, Egyptian women's access to employment is still rather limited. 
Women's right to work is far from universally accepted and, even among those who 
believe in this principle, the idea that some occupations do not suit women's 'nature' is 
prevalent. Kabeer (1999: 438) further argues that another integral component of 
empowerment is women's ability to define and pursue their goals in life despite any 
obstacles or opposition. In many societies conceiving of such goals - let alone 
attaining them - can be restricted by numerous factors. Thus, if an Egyptian woman 
decides that her goal is to work in a certain profession, she may not be able to achieve 
this because that particular profession is deemed as unsuitable for women's 'nature' 
and women are prevented from joining it by laws and/or customs.     
Furthermore, research shows that providing women with basic rights such as 
education and increasing their income does not lead to their empowerment (Ravi et al 
2004: 13, Kiriti et al 2006: 203, Mayoux 2007: 108). Nor does amending or 
introducing laws that grant women some rights lead to empowerment. All of these 
measures can alleviate the living standards of women and provide solutions to 
problems that some women face, but they do not lead to empowerment because 
structures remain unchanged. For in the first case, for example, the educational 
institution that propagates women‟s stereotypical roles remains unchanged, while in 
the second, the legal institution, as well as societal norms and values remain 
unchanged, so that women may very well end up not enjoying the rights the law has 
granted them. A prominent example in Egypt is how the law grants women rights to 
inheritance, but many women do not receive their fair share of inheritance  due to 
prevalent cultural norms among women as well as men. That is precisely why 
women‟s empowerment can not be achieved without transforming numerous aspects 
of culture. Furthermore, it illustrates that empowerment of women can not take place 
if men remain unchanged (Hannan 2007: 14).  
That is why scholars trying to measure empowerment have taken it to mean 
drastically changing all of the structures that undermine and disadvantage women in 
society. Furthermore, women‟s empowerment can only take place in a holistic manner 
that transforms several structures including power structures and cultural structures. 
Thus, formal political structures must be drastically transformed. For all of these 
structures have been formed and shaped by men over many long years so that male 
interests have become institutionalized within them (Parpart 2007: 52). The formal 
political institutions that could be changed are the executive and legislative branches 
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of government, political parties, the electoral system and structures that have to do 
with voters. In Egypt, other institutions play a role in the electoral process, namely the 
police establishment and the judiciary. Therefore, the structures of these two 
institutions may also need to be transformed. It is important to note that if 
governments introduce measures that lead to an increase in the number of female 
members of the existing political institutions (Sharma 2004: 123) this does not lead to 
the empowerment of women because such a tactic simply allows women to join 
structures that have been designed, set up and are run by men and does not change the 
nature of these structures. In addition, these female members of parliament may focus 
their efforts on furthering their party‟s agenda and not on promoting women‟s rights 
(Graham-Brown 2001: 27). Furthermore, these women are unlikely to have any 
decision making power because the Egyptian parliament is nothing but a rubber stamp 
and Egyptian ministers are nothing but subservient bureaucrats (Kassem 2004, p. 
168). As for the cultural structures that need to be changed, these are the ones that 
confine women‟s activity to the private sphere (Rao and Kellenher 2005: 62) 
disadvantage women within that sphere and cripple women‟s activity in the public 
sphere. Change here would be interlinked with changes in legal and economic 
structures. Finally, research shows that a top-down approach to women‟s rights can 
not lead to women‟s empowerment. Marilee Karl (1995: 14) states that empowerment 
is not something that can be granted to people, but change must emanate from within 
society itself and at the grassroots level. A good example is granting women the right 
to vote (Graham-Brown 2001: 27), while in practice their votes are abused by political 
contestants to achieve their own interests. For some political parties consistently buy 
the votes of women who happen to be registered voters.
1
  
The link between media and women‟s empowerment must also be clarified. One of 
the reasons why the two are linked is an argument put forward by Naomi Sakr. She 
suggests (2004a: 4) that the media is one of the components of the apparatus through 
which gender roles and attributes are defined in any given society. Since women's 
empowerment includes transforming women's status in society, it would be useful if 
the media played an enabling role in this regard. Thus, this study will investigate 
whether or not the Egyptian media plays such a role. The second reason is the idea 
that media treatment of women reflects and reinforces societal perception of women, 
as argued by Sakr (2004a: 1). Thus, analyzing media treatment of women and what 
media audiences make of them can provide an indication of the extent to which 
                                                 
1
 But it should be noted that this is phenomenon is not exclusive to women, the votes of impoverished 
men are consistently bought as well. 
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women are empowered in any given society, as well as prospects for and obstacles to 
their empowerment. That is why this study includes a section on drama serials' 
treatment of women's political participation and female audience's reception of it. But 
it is important to note that in an authoritarian context like Egypt, where the drama 
serials industry is largely controlled by the government, as will be argued in Chapter 
2, it is possible that drama serials reflect governmental perceptions of women and not 
societal ones. Whether or not this is the case will be explored in Chapter 7. The third 
reason is that one of the obstacles to women‟s empowerment is related to the notion 
that there is a clear-cut distinction between the private and public spheres. In such an 
environment, discussing the difficulties that women face or their rights within the so-
called private sphere in the public one tends to be unacceptable. Sakr argues (2004b 
:158) that this in itself is an obstacle to women‟s empowerment. She goes on to argue 
that in order for empowerment to take place, these problems must be openly 
discussed, which is a step towards challenging the clear-cut separation between the 
private and public spheres. The media could be an appropriate arena for such 
discussions to take place. But this is subject to whether or not such discussions are 
acceptable in the first place, as well as whether or not the manner in which the media 
operates allows for serious and meaningful discussions in general and on women in 
particular to take place. Examples of some other obstacles to the media playing this 
role in women's empowerment are the media being sensationalist and the tendency by 
both media producers and audiences  to put more emphasis on women's looks than 
their competence and knowledge (2007: 103, 107). Therefore, one of the issues 
examined by this study is whether or not the Egyptian media allows for meaningful 
discussions about women‟s rights to take place. If that is not the case, the study will 
determine the reasons behind this.  
  
2.3.2 Questions for Research 
Therefore, this study will investigate whether or not female politicians or advocates of 
women‟s political rights voice their opinions through various media outlets. It will 
also examine whether or not the proliferation of privately owned media has provided 
them with more media access. In addition, it will analyze the interplay and interaction 
between the state feminist organ NCW, women‟s NGOs, women‟s committees within 
political parties, the international framework and privately owned media in Egypt. It 
will also examine the  ramifications of western intervention in and sponsorship of 
women‟s political rights on Egyptian society‟s perception of women‟s political rights.   
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In addition, the study will investigate how middle class Egyptian women perceive 
both women‟s political participation and Egyptian drama serials treatment of this 
issue. Also, given the different perceptions of women‟s role by different groups in 
Egyptian society, this study will examine which of these are voiced in various 
different media outlets. It will also address whether or not a feminist movement exists 
in Egypt, and if not, the reasons behind this as well as the ramifications of its absence. 
Finally, the study will examine whether or not all of the efforts and approaches by the 
different players are actually leading to the political empowerment of Egyptian 
women. 
 
2.3.2.1 Research Questions: 
Main Research Question:  
How does the treatment of women's political empowerment in the Egyptian media 




What are the connections between Egyptian media‟s treatment of women‟s political 
empowerment and: 
- the various governmental and non-governmental women‟s organizations that are to   
  be found in Egypt? 
- state corporatization of women‟s rights activists and organizations? 
- women‟s committees in political parties?  
- female Egyptian audiences reception of drama serials which address women‟  
   political participation?    
- how language is used to justify and challenge the more politically powerful ideology  
  about women‟s status in Egypt? 
 
 




The methodology used in this study consists of a combination of four different research 
methods; semi-structured interviews and archival research, which are grouped together 
under process tracing, as well as group interviews and critical discourse analysis. This 
chapter will explain why these methods were chosen, how they were used and for what 
purpose. It will also explain how I slightly adapted some of the research methods to suit 
the Egyptian context and it will outline some dilemmas that I faced while conducting 
fieldwork. 
 
3.1 Process Tracing: 
One of the aims of this study is to dissect the process through which changes regarding 
Egyptian women, such as amending a law pertaining  to women, come about and 
identifying the roles played by different organizations and individuals in this process. The 
state seems to be an integral player in this regard and some other institutions also seem to 
be involved in the process. They are all examined in this study. However, I do not regard 
the state or any of the other institutions as monolithic and homogenous entities. I perceive 
each entity as consisting of various structures with multiple agents within it, which allows 
for numerous struggles to occur (Randall 2002: 123). By interviewing members of these 
organizations, I will obtain an understanding of the preferences and beliefs of those 
agents which will help me in understanding the practices of the institutional structures 
they are a part of. While approaching and examining these agents, I took into 
consideration that they grew up in societal structures such as culture, traditions and 
religious beliefs, which have had an impact on them. However, the agents who grow up 
in the same societal structures may very well have responded to different structures 
differently, some may have even rejected and refused to abide by some structures, such as 
some traditions. Indeed if that had not been the case, many of these women would not 
have become activists who seem to seek to change some of these structures (Bevir and 
Rhodes 2002: 124, 140). 
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Furthermore, the structures these agents are now members of as well as other societal 
structures both enable and constrain agents. For the context in which the agents act and 
the boundaries which their actions can not surpass and are determined by various 
structures. In other words, these structures are limiting in some regards. But at the same 
time, they also enable agents to act in a particular manner. In fact, in many instances, 
while tracking policies I will intentionally or unintentionally be trying to determine 
whether and which agents or structures play a greater role in policy making. In addition, 
the actions of agents may be motivated by a variety of issues and they may have a variety 
of consequences. Some agents may very well be acting in a particular manner, such as 
introducing particular changes to laws pertaining to women, in order to achieve their own 
interests. Through their actions, agents can change structures in the manner they 
intended, but their actions may also yield unintentional results (McAnnulla 2002: ). That 
is why the stories told by the different agents can help explain how policies come about. 
They could reveal the intentions of some of the players and they may also shed light on 
how the issue was framed in order to appeal to certain segments of society in order to 
obtain their support because it was deemed as crucial  (Piven 2004: 85). 
I chose to engage in elite interviews because it is the appropriate method to use when the 
interviewees are experts on the topic (Leech 2002: 63). Most of my interviewees have 
been actively engaged in the public sphere in the form of political party membership 
and/or NGO activism for a very long time. They have also been advocating women‟s 
rights for a very long time. In addition, interviewing such elites is crucial because they 
are likely to posses information that is not available elsewhere. For example, they can 
provide me with information about discussions and negotiations that took place amongst 
them in order to arrive at a particular decision. Such information is extremely valuable in 
determining how decisions are made and it is highly unlikely that they would be 
documented in archives, for example (Tansey 2002: 766-7). The interviewes were semi-
structured because as Dexter argues, the interviewees were influential, prominent and/or 
well informed and so they are the ones who should explain the situation to me (cited in 
Leech 2002: 63). I more often than not began my interviews by asking the interviewee to 
tell me about their role in the organization that they represented. This proved to be an 
effective tactic. Partly because starting off by asking the easy questions, as Leech (2002: 
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665) argues establishes rapport and breaks the ice but also because it led them to talk 
about issues like their background, their motivations for joining the organization and as 
they talked about their particular role in the organization they either touched upon issues 
that I was going to ask about so that my next question ran very smoothly or they brought 
up issues that I had not come across while preparing for the interview but that were very 
relevant and interesting nonetheless. I was very careful about sensitive questions saving 
them to the middle or the end of an interview and phrasing them in a non-threatening 
manner and using words that are objective rather than judgmental (Leech 2002: 63, 665, 
666). The most sensitive question I had for NGOs was about their receipt of foreign 
funding. I phrased the question thus “You co-operate with a number of organizations 
[names of 1 or 2] in a variety of manners including financially. Tell me more about it.” 
That proved to be inoffensive and the interviewees comfortably elaborated on the issue. 
In fact, they more often than not automatically proceeded to address the skepticism, 
surrounding foreign funding without my having to directly ask for it. This is because I 
once posed that question in a direct manner rather than the previously described non-
threatening manner and the interviewee was very defensive in her reply. However, I have 
no reason to believe that this adversely affected her answers to the subsequent questions.  
“Excellent interviewers are excellent conversationalists. They make interviews seem like 
a good talk among old friends,” Berry (2002: 679) argues. In the Egyptian context, it is 
unlikely that my interviewees regarded me as a friend because it is not customary to 
regard someone who is some 20 to 30 years younger than them as their friend, which was 
the case. In fact, people who are much older are likely to think of themselves as more 
senior and knowledgeable. However, Egyptians tend to think very highly of education in 
general and PhDs in particular. Pursuing a PhD in the capital of a developed country like 
London is even more widely respected. This is likely to have made me - the interviewee - 
an elite in my own right in the sense that I am receiving highly reputed education and 
pursuing a widely respected task. Berry (2002: 679) goes on to say that making an 
interview seem like a conversation involves not having all of the questions written out in 
a piece of paper in front of you. I believe my interviews were indeed very conversational 
but I did have all of my questions written down infront of me as backup. I tended to have 
a look at the paper towards the end of interview to make sure I had not forgotten to ask 
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any questions. I would also from time to time glance at it quickly while the interviewee 
was talking about something that I had already figured out would not require a follow up 
question. I had all of my questions written down in a particular order and knowing my 
questions well proved to be very useful. I more often than not addressed the questions in 
the form of follow up questions to issues they had briefly touched upon while they were 
answering a previous question. This made the interviews run smoothly and it was also as 
if the interviewees were the ones setting the agenda. Also, tape recording interviews 
rather than taking notes makes interviews more conversationalist and  minimizes the loss 
of information (Berry 2002: 674). Indeed, I recorded all of the interviews and none of my 
interviewees objected to this.  
Most of my interviewees were willing to answer my questions in great detail. They also 
tended to - after replying to my question - start talking about issues related to it. This 
often meant that they brought up unexpected and relevant issues. In such cases, the 
reading that I had engaged in enabled me to quickly come up with follow up questions. 
Sometimes, however, they wandered off topic. In such cases, my reaction was almost 
identical to that described by Leech (2002: 668); I remained silent until they finished and 
then asked them my next question which brought them back on track.  
All of the interviewees seemed at ease about the whole process. Many of them mentioned 
that they had been interviewed by other researchers conducting research about women‟s 
rights. In fact, Rivera et al (2002: 685) argue that during the course of their research, they 
got the impression that the fact that the research they conducted was in collaboration with 
a well established institution seemed to assure respondents that it was purely for 
academic purposes. The fact that I was pursuing my PhD in London boded well with all 
of my interviewees. Their facial expressions conveyed respect and admiration and they 
appeared to take me very seriously. In one of my interviews I was faced with a dilemma 
where one interviewee seemed to exaggerate her role. Berry (2002: 681) says that in such 
cases one should consider what was left out of the interview and possibly even the 
credibility of some of the information provided by the interviewee. One of the solutions 
he suggests for this problem is reading about the interviewee and the organization they 
represent. In my case, my archival research proved beneficial in addressing this particular 
dilemma.  
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My approach to scheduling the elite interviews was rather different than the approach of 
researchers in other parts of the world. Although Goldestin (2002: 671) explains in great 
detail the importance of first approaching interviewees by sending them letters, such a 
tool is generally useless in the Egyptian context. Similarly, Rivera et al (2002: 685) argue 
that sending an introductory letter to interviewees and then calling them to schedule an 
appointment is unproductive in developing countries. They also pointed out that 
directories listing the phone numbers of interviewees simply do not exist. In the Egyptian 
context, secretaries of important people sift through their post and are very likely to 
disregard such a letter all together. Nor is it the norm to approach interviewees in such a 
manner. Although Goldestin (2002: 671) goes on to describe how using connections may 
lead to access to valuable interviewees, in the Egyptian context using connections is the 
only manner through which a researcher can obtain access to any and all interviewees. 
The person putting the researcher through to the interviewee should preferably be more 
powerful then or hold a post that more prestigious than that held by the interviewees. 
Therefore, that was the main tactic I used to obtain access to most of my interviewees. 
One of my interviewees even went as far as asking me before the interview began to 
remind her of the person who had put me in touch with her. At the very end of the 
interview, she actually said to me that she only went out of her way to allow me to 
interview her for the sake of so and so - the person who had put me in touch with her – 
because she likes her. However, my research provides ample evidence to allow me to 
safely conclude that the person who put me through to her works in more or less the same 
field as hers and holds a more senior position. Goldestin (2002: 671) also advises 
interviewers not to be shy about asking some of those they have interviewed, especially if 
they have established rapport with them, to put them through to other people on their 
interview list. I resorted to this tactic on many occasions, particularly when I was finding 
it difficult to get through to particular interviewees. The interviewee would then give me 
the mobile phone number of the person I requested. When I called them up in many cases 
they did not pick up so I would send them a text message explaining that I am a PhD 
student conducting research about empowering women, that I wanted to interview them 
for the purpose of my PhD and I would always state the name of the person who provided 
me with their phone number at the very beginning of the message. After that they would 
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more often than not call me back and in some cases I would redial the number an hour or 
so later and they would pick up.  
Woliver (2002: 678) argues that it is important to ask interviewees whether or not you 
can contact them again if you have more questions, since from her experience, she often 
developed questions based on important issues raised by other interviewees which she 
had not been aware of when she started her fieldwork. In my experience, I initially got in 
touch with many of my interviewees at a very early stage in my research while I 
conducted some pilot research. These pilot interviews revolved around their motivations 
for engaging in politics and their experience thereafter. Although in most cases the data I 
obtained through these interviews was not very useful in terms of findings, it helped me 
to focus my study, decide on my research questions, and it provided me with useful 
insight into the political situation in Egypt which proved to be beneficial while I engaged 
in theoretical reading. More importantly, it was very useful in getting to know many of 
my interviewees, and this helped me in formulating my questions for my future 
interviews with them.  
 
3.1.1 Sampling for Elite Interviews: 
Tansey (2002: 765) argues that using a probability sample when conducting process 
tracing is actually harmful because the aim of the study is not to utilize a representative 
sample in order to arrive at findings that can be generalized, but to ensure that the sample 
includes the key players in the process the researcher is trying to identify. If a probability 
sample is used, some of the key players may very well be excluded from the sample. 
Indeed, my sample is by and large a purposive one, in which I identified the key actors in 
decisions pertaining to women and then interviewed them. In some cases, I also decided 
to interview particular people when their names were brought up in an interview in a 
context that was relevant to my study. This comes as no surprise because Rivera et. al 
(2002: 683) argue that non-probability samples tend to rely more on snowballing using 
personal contacts and referrals. Thus, my sample consists of female members of four 
political parties, three different women‟s NGOs, members of the National Council for 
Women (NCW) and media personnel who work in Egyptian newspapers and talk shows.   
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3.1.2 Archival Research: 
I used archival research to obtain information about the work of the political parties, 
NGOs and NCW that I examined in my study. This proved to be very challenging. For as 
Robert Fisk (2008) and Tansey (2002: 767) note, in the Arab world - including Egypt - 
the public are denied access to government archives forever. I have been unable to obtain 
access to the archive of the ruling NDP. I was told by one of the female members of the 
party that I should get through to Ahmed Ezz
4
 in order to obtain access to the party‟s library, which was simply impossible. The 
situation is no different when it comes to other non-governmental institutions and in 
some cases archives do not even exist. I was only allowed access to some of the 
publications of the Wafd and Tagammu Parties after having met and interviewed one of 
their female members - mostly a high ranking one. They provided me with some 
publications themselves and then personally requested from employees in the party to 
provide me with other publications. Similarly, after having met the then President of the 
Democratic Front Party, he provided me with the party program and the female member 
of the party that I interviewed provided me with documents pertaining to a committee 
that she heads. In all three cases a proper library and/or archive containing all of the 
party‟s documents did not seem to exist.  
On the other hand, out of the three NGOs examined in my study, I only faced problems in 
obtaining access to the library of one of them. In the case of both New Woman 
Foundation and the Association for the Development and Enhancement of Women, I was 
admitted to their libraries without any difficulty whatsoever and was allowed to freely go 
through their contents. I was also allowed to photocopy as much of their holdings as I 
pleased. They also willingly gave me some of their publications, provided that spare 
copies were available. In cases where there they had run out of spare copies, I was 
allowed to photocopy their publications. However, the Egyptian Center for Women‟s 
Rights was rather different. They had several publications - mostly booklets - on display 
and they provided me with copies of some of them and I photocopied others because they 
had run out of spare copies, but I was not allowed into their library. I also had to register 
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 The best friend of the Egyptian President‟s son, one of the most senior ranking members of the ruling 
party and a business tycoon.  
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by writing my name, contact information and the reason behind my visit to the NGO in a 
booklet. Similarly, prior to being admitted to NCW‟s library, I had to fill in my name, 
reason behind my visit to the library, the name of my school, the topic of my PhD and the 
keywords of the publications I would search for prior to being admitted to the library. I 
was allowed to have a look at all of the library‟s contents but was only allowed to 
photocopy a maximum of 10% of any publication. The library was very extensive and 
contained a very large number of very useful publications about NCW. Some of the 
NCW members I met also provided me with some of their publications, many of which 
were not available in the library.  
I went through all of my archival material before my interviews. This helped in 
formulating my questions. It also helped me to identify the gaps in the archival material, 
so that I did not end up wasting precious interviewing time to ask questions that were 
already answered in their publications (Leech 2002: 666). 
 
3.2 Interpretive Communities: 
The audience section of this study uses group interviews with female members of the 
audience of Egyptian drama serials. I chose to interview the women in groups rather than 
on an individual basis because, as Ruddock notes, in ethnographic audience research 
audiences are selected as groups and not as individuals because communication is a 
collective process and identities are defined through affiliations to social groups. In 
addition, while selecting my sampling procedures, I took into consideration that in order 
to come as close as possible to emulating real life situations, these groups should be 
selected so that one research subject is identified and is asked to invite his/her friends and 
family to their households. Such groups are referred to as „interpretive communities‟ 
because their members naturally gather together to consume media and converse about it 
(Ruddock 2001, p.131-133, 136-137). Indeed, van Zoonen cites several studies whose 
results revealed various interesting issues related to women and drama serial viewing that 
back up and further justify the use of such interpretative communities. Research among 
working women revealed that drama serials were a subject of daily conversation. Many 
women were introduced to drama serials by their friends or mothers, who also helped 
them not to lose track of the soaps‟ complicated narratives. Another finding was that 
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women use drama serials to talk about their own lives, and it can sometimes even act as a 
pretext for discussing sensitive personal issues which might otherwise have not been 
discussed (Zoonen 2004, p. 118-119). 
I also took into consideration that researchers have come to utilize more creative 
approaches to audience research. For example, Gauntlett argues that focus groups and 
interviews rely on using language and require participants to express their ideas and 
views on the spot using words, which is something that not everyone is good at. Some 
people are more comfortable about expressing themselves using other means, such as 
blogging, painting, writing, poetry, photography, clothing, designing webpages and 
arranging mementoes and artifacts on a desk or wall. That is why in his study he asked 
participants to build metaphors of their identities using Lego Serious Play. This allowed 
the participants to take their time, think and reflect while building something using their 
own hands and to think about factors they regard as important before being asked to talk 
about them (Gauntlett 2007 p. 2-3, 128-130, 182-183). I also took into consideration that 
it is preferable to begin by allowing participants to express what ever it is they would like 
to convey about the text that was screened prior to asking them questions that relate to the 
study‟s research questions. By doing so, the researcher tests whether or not the issue 
under study was relevant to the audiences‟ reading of the text (Ruddock 2001, p.134-
135). 
 
3.2.1 Adapting the Methodological Approach to the Egyptian Context:  
At the same time, I also took some cultural issues into consideration while designing my 
methodology, so that I ended up adapting some of the aforementioned research methods 
to the Egyptian context. My second supervisor suggested that I conduct focus groups 
consisting of people belonging to the same age group and occupations. While considering 
how to go about selecting my participants and forming the groups, I took into 
consideration that people might not feel very comfortable about expressing their views in 
front of strangers. Had I insisted on complying with the typical standard definition of 
focus groups, i.e. using groups of eight people in addition to ensuring that all of them 
belong to a particular age group and engage in the same occupation, I believe that I 
would not have ended up with interpretive communities. Perhaps the following example 
57 
                                                                                                                                        
illustrates my point. A 23 year-old woman who tends to discuss drama serials with three 
of her co-workers one of whom happens to be in her late 20s, another in her early 30s and 
the last one is in her mid 20s. This would constitute a typical interpretive community in 
the Egyptian context, whose members would to a great extent feel comfortable 
expressing their views in front of one another (since they already do so), but it obviously 
does not fit into the standard definition of a focus group, nor do its members belong to the 
same age group. However, I believe that they would yield more valid results. For the 23 
year-old woman may very well discuss drama serials with three of her former classmates 
who are likely to belong to her age group, but if she brings them together along with her 
co-workers, the two groups of women are unlikely to have met before and so it would be 
an awkward gathering of people who are unfamiliar with each other and far from an 
interpretive community. Consequently, I decided that the interpretive communities used 
in my study would be constructed by asking any given woman to gather the women she 
discusses drama serials with, regardless of their age groups, occupations and how many 
people they might be. 
Secondly, in order to adopt a creative approach, my second supervisor suggested that I 
ask each interpretive community to come up with three brief one sentence plots for three 
different drama serials, each consisting of four female and two male characters. He also 
asked me to provide them with props and ask them to use them to describe what the 
characters would look like and how they would dress. I believed that doing so would be 
rather problematic in Egypt due to several reasons. So again, I slightly adapted this in a 
manner that fits with Egyptian society. Firstly, Egyptians do not study drama at school 
and are not used to coming up with plots, stories and narratives and so asking them to 
come up with plots for drama serials is an unconventional task. In fact, I had a casual 
conversation with a female family member of mine, she seemed dumbfounded at asking 
Egyptians to come up with drama serial plots and said “if somebody asked me to do so, I 
would simply state I can not come up with one, I am not a novelist or a screenwriter.” 
However, when I told her about the approach that I came up with, she was quite excited 
about it and clearly stated that she would be capable of coming up with something to that 
effect. Secondly, Egyptians are very critical about drama serial narratives and the 
characters that they feature and they constantly critique them amongst themselves. Also, 
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Egyptians are not accustomed to being asked to provide short and concise answers. So 
asking them to state their opinion in one or two sentences is simply unrealistic. In fact, 
researchers conducting focus groups with women in the UAE concluded that this research 
technique “fit[s] well in the oral tradition of Arab society” (Wislow 2002: 569). 
Therefore, I believed that the participants would be very comfortable expressing 
themselves using spoken words and there was no need to use props,  which are very 
unconventional and participants would have perceived them as both weird and funny. 
The approach that I came up with is to ask the group members to describe a female 
character that they would like to see featured in a drama serial. Depending on the input 
that they provide me with I would then ask them about other aspects of the character‟s 
life. So for example, if they told me about a 40 year old housewife who is a wonderful 
mother, I would then inquire about her relationship to her husband and about her 
husband‟s character. Then I could inquire about her siblings, neighbors, friends and her 
career. I would of course vary the type and order of questions depending on their input, 
but I would ensure that the account would cover all of the aforementioned aspects of her 
life. In the end I would obtain a drama serial plot consisting of several male and female 
characters, but I would do so in a manner that suits rather than alienates Egyptians.    
After that I screened a clip from a drama serial which directly addresses women‟s 
participation in formal politics. The clip is described Chapter 7. 
I initially relied on snowballing to recruit participants. I asked some of my friends/family 
members/acquaintances to gather people they discussed drama serials with on any given 
day and allow me to join them. By doing so I obtained around 20 participants. But I 
decided that by relying on that method alone, it would be almost impossible to obtain a 
total of 80 participants. Therefore, I decided to go to a club and walk up to groups of 
women sitting together, introduce myself and my research and ask them if they were 
willing to be interviewed. The club I chose is a private one in which various sports and 
recreational facilities are available along with restaurants and an area for children to play. 
Members are largely middle class, and it is a gathering place for families and friends. It is 
not gender segregated, but it is customary for groups of female friends to sit together and 
chat. I am a member of that club and so I had prior access to it. This tactic proved to be 
very effective and I ended up interviewing a sufficient number of women that were 
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actually more diverse in terms of age groups and occupations than those I recruited using 
snowballing. It is noteworthy that not a single group of women turned me down and only 
one group - consisting of two women - refused to be voice recorded. Similarly, 
researchers conducting focus groups with women in the UAE were surprised that the 
participants did not object to tape recording (Wislow 2002: 569). 
I also sometimes ended up interviewing just two people or even just one person. For 
example, I sometimes went up to three people sitting together at the club to find that only 
two of them watched drama serials. At other times, it was only one of them who did so 
and she would have some very interesting things to say. Sometimes all three of them said 
that they watch drama serials but when I started interviewing them one of them would not 
utter a single word and so I ended up interviewing just two people. However, I do not 
think this is very problematic because I noticed that in most cases when I interviewed a 
group of 3, 4 or 5 people, we would go around in a circle every time I asked a question 
and each of them would say something. In other words, it was not really a discussion and 
they did not seem interested in commenting on what the other group members had to say. 
Although I must admit that this was not always the case, but since it took place quite 
frequently I decided that interviewing one or two people was alright because interviewing 
more people at the same point in time did not lead to discussions often enough.  
Also, some participants were unable to come up with characters of their own. In order to 
deal with this without doing away with the creative approach, I asked them to describe 
female characters that they had seen in drama serials and liked and explain what they 
liked about them, as well as describing characters that they had disliked and explaining 
what they disliked them. This was almost always fruitful. In some cases, the result was a 
combination of characters that they came up with and characters that they had seen in 
drama serials. However, in a few cases it was almost impossible to get anything out of the 
participants and their responses were not very useful. After two or three attempts I 
decided to cut that part of the interview short and go on to screening the clip, because I 
felt that insisting on that part of the interview would be unfruitful and might alienate the 
interviewees. By doing so, I obtained their views on women‟s political participation, 
although I hardly obtained any information regarding the type of female characters they 
would like to see in drama serials.    
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In some cases group interviews involved a fair amount of discussion, sometimes even 
heated debate. But most of the time, it was merely going around in a circle whereby each 
participant would express her opinion regarding the issue at stake. In some cases this 
might have been caused by the other group members engaging in side talks and therefore 
not paying sufficient attention to what other people had to say and so they ended up not 
commenting on it. But I do not think that this was the case, because they tended to do so 
some ten minutes or so after the group interview had started. I was unfortunately unable 
to effectively ask them to refrain from side talks. In fact, previous researchers who 
conducted focus groups with women in the UAE faced a similar dilemma. Sometimes 
some of the participants engaged in side talks while others were contributing to the actual 
discussion. One of their recommendations was that smaller groups were more effective, 
partly because a smaller number of participants decreased the potential for side talks 
(Wislow 2002: 569, 573). It is also important to note that, this going around in a circle 
also occurred in many other group interviews in which the participants did not engage in 
side talks and in many cases paid attention to what the other participants had to say. In 
some cases I tried to promote and encourage discussion, but I more often that not got 
brief replies like “yes, I agree with her.” At other times I have to admit that I did not exert 
enough effort to promote discussion, but given the fact that it did not yield much results 
when I tried to do so, there is little reason to believe that it would have led to a 
magnificent discussion. A reason behind this lack of discussion could be that in the 
Egyptian educational system, class discussion is completely unheard of. In both schools 
and universities, it is the teacher/professor who lectures while students listen. From time 
to time, he/she could ask a question and one or two students would answer it but a 
discussion does not take place.  
 
3.2.2 Dilemmas:  
While I conducted my fieldwork, I encountered some unexpected dilemmas and did my 
best to address them. Firstly, trying to get people to describe their interpretive community  
and ask them to gather them at any given date or time and allow me to join them, proved 
to be too problematic. Very few people were capable of defining their interpretive 
community, nor was gathering people feasible because some of the interpretive 
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community members were unable to show up due to various reasons. The groups that I 
interviewed consisted of women who are familiar with one another and who do discuss 
drama serials amongst them but some of them may very well discuss drama serials with 
other women as well.  
Sometimes someone who did not participate in the discussion was around while the 
interview took place. For example, I sometimes went up to three women sitting together 
at the club to interview them and only two of them turned out to be drama serials viewers. 
So I ended up interviewing only those two, but the third person was sitting there and 
watching throughout the interview. In such cases the third person was always a 
friend/family member of the participants, but whether or not her presence had an impact 
on the participants‟ responses is something that I am unable to determine. At other times, 
when I asked people to help me out in recruiting participants and that particular person 
did not participate in the discussion, she was nevertheless present while the group 
interview took place. For example, my cousin introduced me to some of the teaching 
assistants in the university she studies in as an undergraduate and I interviewed them, but 
my cousin was around during the interview. In another occasion, one of my friends was 
around while I interviewed her younger sister and friend. I should note that the friend in 
question visits them at home frequently and is acquainted with my friend‟s family. In 
both cases, it would have been very rude of me to ask my cousin or friend to leave as I 
conducted the interview and so I did not venture doing so. Again, I am unable to 
determine the impact of their presence on the interviewees‟ responses, if any. Similarly, 
researchers conducting focus groups with women in the UAE faced a similar dilemma. 
Three staff members who were not going to participate in the study were present when 
the focus group was about to start and asking them to leave would have been rude, and so 
they ended up not doing so (Wislow 2002: 569). 
Sometimes participants did not pay enough attention to the clip that I screened. I could 
tell from their facial expressions that they were bored or uninterested and tended to end 
up watching passers by, for example, rather than watching the clip. In all such cases, I 
would ask the participants whether they wanted me to go over the events that took place 
in the clip before engaging in a discussion about it. Sometimes they asked me to do so 
and so I would briefly go over it, describing what took place in a nut shell and did my 
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best to refrain from adding or omitting events. At other times they would say that the clip 
was basically about women‟s participation in politics, and would proceed to express their 
views on that particular issue. In all such cases, the subsequent discussion tended to 
reveal that those participants were against women‟s political participation. Therefore, I 
believe that this was the reason why they were not interested in the clip.  
Sometimes people started talking as they watched the clip. In most cases they would be 
trying to recall the name of the drama serial, the different characters that it featured, when 
it was aired or when they happened to have watched it, how the events would unfold etc. 
In such cases I would step in and mention the name of the drama serial or try to cut their 
conversation short by politely asking them to pay attention to the clip now and postpone 
commenting on it till after it was finished. Sometimes that worked, but again sometimes 
it did not.  
Sometimes people were overly concerned about the fact that they had not watched the 
drama serial and insisted on stating that, as I played the clip, in the belief that they would 
thus be unable to answer my subsequent questions. I would then have to clarify that it 
was perfectly alright, that I would only ask questions related to that particular clip and 
ask them to pay attention to it. But by then they would have obviously missed part of the 
clip and distracted the other participants, although often more than one of the participants 
would be expressing such views. 
Sometimes the participants would be distracted by other issues. This was particularly the 
case when I interviewed women who had young children at the club. Sometimes their 
children would come up to them in the middle of the discussion or clip to ask their 
mothers for money, food, drink, taking them to the toilet etc. Sometimes this would take 
place briefly during the clip so that one of the participants would miss part of it. At other 
times this would take place during the actual interview, and is another reason why 
interviews tended to go around in circles rather than a discussion, more so when the 
mother in question went off to take the child to the toilet and returned a few minutes later. 
In such cases I would continue the interview with the other participant(s) and then upon 
her return address the same questions to her. So this was a combination of a group 
interview and a one-on-one interview. In fact, researchers who conducted focus groups 
with women in the UAE faced a similar problem. When the participants in the focus 
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group were accompanied by their children, preventing them from misbehaving was 
impossible and the children ran in and out of the room (Wislow 2002: 570). 
A factor that could help explain many of these dilemmas is unfamiliarity with research. It 
simply does not take place very often in Egypt and so people are not familiar with a 
researchers‟ expectations such as getting their undivided attention.    
 
3.3 Critical Discourse Analysis: 
The final part of my study consists of an analysis of Egyptian newspapers and talk 
shows‟ treatment of women and politics. The talk shows sample consists of three 
Egyptian talk shows. The first is Al Beit Beitak (Make Yourself at Home) which is aired 
on the government owned Egyptian Satellite Channel as well as the government owned 
terrestrial Channel Two. The second is Al Ashera Masan (10 PM) which is aired on the 
satellite channel Dream TV which is owned by an Egyptian businessman called Ahmed 
Bahgat. The final talk show is 90 Dekika (90 Minutes) and it is aired on Al Mehwar 
satellite channel which is owned by the Egyptian businessman Hassan Rateb. All of the 
programs are aired daily from Saturday to Wednesday in the evening. The newspapers 
sample consists of two newspapers, the government owned Al Ahram (The Pyramids) and 
the privately owned Al Masry Al Youm (The Egyptian Today). The relevant stories and 
opinion columns from these two newspapers were accessed from their respective 
websites. Since the state plays an important role in women‟s rights, examining 
government owned media treatment  of women‟s rights is necessary. That is why Al Beti 
Betak was examined, because it is the only talk show aired on government owned 
channels. Al Ahram was included because it is widely regarded as the most prestigious 
and formal government owned newspaper. Meanwhile, Al Ashera Masan and 90 Dekika 
are the oldest and most well established talk shows aired on privately owned channels. 
No accurate figures are available regarding the viewership of talk shows, but it is likely 
that these two are more widely viewed than others. Finally, Al Masry Al Youm was 
chosen because it is the most successful privately owned newspaper and it is estimated 
that it has the highest circulation among privately owned newspapers. The segments of 
talk show episodes as well as the newspapers stories and columns which were analyzed 
were those which addressed two specific changes pertaining to women and politics, 
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namely the adoption of a parliamentary quota for women and how the newly appointed 
provincial governors
5
 did not include a single woman. They were analyzed using critical 
discourse analysis.  
The primary aim of this section of my study is to investigate Egyptian media‟s treatment 
of women‟s political empowerment. As stated in Chapter 1, very few women engage in 
politics in Egypt. Critical discourse analysis (CDA) is the appropriate method to use 
because the text being analyzed pertains to a disadvantaged group in society (Siegfried 
2002: 36). I will analyze how the discussions that took place in these talk shows are a 
manifestation of using language as a site of struggle over dominance and power through 
expressing ideology. This is because language is very often used to justify the status quo 
by arguing that it is normal and common sense, when in reality the more politically 
powerful group in society is actually imposing the ideology it pleases onto society as a 
whole to its own benefit (Thompson 1990: 7,8). Meanwhile, the disadvantaged groups 
may be trying to struggle against such ideological domination and trying to express and 
further their own ideology (Fairclough 1989: 14, 15, 84, 86, 88). Therefore, I will 
examine whether men express arguments such as „women should not attain this particular 
political post because it is inappropriate for women‟, while women argue that women are 
perfectly capable of attaining that post. However, manifestations of such dominance are 
not only found in such explicit statements. In fact, they are more likely to be found in 
subtle use of language such as intonation (Siegfried 2002:  261). That is why I looked at 
not only what people said, but also at how they said it in the talk shows. 
Since the study thoroughly investigates the various societal factors that relate to the 
meagre levels of women‟s participation in politics, I would not be able to study media‟s 
treatment of this issue without taking these societal factors into consideration. Indeed, 
context is an integral element in CDA (Meyer 2002:15; van Dijk 2002: 97). The most 
important elements of context in this study are history, culture and politics. For it is 
impossible to understand Egyptian women‟s contemporary status and the dilemmas that 
they face without taking Egypt‟s colonial history into consideration. In addition, some of 
the statements made by the participants in the text that will be analyzed can only be 
understood properly if they are placed in the context of aspects of Egyptian culture. 
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 Being a provincial governor is equivalent to being a minister 
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However, context must also include several important issues about the media outlets 
themselves, such as who owns them and whether or not - and if so how - the government 
has any form of control over the privately owned media outlets. (van Dijk nd:  31). In 
addition, since this is a study about women and politics, the political environment in 
Egypt must be taken into consideration at all times.  
As stated in Chapter 2, different groups in Egyptian society have very different views 
regarding women‟s status and the role that they ought to play in society. I will closely 
examine whether or not different groups have different degrees of access to the different 
talk shows and newspapers, i.e. whether some groups are more readily represented than 
others in the different talk shows and interviewed more often or provided with more 
space in opinion columns in the two newspapers. However, I will also take into 
consideration that if a member of any given group is featured on a talk show, this does 
not necessarily mean that the person in question will have been able to express their 
opinion freely. This is because the presenter and the other crew of the talk show have 
considerable control over its agenda. For example, they are the ones who choose the topic 
of the discussion and the questions to be posed (van Dijk nd:  21, 22). Also, the presenter 
is the one who administers the discussion, allocates turn taking and decides on who gets 
to speak first - and possibly - the most frequently or for longer periods of time. Therefore, 
members of powerful groups may be favoured and receive preferential treatment or they 
may have an edge over the others by simply being more articulate, so that they end up 
dominating the conversation, setting its tone, initiating a sub-topic that is then addressed 
and thus, diverting the discussion to a sub-topic that suits them (Siegfried 2002: 260; van 
Dijk nd: 22, 28, 31-2). Similarly, in a news story some people may be quoted more than 
others and it is up to the reporter to chose which parts of the interview will go into the 
news story and which ones will be disregarded. So for example, if members of opposition 
groups are quoted in government owned newspapers, the parts of their statement which 
were the least critical of government policy may be the only ones to be included in the 
story. In addition, I will examine how several external and internal power structures 
relate to the text being analyzed. The first external power structure is the government 
because no media outlet is totally free of government control. In fact, as previously 
stated, one of the talk shows examined in this study, Al Beit Beitak, is aired on two 
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government owned channels. Therefore, clearly the segments of that program that will be 
analyzed can not possibly be analyzed without taking aspects of the government‟s power 
over the program into consideration. The same applies to the news stories and opinion 
columns of the government owned newspapers. I will also examine whether or not and 
how the government exercises control over Al Ashera Masan and 90 Dekika as well as Al 
Masry Al Youm, and how this relates to the segments of these media outlets that will be 
analyzed. In addition, the owners of Dream TV, Al Mehwar and Al Masry Al Youm may 
very well have a say in how they operate, and they may also be allied with or have 
business interests with different powerful groups in Egypt. I will examine how all of this 






WOMEN IN EGYPTIAN PARTY POLITICS  
IN RELATION TO THE MEDIA  
 
This chapter examines political party dynamics in Egypt, with an emphasis on their 
stance on women‟s rights, women‟s status and women‟s role within these political parties 
in relation to the media. Although many scholars including Bianchi (1989), Albrecht 
(2009) and Lust-Okar (2009) have previously examined Egyptian political parties and the 
environment in which they function, the central focus of their studies was not women, nor 
did they take the media into consideration. While doing so, the chapter also looks into the 
powers of and roles played by the President and first lady, in light of Kassem‟s (2004) 
argument that the Egyptian President is not only extremely powerful, but power is also 
personalized around him, as well as Joseph‟s (2001) argument that first ladies tend to 
play informal political roles that revolve around their husbands. It looks into media 
treatment of their roles and how their roles relate to media treatment of women‟s rights. 
The chapter also builds on Adam‟s (2007) argument that governmental women‟s 
institutions are used to establish patronage networks, by examining whether or not this is 
the case when it comes to female members of opposition political parties.  
The chapter examines five different political parties/forces. The first party is the ruling 
party. Three other parties were carefully chosen because they reflect the diversity of 
opposition political parties in Egypt. One of them is a liberal party whose history dates 
back to the early 1900s, another is a liberal party which was formed very recently and the 
last party is a leftist one. In addition, the Muslim Brotherhood is examined even though it 
is not a political party in the legal sense, although it more or less functions as one. It is 
included because it is widely regarded as the strongest opposition force in Egypt.  
The creation of political parties is regulated by Law No. 40 of 1977 and any new party 
must be authorized by the Committee for the Affairs of Political parties. The Committee 
is affiliated to the Shoura Council and its members include the Minister of Interior, three 
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other ministers and three senior retired judges. Also, the application to establish a 
political party must be signed by 50 people, half of who must be peasants and labourers. 
In order to be authorized, any party must accept that the main source of legislation is 
Sharia and it must be willing to defend social peace, democratic socialism and the 
interests of peasants and laborers. Also, parties are not allowed to be formed on the basis 
of class, religion, social category, geography, sex, origins or dogmas. In addition,  the 
party program is required to be different from those of existing parties. Therefore, those 
who decide on whether or not opposition parties are formed are members of the regime 
using vague criteria that enables them to systematically reject authorization of parties. 
Not surprisingly, out of 52 applications to establish political parties received by the 
Committee over 26 years, only one party was authorized. Indeed almost all of the 
opposition political parties which have been established since 1977 and to date came 
about thanks to court rulings by Cairo‟s Appeals Court after long legal battles (Kienle 
2001: 28-31, 68-9; Stacher 2004: 220-1, 224). 
The chapter is divided into five sections, one about each of the different political 
parties/forces. Each section is then sub-divided into sub-sections which provide 
background information about the party and the party‟s stance on women. Other sub-
sections are about the women‟s unit within each party/force and the party‟s media 
strategy and interaction with the media. In some, but not all cases, some additional 
sections are included. In the case of the NDP, this includes a sub-section about how 
decisions pertaining to women are made. Other sub-sections included within some of the 
sections about various other parties address the experience of female members of the 
party who ran for parliament, co-operation between the female members of the party and 
the National Council for Women as well as the activism of female members of the party 





4.1 National Democratic Party: 
4.1.1 Background Information about the Party: 
The National Democratic Party (NDP) is the ruling party in Egypt.  As stated in Chapter 
1, it was formed by President Sadat in the late 1970s when he dismantled the Arab 
Socialist Union and introduced controlled multi-partism. According to its publications, it 
is a popular party which seeks to develop and organize Egyptian society and ensure that 
the Egyptian people are free and privileged. It also aims to maintain social security and 
order, national unity, social justice and the rule of law (NDP nd: 5). However, given all of 
the literature that was cited in Chapter 2 about the nature of the Egyptian regime, it is safe 
to conclude that the NDP does not implement any of this.   
 
4.1.2 Background Information about Nehal Shoukry: 
Nehal Shourky is a journalist in and a deputy editor in chief of Al Ahram. She is also a 
member of the NDP‟s Women‟s Secretariat and NCW‟s Political Participation 
Committee. She has always been interested in politics but she joined the NDP by 
coincidence after the journalist who use to cover the NDP in Al Ahram fell out with 
President Sadat. After that, Sadat insisted that the journalist in question quit both the 
NDP and Al Ahram, and so Shourky temporarily replaced him. “That is how women‟s 
participation is always perceived, as something temporary,” Shoukry said. Yet she was 
allowed to stay on because she did a good job. She continues to cover the NDP‟s 
activities, especially those of its senior members, to date as well as covering women‟s 
issues
6
.     
 
 
                                                 
6
 Interview with Nehal Shoukry, member of the NDP Women‟s Committee, Cairo, 15 January, 2009 
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4.1.3 The Party's Stance on Women’s Rights: 
The NDP's vision regarding women revolves around increasing women's participation in 
all walks of life and protecting women's rights (NDP c. 2003: 43). It strives to empower 
women economically, socially and politically as well as ensuring that women play a role 
in development. This entails overcoming several challenges including decreasing female 
illiteracy rates, bringing an end to school drop out rates among girls as well as maternity 
death rates and improving the nutrition of young girls in impoverished areas. The NDP 
also aims to attain equality between men and women in general and in high ranking 
positions in particular (NDP c. 2003: 5).  
Some of the measures used to achieve this are  calling upon Islamic scholars to combat 
discrimination against women, placing challenging discrimination against women at the 
top of the Ministry of Information‟s agenda and establishing a database about violence 
against women and using it to decide upon means to combat it, in addition to making 
small loans programs more readily available, especially for female headed households 
(NDP c. 2003: 7).  Also, in order to achieve women‟s political empowerment, the NDP 
encourages women to join syndicates
7
 and supports them so that they attain decision 
making positions in them and it also calls upon women's NGOs and syndicates to allow 
for higher rates of female participation in politics (NDP c. 2003: 5, 7). It is also 
noteworthy that women represent a total of 13% of NDP members (NDP 2004: 16). 
However, the NDP has been in power for more than three decades and the number of 
women in decision making positions remains extremely limited. For example, as stated in 
Chapter 1, there are only three female ministers. Also, the media is full of stereotypical 
images of women (see Chapter 7), violence against women is widespread (see Chapters 5 
and 8 for information about sexual harassment and assault) and the number of female 
members of the NDP is extremely limited. All of this implies that the NDP is not truly 
trying to implement the vision that is to be found in its publications.  
                                                 
7
 An organization whose membership is restricted to people who work in a specific profession, e.g. 
engineers, accountants and doctors. The organization provides services for its members and defends their 
rights. It is noteworthy that syndicates are not allowed to play a role in politics.   
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4.1.4 Women's Secretariat: 
The women‟s unit within the NDP is called the Women‟s Secretariat. It develops plans to 
implement the party‟s vision regarding women. Its activities within the area of politics 
include encouraging women to register as voters and participating in politics, (NDP c. 
2003: 43) recruiting women to join the party, drawing people's attention to the 
importance of women‟s political participation as well as helping women out in obtaining 
national ID cards and in registering as voters (NDP nd: 2). Other activities in this arena 
are supporting NDP candidates in elections and supporting female NDP members in all 
walks of life. Also, the members of the Women‟s Secretariat support female NDP 
members who contest elections by organizing conferences for them, distributing leaflets 
about them, talking to women in the constituency about them and helping them out in 
publicity
8
.    
The Women‟s Secretariat is also involved in other activities such as combating illiteracy, 
organizing trips by medical staff to remote areas in which health care facilities are 
unavailable and supporting the government‟s efforts in family planning, (NDP nd: 2) 
vaccination, combating diseases, child nutrition, various issues pertaining to the family, 
combating FGM and addressing problems related to education among girls
9
.  
Therefore, the Women‟s Secretariat is largely active in providing women with services. 
Also, it does not participate in formulating the Party‟s vision on women, but simply 
implements it.  
 
4.1.5 Elections:  
According to Shoukry, the NDP nominated her  for the Local Municipal Elections in 
2008 even though she was reluctant to run for an elected body. She won the elections and 
believes that it was thanks to the Party‟s tremendous support. They put up numerous 
banners in the constituency she was running in and mobilized people but they did not 




 Ibid  
 73 
organize any conferences. It is noteworthy that she was the only woman running in that 
constituency and the party stressed the importance of voting for a woman. She got 13,000 
votes “which shows how hard the party worked.” She faced no problems whatsoever and 
that is why she is considering running for the People‟s Assembly or the Shoura Council10.  
 Shoukry‟s statements show that the NDP has the means to provide ample support for its 
candidates during elections. But much previous research has documented that Egyptian 
elections are rigged
11
. The minimal effort exerted by Shoukry seems to provide further 
evidence to support this.  
 
4.1.6  Media: 
The NDP aims is to develop a media strategy to change the negative ideas and 
perceptions of women in society. The first step towards achieving this is deciding on the 
most important women‟s issues and gender issues that need to be addressed and then 
developing objectives to achieve them and then developing media content that 
incorporates all of this. Another step is forming a committee consisting of representatives 
of various media institutions, as well as the ministries of education, culture and health, in 
addition to religious institutions and NGOs in order to develop a vision regarding media‟s 
treatment of gender. Other measures include ensuring that the media refrains from 
discrimination on the basis of gender and promotes equal opportunities, ensuring that one 
of the criteria used by the procedures of televised programs in selecting interviewees is 
ensuring that the interviewees are aware of gender issues and the rights of both men and 
women. Other measures are paying special attention to programs targeting children, 
particularly when it comes to treatment of gender roles as well as ensuring that one of the 
criteria for selecting high ranking media personnel is their belief in using the media to 
initiate societal change regarding women (NDP 2004: 6). 




 See for example Maye Kassem, 2004, Egyptian Politics: The Dynamics of Authoritarian Rule, Eberhard, 
Kienle, 2001, A Grand Delusion: Democracy and Economic Reform in Egypt and Ninette Fahmy, 2002, 
The Politics of Egypt: State-Society Relationship.   
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The NDP also has a vision regarding drama serials that emanates from the idea that 
drama serials are extremely popular and influential when it comes to societal values and 
people‟s mentality. Thus, the NDP advocates analyzing the content of drama serials to 
investigate the information and values that they advocate and then engaging in dialogue 
with those behind drama serials to achieve common ground regarding gender issues 
(NDP 2004: 6). This indicates that the NDP believes that drama serials have an immense 
impact on viewers. Also, given that drama serials are full of stereotypical images of 
women (see Chapter 7), it is safe to conclude that the NDP does not actually implement 
the strategy that is found it its publications on drama serials. This also leads one to doubt 
that it implements any of the other strategies mentioned in their publications on women 
and media.   
 
 4.1.7 Relationship with NCW: 
According to Shoukry, 
there is no cooperation between NCW and the NDP‟s Women‟s Secretariat. NCW 
is a national organization but NDP is a political party and its members are loyal to 
it and so the line has to be drawn. However, you could say that a form of indirect 
cooperation takes place because many people are members of both NCW and the 
[NDP‟s] Women‟s Secretariat … so that some things which are not achieved by 
the party can be achieved through NCW and vice versa
12
.  
Perhaps such cooperation is unnecessary because the Women‟s Secretariat is largely 








4.1.8 How Decisions Regarding Women’s Rights are Made:  
Some of the changes that have been made pertaining to women in recent years during the 
reign of the NDP are the introduction of the khula law, appointing women as judges and 
amending the nationality law
13
. Another change is the adoption of the women‟s 
parliamentary quota, which is examined at length in this study. How these decisions were 
reached and the role played by various individuals and units within the NDP is an 
important issue that must be examined.  
According to Shoukry, for many years the Women‟s Secretariat produced several reports 
about the need to introduce something along the lines of what later became the khula law. 
The reports were then passed on to the Secretary General of the NDP. But the leaders of 
the party were embarrassed and were reluctant to make that decision until Suzanne 
Mubarak supported this cause and after that it was implemented
14
. Similarly, the 
Women‟s Secretariat sought to change the nationality law for many long years but the 
NDP refused to even consider it.  
Things only changed after Safwat al Sherif became Secretary General of the NDP 
and the Policies Committee was formed in 2002 headed by Gamal Mubarak i.e. 
young people with a new vision joined the Party. They sponsored changing the 
nationality law. We also owe the first lady because she exerted a lot of effort in 
this regard and at the end of the day, we owe the President for responding to the 




Shoukry went on to say that “appointing women as judges was the result of efforts by the 
first lady … the Women's Secretariat … did not play any role whatsoever in this issue 
and the NDP as a whole had nothing to do it”16. 
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 The Egyptian nationality law used to allow for the children of an Egyptian man and a non-Egyptian 
woman to obtain the Egyptian nationality. The children‟s mother was also entitled to it two years after the 
marriage took place. However, the children of an Egyptian woman married to a non-Egyptian man, as well 
as the children‟s father, were not allowed to obtain the Egyptian nationality. In 2003, the law was amended 
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All of this shows that the Women‟s Secretariat and the NDP as a whole have no decision 
making power whatsoever and that changing laws pertaining to women are at the 
discretion of the President, first lady and Gamal.  
In addition, Shoukry said that when it came to the adoption of the women‟s parliamentary 
quota,  
NCW's political participation committee wanted the quota system to be adopted 
using some of the existing parliamentary seats. However, the NDP has rejected 
this and has come up with a different idea, whereby new electoral constituencies 
would be created and only women will be allowed to run for these additional 
parliamentary seats so that we do not take away anything from men and their 
parliamentary seats in order to avoid upsetting them. We are pleased but we have 
argued that this will lead to an insufficient number of women joining parliament. 
A debate is currently ongoing within the Party; some people argue that the 
number of additional seats for each governorate should be proportional to its 
population. We are awaiting their decision. Women are still entitled to run for the 
existing parliamentary seats, we do not know whether or not this will change, it 
depends on their decision. … The NDP Policies Committee which is headed by 
Gamal Mubarak formed a working group to address all of this
17
.  
The role played by the Women‟s Secretariat in the adoption of the women‟s 
parliamentary quota was that Aisha Abdel Hadi, the head of the Secretariat, asked the 
head of each of its branches whether they would like that governorate to be represented 
with 2 or 3 seats in parliament. She then wrote a report based on their requests and 
submitted it to Safwat al Sherif, the Secretary General of the NDP and he passed this 
information onto the Policies Committee and the working group
18
.  
This is further evidence to prove that the Women‟s Secretariat has no decision making 
power. It also shows that NCW is not a very powerful institution and suggests that the 
NDP is considerably powerful and plays a role in how a women‟s right is addressed if the 
interests and privileges of its members are at stake. Furthermore, Shoukry‟s statements 
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indicate that the male members of the NDP perceived the women‟s parliamentary quota 
as taking away some of their power and privileges and giving them to women.  
 
 
4.2 The Neo Wafd Party: 
4.2.1 Background Information about the Party: 
As stated in Chapter 1, Al Wafd Al Gadid or The Neo Delegation Party is a party whose 
roots date back to 1919. It was the ruling party in Egypt from 1923 to the early 1950s. 
But it was dissolved by Nasser along with all other political parties. A new version of the 
party, hence the word new in its name, was formed in the late 1970s when late President 
Sadat re-introduced the multi-party system. 
The Wafd is a party that seeks to establish a democratic system in which the rulers would 
be chosen by the Egyptian people, there would be a clear separation between the 
branches of government and parliament would have the right to hold the executive 
accountable for its policies. Elections would also be free and fair and the judiciary would 
be independent. It would also be a system characterized by multi-partism in which human 
rights would be respected and there would be no constraints on establishing political 
parties and launching newspapers (Wafd Party nd: 6-10, 13). 
The Wafd‟s party program is largely a response to the current political system in Egypt, 
in which elections are rigged and the separation between the powers of the different 
branches of the state is extremely blurred.  
 
 
4.2.2 Background Information about Mona Korashi: 
Mona Korashi is a member of the Wafd Party‟s High Council and Women‟s Committee. 
She comes from a privileged background; both of her parents come from wealthy land 
owning families which were rather powerful in pre 1952 Egypt. They were also both 
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Wafdist families. Korashi only became active in the political party and NGO arenas after 
she was widowed and her children had moved out
19
.   
 
 4.2.3 The Party's Stance on Women's Rights: 
The section on women in the party program states that “women represent 50% of 
Egyptian society and have an integral role to play in both the family and nation as a 
whole” and therefore, the party‟s objectives are augmenting family planning efforts, 
building a larger number of child care centers throughout the country and ensuring that 
large factories build such child care centers. In addition, the Party believes that women 
should be entitled to two years of maternity leave the first time they deliver, during which 
they should be paid half of their salaries among other rights, such as being promoted on 
time (Al Wafd Party nd: 62). 
Therefore, the Wafd has a very traditional and rather stereotypical perception of women 
and their role in society. But it is concerned with providing working women with some 
support to assist them in juggling families and careers.  
Indeed, Korashi, said that she believes that the Wafd is not doing enough for women. A 
program is in place but it is not being implemented, there is nothing tangible regarding 
women‟s issues. She added that female members of the Wafd call for the adoption of a 
women‟s parliamentary quota but the Party itself has not made a clear statement 
regarding an electoral system that is favorable to women. Also, women are under 
represented in the Party‟s high ranks. Out of 60 decision makers, i.e. the members of the 
Party‟s High Council, only three are women, one of whom is Korashi. Several women 
contested these internal elections "but elections are all about personal interests and not 
democracy, the male members of the Party did not want four women to join the High 
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Therefore, some female members of the Wafd are agents who are truly interested in 
women‟s rights, but the Party as a whole is not. Her statements also indicate that male 
members of the Wafd – like the male members of the NDP – perceive women‟s rights as 
diminishing men‟s power in order to make women more powerful.  
  
4.2.4 Women's Committee: 
According to Korashi,  
the Women‟s Committee of the Wafd is not very active, just like all of the other 
committees. We need experts and researchers to help us decide on the agenda of 
each committee and that has not taken place yet. … The Women‟s Committee 
used to be active in issues like charity and community service, but these are not 
women‟s issues. Its members were incapable of addressing women's issues and 
they lack an expert who could guide them in a scientific and cultured manner
21
.  
Therefore, most of the Wafd‟s committees – and not just the women‟s committee – are 
largely inactive. Also, the Women‟s Committee – like the NDP‟s Women‟s Secretariat – 
is largely active in providing women with services and does not address women‟s rights.  
 
4.2.5 Elections: 
Korashi ran for parliament twice in 2000 and 2005 in the Kasr El Nile constituency. The 
party was desperate for some of its members to run for parliament because very few 
people are willing to do so
22
.   
Based on her experience, voters could not care less about the electoral program. Their 
main concern is the services the candidate has to offer them such as addressing social 
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problems. “But first and foremost, voters perceive it as an opportunity to make money. 
They vote for the most powerful candidate, i.e. the NDP because they are more capable 
of providing them with services. … Women in rural areas are assembled and told by a 
man to vote for a particular person. They do not choose who to vote for or compare 
electoral programs.” She did not address women‟s issues in her electoral campaign 
because these are not the issues that concern laymen and women in Egypt, “people would 
walk away in the middle of the conversation if I did so.” People are concerned with 
issues like the economy, housing and education. Meanwhile, "intellectuals who reside in 
Garden City and Zamalek are not registered voters. This leads to our loss because these 
are the kind of people who may vote for somebody like me. But those who are 
impoverished are after money and services. Intellectuals argue that going out of their way 
to vote is pointless because the election results are predetermined, but people are being 
passive.”  
The Party provided her with L.E. 2000 to fund her campaign, “which is peanuts” so she 
had to resort to connections and ask people for favors. For example, some people 
provided her with material upon which to print her photographs, others stuck up her 
promotional material on walls for free. It is noteworthy none of the women's NGOs or 
NCW provided her with any form of assistance.
23
  
Korashi‟s statements indicate that the Wafd Party is not very active, has limited resources 
and does not play a significant role in Egyptian politics. They also indicate that many 
illegal methods are employed in Egyptian elections and that party programs and political 
ideologies are not in the least important. It is not surprising that it is extremely difficult 
for women‟s rights to be addressed in this environment. Her statements also indicate that 
there is not much cooperation between women‟s activists in the arena of political parties 
and those who are active in the NGO arena.  
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4.2.6 Media: 
According to Korashi, in the Wafd‟s newspaper outstanding female figures receive 
coverage but that is not the case when it comes to women‟s issues. Journalists in the 
Wafd newspaper do not go out of their way to conduct investigative reporting about 
women‟s issues and the female members of the party have not put pressure on the 
newspapers‟ editor in chief regarding this issue24.  
Korashi is given room to address any issue that that she pleases in the form of an opinion 
column in the newspaper. But she believes that television has a much greater role to play 
due to the very high illiteracy rates
25
. 
The Wafd Party's newspaper covered Korashi‟s experience in running for parliament as 
part and parcel of the coverage of the 400 members of the Party who were running for 
parliament. Meanwhile, other media outlets, including privately owned ones did not 
cover any of her activities
26
.  
Korashi‟s statements indicate that it is the female members of the Wafd who are 
concerned about not only women‟s rights, but also media treatment of them. They also 
indicate that the existence of the privately owned media has not made much of a 
difference in terms of the coverage of the activities of female members of political 
parties.   
 
4.2.7 Relationship with NCW: 
Korashi often attends meetings organized by NCW for female members of political 
parties. But sometimes they only get in touch with her a day before the meeting is due to 
take place and in that case she does not attend the meeting. In the meeting NCW‟s 
Secretary General Farakhonda Hassan asks each of them to express their views, "but she 
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would do not take a leftist party‟s opinion very seriously, she might give the Wafd‟s ideas 




4.2.8 NGO Activism: 
The NGO that Korashi heads is a member of the International Feminist Union (IFU). She 
presents the Arab world‟s problems in the IFU. Also, she ensures that every single 
woman who walks into the NGO that she runs issues a national ID and registers as a 
voter. “They do not comprehend the importance of all of this and how those who 
orchestrate the elections abuse their right to vote. But at least I have taken a step 
forward.”  
 
4.3 Democratic Front Party: 
4.3.1 Background Information about the Party: 
The Democratic Front Party (DFP) is a party that is still under construction, i.e. it has not 
received authorization just yet. It seeks to establish a liberal democracy in Egypt in which 
there would be a clear separation between religion and the state, but at the same time 
citizens would be free to practice their faith. The DFP seeks to ensure that nobody is 
above the law, including those who are in power. It believes that laws should emanate 
from the principles of freedom and human rights. It is against favoring any group of 
citizens over the others such as peasants and laborers. It also seeks to prohibit any 
interference on the part of the military and police establishment in the state, and perceives 
them as tools at the discretion of the state to serve citizens and not as political players or 
tools to serve the interests of one political force or the other. It also believes in a 
disciplined free market economy which operates under state supervision. At the same 
time, the government should be the one to decide on general economic policies, provide 




basic public services, make development possible and preserve social justice (DFP 2007: 
14, 15, 19, 20).  
Some of the elements of the DFP‟s program – like that of the Wafd – is a response to the 
political situation in Egypt, such as the lack of separation of powers between the different 
branches of the state. But by and large the DFP is a party which upholds values 
associated with Western liberal democracies, such as separation between religion and the 
state and the centrality of human rights.  
 
4.3.2 Background Information about Magda Saed: 
Magda Saed is one of the founders of the Democratic Front Party. She comes from a 
middle class background and works as a journalist and writer. She had been active in the 
NGO arena for several years before she decided to become active in the political party 
arena
28
.   
 
4.3.3 The Party's Stance on Women's Rights: 
The DFP aims to fully empower women and ensure that women are entitled to the same 
opportunities as men. The party vows to abide by this within its internal structure and 
activities as well as ensuring that this is one of the corner stones of its program and 
policies. It believes that women have made some achievements in particular fields but 
women‟s status as a whole is still in need of a lot of continuous and serious efforts 
because women‟s status, according to all of the human development indices, falls behind 
that of men in terms of literacy rates, income, health and political participation (DFP 
2007: 38). 
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The DFP‟s stance on women reflects its liberal ideology and conveys that it is interested 
in empowering women. But whether that is truly the case or whether the DFP simply 
pays lip service to women‟s empowerment remains to be seen.   
According to Magda Saed, one of the founding members of the DFP:  
The problems that women face must be perceived as part and parcel of societal 
problems. That is why we established a women‟s committee and not a secretariat 
within the party in order to avoid isolating the problems that women face from 
those of society as a whole. Women must play a role within political parties and 
stand up for societal problems and not only those that concern women. But female 
members of political parties confine their membership to women‟s committees. 
Women must fight for their rights, no one will grant them their rights and their 
male colleagues in the political parties will treat them in the same manner that 
men treat women in society as a whole.  
Saed comes across as having a clear understanding of women‟s rights and how to attain 
them. Yet Saed‟s statements also imply that male members of the DFP are not that keen 
on women‟s rights and their empowerment after all, otherwise she would not have said 
that “women must fight for their rights and that their male colleagues in the political 
parties will treat them in the same manner that men treat women in society as a whole.”  
 
4.3.4 Saed’s Experience:   
I first met Saeed in December 2007. She came across as a strong and enthusiastic woman 
with a clear vision and she considered running for parliament in El Manial constituency 
but decided not to do so because she realized that voters would be skeptical of a female 
candidate after having voted for a woman, Shahinaz al Naggar, who let them down and 
resigned from parliament when she got married
29
.  




I met Saed again in September 2008. She was no longer an active member of the party 
and said: 
Democracy is non-existent. The political environment does not allow for 
democracy [or] political activity. Political parties do not function properly, 
syndicates do not function properly, unions do not function properly, they are all 
fake. The NDP, not the NDP - but its high-ranking members for the party itself  
does not exist as such - do not give anybody the opportunity to do anything. … 
What kind of political activity [can we talk about] when people are not even 
allowed to voice their opinions? There has to be a legal channel through which 
people can express their opinion [such as] a union, syndicate, political party but 
all of them are harassed … which creates a corrupt political environment … the 
political empowerment of women is part and parcel of politically empowering 
men and citizens in general … you can not achieve political empowerment in a 
corrupt political environment. … The government cripples political parties by 
prohibiting them from interacting with people and more importantly, the corrupt 
electoral system has transformed the elections into a meaningless process. For the 
electoral program of parties is not in the least important and the same applies to 
voters‟ political views. The NDP abuses the poor and hungry and degrades them 
by buying their votes. This is coupled with rigging elections. Although many fine 
women are members of political parties, the parties do not risk nominating 
women during elections because they have to spend a lot of money to secure a 
parliamentary seat for any candidate. Nominating a woman in this environment is 
risky because her chances of winning are perceived as less than those of a man 
because people may not vote for her because of her gender. … The electoral 
process has been transformed into a process of buying a parliamentary seat and 
later abusing your authority as a member of parliament - not only to make up for 
the money that you spent in order to buy the seat - but to make ten times as much 
money. But we should not postpone seeking to politically empower women, we 
should all work together to change the status quo. … one feels like withdrawing 
completely from life as a whole, for all one can see is  blatant corruption … [last 
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time] I was enthusiastic but I now I feel very depressed after my experience in the 
party. We did our best to try to establish a decent party … which implements the 
principles it came up with but we were harassed in the same manner the NDP 
adopts: the decent members of the party were harassed through buying votes, 
those who gave in to this no longer abide by the party‟s principles and those who 
still believe in them have mostly quit the party … I will not participate in formal 
politics again unless things change drastically. … I wish women could realize that 
political reform is a pre-requisite for economic reform. Women say that they do 
not have time for politics because they are preoccupied with struggling to feed 




Saed‟s statements show that the DFP has been coopted and transformed into yet another 
party which exists to maintain the fake liberal authoritarian system described by Albrecht 
(2007) and is not a strong party that can play a significant role in the political arena. She 
also shed light on the tactics used by the regime to control opposition parties. In addition, 
she elaborated on how difficult it is for a woman to play a role in politics in such an 
environment. Her own personal experience further illustrates this. Therefore, it is safe to 
conclude that the DFP‟s party program and stance on women merely pay lip service to 
liberal principles and women‟s empowerment. 
   
4.3.5 NGO Activism: 
As stated previously, Saed had been active in the NGO arena before joining the DFP. 
After her experience in the party, she has shifted back to participating in NGOs. She 
decided to establish an NGO that will offer youth training sessions to help them find jobs 
and it will also aim to empower women
31
. 
                                                 
30
 Interview with Magda Saeed, Cairo, 13 September, 2008  
31
 Ibid  
 87 
This indicates that the regime allows NGOs slightly more freedom in their activities than 
political parties, probably because it perceives NGOs as far less of a threat to its power. 
Saed‟s experience illustrates that the regime seems to be indirectly forcing activists to 
channel their activism to the NGO arena and not the political party one.    
  
4.4 Tagammu Party: 
4.4.1 Background Information about the Party: 
Al Hizb Al Watani Al Takadomi Al Wahdawi or the National Progressive Unionist Party, 
commonly referred to as Al Tagammu or the Union Party, was established in 1976 when 
late President Sadat reintroduced controlled multi-partism, as stated in Chapter 1. 
Tagammu is a leftist party which supports democracy and all of the principles of the 23 
July Revolution and seeks to build on its achievements. Its ultimate goal is to transform 
Egyptian society into a socialist one which is free of all forms of abuse, to implement 
independent national development and fulfill the Egyptian people‟s basic needs.  It also 
supports national unity, struggling to free all occupied Arab land and enabling the 
Palestinians to reclaim their rights. It believes in forcefully opposing Zionism and 
imperialism and allying with third world countries and their peoples in an effective 
manner (Tagammu 2006: 25-7). Therefore, Tagammu is a leftist party.  
According to Bahiga Hussein
32
,  
Both men and women are barred from political activity by laws that cripple them. 
We are confined to the headquarters of political parties and we are also denied 
access to the media. ... The regime's agents infiltrate into opposition parties and 
weaken them from within and create problems within the parties which prevent 
them from focusing on their limited activities
33
.  
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Hussein‟s statements shed light on some of the tactics used by the regime to control 
opposition parties.  
 
4.4.2 Background Information about Bahiga Hussein: 
Bahiga Hussein comes from a rural background. She first became politically active while 
she was an undergraduate student. This was during the Nasser era and her family 
supported her political activity. She was imprisoned during the Sadat era for her political 
views. Hussein is a journalist in Al Ahaly newspaper, which is affiliated to Tagammu and 
is also a member of the Feminist Progressive Union. She is also active in the NGO arena. 
In addition, she is the editor in chief of the magazine Al Mara’ Al Gadida (The New 
Woman magazine), which is issued by the women‟s NGO New Woman Foundation34 
(see Chapter 5 for details about New Woman Foundation).   
 
4.4.3 The Party's Stance on Women's Rights: 
One of Tagammu‟s priorities is fully empowering women. The party‟s principles when it 
comes to women are liberating women, respecting their rights and achieving equality 
between men and women (Abdel Radi 2008: 3). It also believes that women‟s liberation 
emanates from the nation‟s liberation, which in turn emanates from the liberation of the 
people (FPU 2003: 2). The party also encourages and supports the proliferation of 
women‟s movements as well as co-operation among such movements (FPU 2006: 63) 
and it strives to form a movement at the grassroots level while ensuring that women are at 
the forefront of this movement (FPU 1992: 1).  
Thus, Tagammu supports: 
 a new family law that preserves the family and women‟s rights 




 a new nationality law that automatically grants the offspring of an Egyptian 
woman and a non-Egyptian man as well as the children‟s father the Egyptian 
nationality  
 a new law that does not discriminate between men and women in employment 
opportunities and attaining high-ranking positions 
 establishing the largest number of child care centers, playgrounds and gardens all 
of which can be utilized free of charge  
 making electrical appliances readily available so that working women find it 
easier to do household chores (FPU 2006: 109, 110) 
Much of Tagammu‟s stance on women is a reflection of its leftist ideology. It also seems 
to be concerned with helping women out in juggling careers and families.  
 
4.4.4 Feminist Progressive Union: 
The women‟s unit of Tagammu is called the Feminist Progressive Union (FPU). It “does 
not advocate working against men”, on the contrary, its members believe that cooperating 
with men is necessary in order to achieve national development (FPU 2003: 4). They 
aspire for the Feminist Progressive Union to become an umbrella organization that 
encompasses those who believe in women‟s rights from all ideological backgrounds. 
Thus, being a member of the Tagammu Party is not a pre-requisite for being a member of 
the Union, but the pre-requisites are believing in women‟s rights as citizens and believing 
in women‟s issues35.The FPU has branches in 22 different Egyptian governorates. The 
Union has a say in selecting female nominees for all types of elections. 
Some of the activities the FPU engages in are:  
 combating illiteracy among women belonging to various age groups  
 organizing exhibitions for clothing and hand made products in various villages 
and governorates  




 organizing seminars about:  
 the impact of globalization on women  
 Iqbal Baraka‟s book: A Modern Perception of the Veil  
 the economic impact of the Iraq war   
 how the nationality law discriminates against women 
 organizing an event on the 8th of March to commemorate International Women‟s 
Day on an annual basis 
 visiting elderly homes on mother‟s day, orphanages on different occasions 
pertaining to children as well as visiting cancer patients (FPU 2003: 5-7)  
 activities to call for the adoption of a women‟s parliamentary quota, (FPU 2003: 
34) such as conferences, seminars in collaboration with other political parties and 
a demonstration in front of the People‟s Assembly36 
The FPU is also concerned about female workers and it aims to: 
- help female workers in organizing themselves 
- raising the minimum wage of female workers  
- ensuring that factories abide by working hours so that female workers 
work for 8 hours a day  
- ensuring that female workers are not forced to work over time but have the 
right to do so if they please  
- providing female workers with safe transportation facilities  
- brining an end to discrimination against female workers on the basis of 
gender (Abdel Radi 2008: 20) 
Therefore, much of the FPU‟s activities are providing women with services – just like the 
women‟s units of the NDP and the Wafd. But some of its activities are slightly different 
because of its leftist ideology, namely the ones which target female workers. Also, the 
fact that FPU felt the need to state in its program that they do no advocate working 
against men reflects the misperception of women‟s rights in society.  
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However, the FPU faces some problems. Many of the Party's members do not take 
feminist activities very seriously and some male members of the party do not co-operate 
with it. In fact, one of the party's female members went as far as describing the manner in 
which the male members of the party perceive the FPU as “an illegitimate child” of the 
Party (FPU 1992: 8-9, 34). Furthermore, the head of the FPU believes that it is 
completely detached from women at the grassroots level because the government cripples 
its activities. For example, they once organized a rally and the number of policemen 
surrounding them outnumbered the number of protestors. She added that they are allowed 
to say anything they like within the party‟s headquarters where nobody can hear them37.  
Therefore, it seems that Tagammu‟s publications give an exaggerated impression of the 
Party‟s support for and belief in women‟s rights. Apparently, many of its male members 
do not support women‟s rights after all. Also, the fact that the FPU is detached from 
women at the grassroots level makes it very unlikely that it will achieve the goals stated 
in its publications.  
 
4.4.5 Elections: 
According to Hussein, Tagammu adopts a quota system, whereby 6% of its nominees for 
any elections are women
38
. Al Shal added that in the 2005 parliamentary elections, it was 
the only party - other than the NDP - which nominated two women and they both lost the 
elections. The Party and the FPU supported the female candidates financially, morally 
and by producing leaflets and banners, as well as organizing rallies and seminars in the 
streets and coffee shops. “The candidate who ran against Amina Shafik is a drug dealer 
who spent LE 6 million on his electoral campaign. He hired female thugs to beat those 
who were backing her up and some of us got wounded”39. They also nominated 19 
women for municipal elections, and 6 or 7 of them won. She argued that some of the 
reasons behind their victory is that the constituencies are small and that those who run for 
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municipal elections are different from those who run for parliament: “the People‟s 
Assembly elections are contested by tycoons who spend millions of pounds to make it, it 
is a fierce battle”40.  
Al Shal‟s statements are yet another indication for how that party programs and 
ideologies are not in the least important in parliamentary elections. Even though 
Tagammu is the only party which adopts a women‟s quota, this has not lead it to 
nominate a significant number of women. One of the reasons behind this is probably that 
the Party does not nominate a significant number of candidates during any form of 
elections anyway.  
 
4.4.6 Media: 
Tagammu releases the weekly newspaper Al Ahaly while the FPU issues a magazine 
entitled Al Mara’ Al Masreya (The Egyptian Woman) every three months, as well as 
issuing a special issue on International Women‟s Day.  The magazine is distributed for 
free to female members of the People‟s Assembly and Shoura Council and NCW 
members as well as NGOs and the Tagammu Party‟s branches in provincial 
governorates
41
. The FPU also issues leaflets about women's struggles in various fields, 
such as working women‟s conditions in the era of globalization (FPU 2003: 7).  
According to Al Shal, “the government owned media did not cover any of our activities 
regarding the women‟s parliamentary quota or the nationality law because they 
completely disregard the existence of opposition political parties.” But sometimes, the six 
o‟clock news bulletin aired on the government owned stations covers some of their other 
activities, such as exhibitions. Meanwhile, “the privately owned television station Dream 
TV covered the demonstrations that we organized, such as the one calling for the adoption 






of a women‟s parliamentary quota which was held in front of parliament, and Al Masry 
Al Youm covers our major events”42.  
This indicates that the proliferation of privately owned media has allowed for minimal 
coverage of some of the activities of the women‟s units of opposition parties.  
Hussein is featured in the program Sabahak Sokar Zeyada (Extra Sweet Good Morning) 
on the privately owned satellite channel O TV once a month. The program's editors select 
articles from newspapers and magazines about a variety of issues including women and 
she comments on them
43
.  
Hussein argued that:  
Members of opposition parties are featured in the media to discuss specific issues 
with particular people, but not to promote political participation. ... These 
privately owned satellite channels have provided greater opportunity for freedom 
of expression and for featuring women, largely due to competition between the 
different privately owned channels in addressing day to day problems and 
featuring unfamiliar speakers. However, all of this does not aim to change 
perceptions regarding women‟s political participation. ... I believe that these 
channels have provided viewers with more information but they have not led to 
raising their awareness in a manner that leads to taking action. I believe that the 
latter is the role of political parties had they not been crippled by laws. These 
channels allow the Egyptian people to voice their anger at the government which 
has reached unprecedented levels and only leads to spontaneous reactions with 
limited demands, such as the strike wave
44
. 
This indicates that the proliferation of privately owned media has provided female 
members of opposition parties with some media access. 
 








4.4.7 Relationship with NCW: 
The FPU co-operates with NCW on various fronts. In the words of Al Shal, “We are in 
disagreement with the government regarding economic policies but not when it comes to 
women‟s issues. Women‟s status is deteriorating, violence against women takes place, 
women are deprived of many of their rights, even the governmental women‟s 
organizations believe in all of this
45”. One of the forms of co-operation is that young 
female members of the FPU attend NCW training sessions, such as a one month training 
course about the quota system and other women‟s rights46. Also, some of the members of 
the FPU participate in conferences and attend seminars organized by NCW. The FPU 
also invites NCW to their events, and the Secretary General of NCW does indeed attend 
many of their events, such as an event to celebrate the 30th anniversary of the Union‟s 
establishment. However, “NCW does not participate in our activities which involve 
interaction with people at the grassroots level, they only attend seminars which are held 
in offices”. Al Shal also said “because Mrs. Mubarak is the President of NCW, its 
activities receive media coverage, which is beneficial. However, she added that NCW did 
not support Al Tagammu female members who contested the elections and they criticized 
them in this regard. 
Yet another member of Tagmmu expressed some very different views of NCW. Hussein 
said:  
NCW is an elitist organization that adopts a top down approach. It was established 
by those who oppress the Egyptian people and waste money that belongs to the 
Egyptian people. Its activities have nothing to do with [Egyptian] women‟s real 
problems. NCW has not achieved anything because it is a governmental 
institution. ... There is a huge gap between the wonderful slogans about women‟s 
empowerment and women‟s status. Many of the activities conducted to empower 
women are done merely for social prestige and are not researched properly, so 






that a lot of money has been wasted. … Many women register as voters but are 
abused by the NDP
47
.  
Her views clearly contradict with those of Al Shal. This conveys that members of the 
same party can have very different views and there may be profound disagreements 
between them. 
 
4.5 The Muslim Brotherhood: 
4.5.1 Background Information about the Muslim Brotherhood: 
The Muslim Brotherhood is an Islamic movement that was established by Hassan El 
Bana in 1928 (Shehaden 2003: 10). The current Egyptian regime describes it as an 
„outlawed group‟ and forbids it from forming a political party on the grounds that Article 
5 of the Egyptian constitution states that “no political activity shall be exercised nor 
political party established on a religious referential authority.”  Despite this, it is widely 
regarded as the strongest political opposition to the Egyptian regime. Its members are 
constantly harassed by the state and many of them are tried in military courts and 
sentenced to several years in prison. Since it is outlawed, no accurate figures are available 
regarding its membership. However, Diaa Rashwan, a scholar who specializes in Islamic 
movements estimates that anywhere between 50, 000 and 60, 000 people are members of 
the Muslim Brotherhood and its supporters/sympathizers amount to between 400, 000 
and 500, 000 people (Rashwan 2008a).  
 
4.5.2 Would-Be Party Program: 
In late 2007, the Muslim Brotherhood made public a program of its would be political 
party. It stipulated that the Muslim Brotherhood seeks to establish a democratic system in 
which rotation of power would take place and there would be clear divisions between the 




three branches of the state. It would also be a state in which government officials are 
elected by the Egyptian people, nobody would be above the law and all citizens would be 
equal. Other features of the state would be that Islamic Sharia would be the primary 
source of legislation, the judiciary would be independent from the government, the 
Islamic principle of shoura would be adopted and people would have the right to 
establish political parties and NGOs (Mohamed 10/8/2007).   
Much of this program – like those of many of the secular political parties - is a response 
to the political system in Egypt in which the same people have been in power for many 
long years and there is no significant separation of powers between the different branches 
of the state. The would be party program also reflects the Muslim Brotherhood‟s Islamist 
orientation.  
 
4.5.3 Stance on Women: 
In general, Islamists perceive the family as the basic institution of society, state and 
civilization as a whole. In each institution, men and women perform their roles in 
accordance with their capabilities and merits. Although women have the right to play 
roles in both institutions and both are respected, their role within the family is perceived 
as taking precedence over their role in the state (Kausar 2008: 40-42). Also, most 
Islamists uphold male leadership of both the family and the state but they are totally 
against male dominance of these institutions in the patriarchal sense. Instead, they 
envision men‟s leadership of these institutions as one of “responsibility and governing the 
governed” by taking care of them and “discharging functions with benevolence and not 
with domination and oppression” (Kausar 2008: 42-43). 
The Muslim Brotherhood‟s would be party program included a section entitled „Family 
and Women‟ which stipulated that it believes in implementing a media campaign to 
change the negative societal perception of women and promote equality. It also included 
taking all of the necessary steps to empower women and ensure that they enjoy all of 
their rights, as well as enabling women to juggle careers and families by protecting 
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women‟s rights to maternity leave and enabling working women to go on leave during 
school examination periods. In addition, the would-be party program advocated 
organizing conferences in which all political forces and NGOs would participate in order 
to arrive at solutions for women‟s problems as well as supporting women‟s NGOs and 
directing their activism to solving women‟s problems. Furthermore, it included 
criminalizing all forms of violence against women both verbal and physical, as well as 
criminalizing forced marriages and creating laws that allow for punishing those who 
commit these crimes (na 14/8/2007).  
Therefore, much of the Muslim Brotherhood‟s stance on women focuses on enabling 
women to juggle careers and families and protecting women from various forms of abuse. 
Even though the would-be party program states that steps would be taken to empower 
women, it does not elaborate or provide a definition for empowerment.  
 
4.5.4 The Muslim Sisters: 
Omayma Abdel Latif use to be a research and program associate at the Carnegie 
Endowment. She (2008) conducted a thorough analysis of the Muslim Sisters which 
provides deep insight into its position within the Muslim Brotherhood as well as its role.   
The structure of the Muslim Brotherhood must be explained in order to understand where 
the women‟s division is located within its hierarchical structure. The Muslim 
Brotherhood consists of four hierarchical bodies. The highest authority is the Supreme 
Guide. After that comes Maktab al-Irshad (The Guidance Bureau) which is an executive 
body that consists of 16 members who are elected by the Majlis al-Shura (Consultative 
Council) which is a body that outlines general policies. It consists of 75 to 90 members 
who represent the 22 provincial governorates in Egypt. The last body is al-Makatib al-
Idariyya (The Administrative Bureaus) which are executive bodies at the provincial 
governorate level and are responsible for outlining the Muslim Brotherhood‟s plan of 
action for the provincial governorate and they communicate with Maktab al-Irshad 
(Abdel Latif 2008: 10).  
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The women‟s division of the Muslim Brotherhood is called the Muslim Sisters. It was 
first established in 1932 and its members largely consisted of the female relatives, 
especially the wives and daughters, of the male members of the Muslim Brotherhood. 
This is still the case today. At the beginning, it did not have a female head but a deputy 
who communicated its underpinnings to the Supreme Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood 
which oversaw it. Later a male member of the Muslim Brotherhood was appointed to 
oversee the Muslim Sisters. Its activities largely revolved around charity, social activities, 
religious issues and medical services. A male member of each of the Makatib Idariyya is 
“in charge of women‟s activities … and acts as a liason between the Sisters‟ division in 
each governorate” (Abdel Latif 2008: 3). Today, the activities of the Muslim Sisters 
largely revolve around charity and religious education. They also organize seminars 
addressing political, social and religious issues. However, during elections they played 
crucial roles as organizers and in mobilizing voters. Also, during a recent crack down on 
the movement by the state in the form of imprisoning large numbers of senior members 
of the Muslim Brotherhood and confiscating their property, Muslim Sisters organized 
street demonstrations, ran media campaigns, secured funds to support the families of the 
detainees and pay their lawyers and organized visits to the detainees (Abdel Latif 2008: 
3, 7).  
Some of the Muslim Sisters  along with some of the male members of the Muslim 
Brotherhood are actively seeking a larger role for women within the structure of the 
Muslim Brotherhood and in society as a whole. These male members are largely middle 
ranking ones who come from an urban background. In addition, many young members of 
the movement - both male and female - are also in favour of this. They, for example, call 
for women to be represented in all decision-making bodies and for the Muslim Sisters to 
be integrated into the main structure of the Muslim Brotherhood. They also opposed the 
clause in the party platform that stipulated that women should not attain the post of head 
of state. However, most members of the Muslim Brotherhood - both male and female - 
have conservative views regarding women‟s participation in the public sphere (Abdel 
Latif 2008: 10, 13). Some of the male members are also apprehensive of women‟s 
participation in the Muslim Brotherhood‟s high-ranking bodies because members of these 
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bodies are constantly harassed by the state and periodically imprisoned. Imprisonment of 
its female members is a red line for the Muslim Brotherhood that it will not allow to be 
crossed at any cost. An example that illustrates this is the Muslim Brotherhood‟s reaction 
when some of its female members who have been more openly active in recent years 
were arrested. Muslim Brotherhood members demonstrated for three days non-stop 
demanding their release. Indeed, there seems to be an implicit agreement with the 
authorities that women shall not be subject to such treatment as long as their activism is 
minimal. An example to that effect is that the Muslim Brotherhood received several 
warnings that women would “no longer be beyond the reach of the police if they 
continued to be conspicuous in the streets.” Abdel Latif (2008: 14) argues that the 
Muslim Brotherhood‟s strategy of minimizing women‟s activism is also a survival tactic 
which ensures the survival of the Muslim Brotherhood because its female members are 
active away from the gaze of state security. Furthermore, the fact that women are not 
subject to harassment ensures the Muslim Brotherhood‟s survival during crisis in which 
the state cracks down on the movement.   
If indeed most members of the Muslim Brotherhood – both male and female – have 
conservative views regarding women‟s participation in the public sphere, then this leads 
one to question whether the would-be party program gives an exaggerated impression of 
the Muslim Brotherhood‟s interest in women‟s empowerment. Also, it is difficult to come 
up with a conclusion regarding whether or not the limited activity and decision making 
power of the Muslim Sisters is truly caused by constant state harassment of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, or whether it reflects its stance on women and the role that they ought to 
play. In any case, the Muslim Sisters are not very different from the women‟s units of the 
secular political parties, they are largely active in services and not women‟s rights. Nor 
are the Muslim Sisters very different from the female members of the secular political 
parties in another regard; they all have very limited or no decision making power. It 
seems that overall the Muslim Brotherhood has a rather conservative stance on women, 
while a small number of agents – consisting of both male and female members – are truly 
interested in women‟s empowerment, which again is not very different from the secular 
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parties. The only difference is that in the Muslim Brotherhood‟s case the agents include 
men as well as women, while in the case of secular parties, the agents are all women.   
  
4.5.5 Media: 
The Muslim Brotherhood‟s would-be party program included a section on media. the 
policies it included were providing incentives to enable the cinema industry to flourish 
and encouraging the production of patriotic and religious songs and gearing the music 
industry to abide by morals and ethics. The Muslim Brotherhood believes that the media 
should play a role in development, promote democracy, human rights and women‟s 
rights. It also seeks to replace the existing press law with one that ensures freedom of the 
press, prohibits imprisoning journalists and makes it easier for journalists to access 
information (14/8/2007).  
This reflects the Muslim Brotherhood‟s Islamic orientation, since it would like to 
encourage the proliferation of religious songs, for example. But it is noteworthy that it 
would also like to use the media to promote democracy, human rights and women‟s 
rights.   
 
4.5.6 Elections: 
The Muslim Brotherhood has been contesting the parliamentary elections ever since 
1990. At the beginning, it use to do so through coalitions with political parties but in 
recent years, its members have contested elections as independents, i.e. individuals who 
are not nominated by any political party. It nominated a woman for the first time in the 
2000 parliamentary elections and has since then nominated small numbers of women in 
all of the legislative elections it has contested (Abdel Latif 2008: 7). 
Therefore, the Muslim Brotherhood – just like many of the secular political parties – 
nominates a small number of women during elections.  
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4.6 Conclusion  
Most of the political parties in Egypt, such as the Wafd,  are not truly concerned about 
women, women‟s rights or women‟s empowerment. Others, like Tagammu and DFP 
merely pay lip service to women‟s rights. However, this is not specific to women, these 
parties either have no vision at all on all matters or pay lip service to various other issues 
as well. For example, the Wafd Party‟s various other committees are just as inactive as 
the Women‟s Committee, as Korashi mentioned, while the DFP pays lip service to issues 
like human rights, democracy and the rule of law. It is therefore not surprising that the 
media hardly ever mentions these political forces, their activities or stances on women, 
because there are hardly any activities or stances to begin with. Whether or not all of 
these opposition parties have access to the media, the extent of any such access and 
whether or not there is a discrepancy between the media access of secular and Islamist 
forces is all examined in Chapter 5.  
Some individual female members of almost all of the political forces are interested in 
women‟s rights and women‟s political empowerment. However, in most cases, they are 
unable to achieve much within the political parties. They are largely confined to the 
women‟s units in which they are at best active in apolitical arenas, such as community 
service. Even within the ruling party, the Women‟s Secretariat is clearly a very weak unit 
because it does not play any role whatsoever or have any kind of impact on any decision 
pertaining to women‟s rights. These women also find it very difficult to excel within the 
party‟s ranks, largely because male members of the political forces perceive any gains by 
women within the party, such as women joining the party‟s higher ranks, as women 
taking something that belongs to men and thus diminishing their power. For example, as 
stated previously, the male members of the Wafd  wanted only three and not four of the 
female members of the party to join the party‟s decision making body because if four 
women joined it, one of them - the men - would no longer be a member of the decision 
making body. Whether or not and to what extent these women‟s voices are to be found in 
the media is investigated in Chapter 6. It is perhaps not surprising that many of these 
women also channel their activism in the NGO arena. For many of them are members or 
heads of women‟s NGOs. This form of women‟s activism is thoroughly investigated in 
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Chapter 5. Also, whether or not any from of co-operation takes place between female 
members of the various political forces to further women‟s cause is investigated in 
Chapter 8.  
This chapter has also shown that the NDP believes that drama serials have an immense 
impact on viewers that resembles a brainwashing effect. Therefore, it extends a similar 
argument made by Abu Lughod (2005) about those in control of the dramas serials 
industry to the NDP.  
The evidence in this chapter shows that decisions pertaining to women‟s empowerment 
are made by the President and/or first lady and to a lesser extent their son Gamal. For 
example, the first lady played an integral role in the introduction of the khula law and 
women‟s appointment as judges. This signifies that she is involved in formal and not 
informal politics, as suggested by Joseph (2001). It also implies that Kassem‟s (2004) 
notion of personal authoritarianism also extends to the first lady especially when it comes 
to women‟s rights. Her role and how it is reflected and relates to media treatment of 
women‟s rights are further investigated in Chapters 5 and 6. Gamal is also clearly active 
in formal politics and has an official title - the Secretary of the NDP‟s Policies 
Committee. His activities vis a vis women‟s political empowerment and media treatment 
of women in politics is investigated in greater detail in Chapter 5.   
Findings presented in this chapter suggest that the NDP is a rather powerful institution 
which intervenes on some occasions in some key decisions pertaining to women‟s 
political empowerment. This power seems to have been underestimated in theories like 
Kassem‟s (2004) account of personal authoritarianism in Egypt‟s political system. At the 
same time, and in a contrast that seems paradoxical, the NCW seems to be a rather weak 
institution. For example, it advocated increasing women‟s parliamentary representation 
by allowing only women to run for some of the existing parliamentary seats but this idea 
was rejected by the NDP who came up with the idea of adding extra seats to parliament 
and allowing only women to run for them. The reasoning behind the NDP‟s idea was to 
avoid taking away any parliamentary seats from men. Clearly, the NDP is trying to keep 
its interests intact. But the idea that it came up with is also additional evidence to support 
 103 
the argument made previously about how male politicians perceive the idea of women 
obtaining rights as a process in which rights are taken away from men and given to 
women. In other words, they perceived it as a zero-sum game in which either men or 
women - but not both - can be powerful. Whether or not and to what extent the NDP is 
truly a powerful institution while NCW is a weak one and how this is reflected in media 
treatment of decisions pertaining to women is investigated in Chapter 6.  
  
Chapter 5 
ACTIVIST WOMEN, WOMEN’S ACTIVISM  
AND THE MEDIA 
The previous chapter has shown that political parties are not concerned about women‘s 
political empowerment, and that many female members of political parties are also active 
in the NGO arena. This signified the need to examine women‘s NGOs in order to 
determine whether or not, and if so to what extent, they fill the gap left by political 
parties. Thus, three different women‘s NGOs are examined in this chapter. They were 
carefully chosen because they seem to demonstrate the various different relations 
between NGOs and the state that are to be found in Egypt. Previous scholars like Bianchi 
(1989) and Abdel Rahman (2004) have examined relations between NGOs and the state, 
but they have not looked specifically at women‘s NGOs. More importantly, the chapter 
will focus on how the relations between women‘s NGOs and the state relate to the media 
access these NGOs enjoy and how these relations are reflected in media treatment of 
these NGOs and of women‘s rights as a whole. This is done with particular emphasis on 
the privately owned media in order to determine whether or not the proliferation of 
privately owned media has meant that women‘s NGOs have more media access and 
whether their treatment of women‘s NGOs and women‘s rights differ from that of the 
government owned media in any way. Furthermore, it looks into the effectiveness of 
women‘s NGOs in light of Jad‘s (2004) arguments about how addressing women‘s rights 
using NGOs depoliticizes them and fragments women‘s activists into leading institutions 
that compete with one another. The chapter also analyzes how this relates to media 
treatment of women‘s rights.   
In addition, a governmental women‘s organization called the National Council for 
Women is examined because, as argued in 2.2.2, the Egyptian government is active in 
what it describes as women‘s issues. This chapter analyzes the role of the first lady in this 
regard and how this relates to the role that she plays in politics while taking into 
consideration Joseph‘s (2001) argument that first ladies tend to play a role in informal 
politics, as well as examining how her role relates to media treatment of NCW. In 
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addition, this chapter looks into the interaction between NCW and women‘s NGOs and 
builds on the arguments put forward by Adams (2007) who examined a similar 
governmental institution in another authoritarian country. But it also investigates an 
additional element, namely how this interaction relates to the media access and treatment 
of all of these organizations. It also examines the government‘s approach to women‘s 
rights, its effectiveness and shortcomings, such as the ones suggested by Murphy (2003). 
The findings in this particular area are built on in the next chapter.  
The last organization examined in this chapter is the United Nations Development Fund 
for Women (UNIFEM) Cairo office, largely because it seems to be interlinked with 
NCW. The chapter looks into whether or not and if so how this relates to ideas that a 
particular version of women‘s rights is being imposed onto Egypt, as stated in 2.2.1.  
An overview of the law pertaining to NGOs in Egypt is necessary because it provides 
some important background information about the relationship between NGOs and the 
state. Although the Ministry of Social Affairs (MOSA) is the one responsible for ensuring 
that NGOs abide by Law 84/2002, a state security office is located in the Ministry‘s 
headquarters and it plays a direct and integral role in this regard.  According to the law, 
all NGOs are required to register with the state and MOSA  must approve the founders 
and board of directors of any given NGO. The law allows for direct interference in the 
NGOs work. For example, a MOSA representative can attend meetings  held by the board 
of directors of NGOs. All NGOs are also required to provide MOSA with minutes of 
such meetings and with a detailed report of their expenditure and revenue. Furthermore, 
the law prohibits NGOs from engaging in political activity and activities that threaten 
national unity or violate morals and public order. These categories are vague and not 
clearly defined in order to allow the state to interpret them as it pleases whenever it 
deems necessary. Also, NGOs are required to notify MOSA of their activities 60 days in 
advance, and they are allowed to go ahead with them, provided that they do not receive 
written notice of MOSA‘s rejection of the activity in question. This makes it very 
difficult for NGOs to react swiftly to current events. Furthermore, MOSA must approve 
any NGOs‘ receipt of foreign funding, which tends to be the main source of income for 
the vast majority of NGOs. Thus, one of the tactics utilized to control and cripple NGOs 
is delaying such approvals (Agita 2007: 6-8).  
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The chapter is divided into six sections, one about each of the organizations that were 
previously mentioned. Each of these sections is then sub-divided into several subsections 
about how that organization is run, its sources of funding, its relation to the state 
apparatus, its relation to other women‘s organizations, the discourse it uses to address 
women‘s rights as well as a section about how the organization interacts with the media 
and media treatment of the organization.  
 
5.1 Association for the Development and Enhancement of Women: 
The Association for the Development and Enhancement of Women (ADEW) is an NGO 
that primarily works with female headed households living in shanty towns. The 
objectives of ADEW include empowering women who head their households 
economically, legally, socially, culturally and in the area of health, establishing 
communication channels between females who head their households and decision 
makers and drawing the latter‘s attention to the difficulties these women face (ADEW nd: 
6). 
  
5.1.1 NGO Management: 
ADEW‘s Board of Directors consists of seven people, six women and one man. One of 
them, Iman Baibers, is the President of the Board of Trustees (ADEW nd: 32). Some of 
ADEW‘s publications are written by Baibers
47, the vast majority of ADEW‘s publications are forwarded by Baibers and a photo of her 
is featured in that forward
48
. Numerous pictures of her are also always to be found in 
ADEW‘s newsletter ‗Our News‘ (ADEW 2004: 1, 3-7). It is noteworthy that none of the 
other board members are ever mentioned in any publication. In addition, when ADEW 
trains journalists, most of the time it is Baibers who selects the training material and 
conducts the training herself
49
. Also, Baibers is the only ADEW member interviewed by 
the media or mentioned as part and parcel of the media‘s coverage of ADEW‘s 
activities. All of this indicates that ADEW is run like a one (wo)man show. But it is 
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noteworthy that Baibers stated that she always get deeply offended when she is 
interviewed on television and the interviewee refers to ADEW as ―my NGO‖50. 
 
5.1.2 Funding: 
ADEW receives funding from a very large number of foreign donors, a local donor, a few 
individuals as well as from an organization affiliated to the Egyptian government.  
Its foreign donors include the Union Bank of Switzerland, Optimumus Foundation, 
German Technical Corporation, UNDP, Ford Foundation, the Embassy of Finland, the 
Italian Fund Debt Swap program, International Children‘s Fund, the World Bank, GEF, 
Virginia Foundation, the European Union, the Arab Gulf Program for United Nations 
Development Organizations, the German Embassy, EED, the Japanese Embassy, the 
Australian Embassy, Vodafone, Flora Foundation, the Body Shop, Dorsis Foundation, 
OSI, the Swiss Fund, UNIFEM, AECI/CONEMUND (ADEW 2006),  the British Council 
and the Egyptian Swiss Fund and Global Fund for Women (ADEW 2002: 28). Its local 
donor is Sawiris Foundation for Development and the individuals it receives funding 
from are Akef Al Maghrabi, Ashraf Al Shafky, Faith Galetshoge and Paul Herman. 
Meanwhile, the organization affiliated to the Egyptian government it receives funding 
from is the National Council for Childhood and Motherhood (ADEW 2006). It is 
noteworthy that ADEW refuses to accept funding from the American government 
because Baibers believes that the American government seeks to shape society in a 
manner that she dislikes
51
.  
The fact that ADEW receives funding from such a large number of foreign donors 
indicates that it is fully integrated into the international framework and works by its rules. 
In addition, its receipt of funding from organizations affiliated to the Egyptian 
government suggests that it is on good terms with the state.  
Baibers commented on their receipt of funding from a very large number of donors by 
saying:  







We are competent, we write good proposals, we produce publications, we deliver, 
we are very open. Maya Morsi [UNIFEM Coordinator in Cairo] asked us to 
collect signatures objecting to violence against women, we collected 3500  
signature in just three days, more than any other NGO. That‘s why they [donors] 
like us. When I organize a conference, I secure coverage from all media outlets 
and the most important people in the country [attend it]. As an employee in a 
donor organization all of this enables you to write an outstanding report. Both the 
donor and I benefit. Another important issue is quality. If the donor‘s boss wants 
to inspect our work any time they are most welcome
52
. 
On the contentious issue of donors setting agendas, Baibers said: 
I do not accept taking orders from donors or changing things in order to please 
donors. We submit a proposal and if a donor likes it the way it is we accept 




Therefore, even though Baibers denied that donors set the agenda for ADEW‘s activities, 
she admitted that the whole idea of donors setting agendas is not a fantasy.  
  
5.1.3 Relationship with State Apparatus: 
ADEW seems to be on good terms with the state because state security does not give 
them a hard time, many of their events are sponsored by high ranking government 
officials, many of whom are also speakers in those events and some of their publications 
include praise for the government. 
Baibers described their relationship with state security by saying: 
We have to take permission from MOSA and it sends our papers to state security 
for approval as well. I go directly to state security. They do not know anything 
about NGOs and perceive them as vehicles for making money or evil people who 
are in touch with foreigners. … We do not face any problems [with them] and 
when we do face minor problems it is usually because we did not follow up on the 




 Ibid  
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paper work properly or because one of the employees dislikes us. We are not one 
of the NGOs that they pick one because we are not perceived as anti-government 
and we do not [engage in activities such as] monitoring elections
54
. 
Baibers statement suggests that state security is far more powerful than MOSA and has 
the upper hand when it comes to decisions on allowing NGOs to function.  
In addition, many of ADEW‘s events are sponsored by high ranking government officials 
including the first lady and several ministers
55
. In addition, speakers in their events 
include important members of the ruling party (ADEW 2001: 19) and members of the 
People‘s Assembly and Shoura Council (ADEW 2006: 13, 19, 46, 50, 51).  
Also, ADEW‘s publications are not only void of criticism of the government at any and 
all levels, but they even include praise for the Egyptian first lady. For example, in an 
introduction to one of ADEW‘s publications, Baibers wrote ―the Egyptian feminist 
movement under the auspices of the honorable Mrs. Suzane Mubarak‖ (ADEW Sept. 
2002-Feb. 2003: 5). The same publication also includes the following sentence: 
―women‘s issues receive more and better coverage by the media due to … Mrs. Suzane 
Mubarak‘s patronage‖ (ADEW Sept. 2002-Feb. 2003: 7). 
All of this indicates that ADEW is on good terms with the state and even raises the 
question of whether it is truly an NGO or simply a GONGO.  
In the words of Baibers:  
We are apolitical. In order to change the nationality law, we turned to everyone 
the NDP, NCW. Who is the one who is going to change the law? Hosni Mubarak. 
If you do not like him, go ahead and establish a political party and change him. 
But until he is changed, I will beseech him to change the nationality law. And 
when the law was changed, millions of people benefited from it. … On Orbit 
[television] I said Mr. President these are your children, please do not let them 
down. Who stood up on the 18th of September 2003 and said we will change the 
nationality law? Hosni Mubarak. You have to utilize the tactics that will result in 
achieving your goals. Didn‘t this bring an end to the suffering of many children? 




 See for example: ADEW 2001: 6,9; ADEW 2006: 13; ADEW 2007: 8 
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Am I a traitor? Do I like Hosni Mubarak? … Suzanne, Gamal and Hosni 
[Mubarak] are the ones who change things regardless of whether or not you work 
on the media. You have to get your message across to them and be persistent
56
. 
The agitation and defensiveness of Baibers implies that she has been criticized for her 
approach. Her statement also indicates that changing laws to grant women rights is a 
decision that can only be made by the President, first lady and/or their son Gamal. 
  
5.1.4 Relationship with NCW:  
ADEW co-operates with NCW on various fronts, NCW members attend and/or speak in 
events organized by them and some of ADEW‘s projects are in collaboration with NCW. 
ADEW was also one of the NGOs which were invited by NCW to participate in 
discussing the joint CEDAW report
57
. In addition, the Secretary General of NCW, 
Farakhonda Hassan, attends many of their events and speaks highly of ADEW‘s 
activities
58
 (ADEW 2001: 6).  
This is another indication that ADEW is on good terms with the state and suggests that it 
could be a GONGO.  
Baibers described ADEW's relationship with NCW by saying: 
Much of the data and footage aired by NCW on television and the photos they use 
originally belong to us. I am not concerned about whether or not I am given any 
credit for all of this. If the government thinks highly of my studies and uses them 
to change laws, this is good, regardless of whether or not I am given any credit. I 
lobby these people. It is very easy for Suzanne Mubarak to change a law. If her 
employees take our work and claim that it is their own and end up being 
promoted, it does not matter. What matters is whether or not they read our work 
and whether or not it ends up becoming government policy
59
. 
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Baibers‘ statement indicates that the first lady has some considerable powers at her 
disposal – she can change laws. It also suggests that NCW takes the work of women‘s 
NGOs and attributes it to itself.  
Baibers also said: 
Many Egyptians argue that women have attained all of their rights because in 
conferences they state that the number of women in this field or post exceeds the 
number of men and we have established these institutions and organizations, but 
none of them address women‘s issues ... They all talk about their activities, their 
own achievements. I remember in 2002, we started talking about how female 
headed households still exist because … [after NCW was established, people] 
started saying things like we have solved [all] of women‘s problems [but] the 
laws have not changed ever since we started working in this field in 1975. Do you 
want women‘s issues to be resolved or do you want to prove that you are great? 
Very few women are after resolving women‘s issues60.   
If Baibers‘ statements about NCW are compared and contrasted to those in ADEW‘s 
publications one gets the impression that statements in the publications gloss over any 
tensions between ADEW and NCW and instead emphasise their good relations. Clearly, 
Baibers has her differences with NCW and its approach.  
 
5.1.5 Discourse: 
The discourse ADEW used in its campaign to amend the nationality law to allow 
Egyptian women married to non-Egyptian men to pass on the Egyptian nationality to 
their children must be analyzed very carefully. At the beginning the discourse they used 
was based on equality between men and women regarding passing on the Egyptian 
nationality to their children. But they realized that using the discourse of ‗alhimaya wa al 
bakaa‘ or ‗protection and survival‘ coupled with allowing these women and their children 
to tell their own stories was far more effective (ADEW 2001: 3). This entailed arguing 
that these children will end up dropping out of school because their mothers can not 
afford to pay for their school tuition in dollars, as required by law from foreigners and 





stressing that most of these children have grown up in Egypt and have never even visited 
their fathers‘ home countries. They also countered the argument that allowing these 
children to obtain the Egyptian nationality would threaten Egypt‘s national security 
because they would be dual citizens, by arguing that these children would indeed threaten 
Egyptian national security if they identified themselves as Egyptians but were treated as 
foreigners and would therefore suffer in issues like education and employment. They also 
used statistics to convey that this is a widespread problem
61
.  
In Baiber‘s words: 
In 2000, the People's Assembly addressed the nationality law. Six female MPs 
said things like ―our children are having a hard time finding jobs, so will children 
of [Egyptian] women married to Saudis find jobs?‖ We organized a conference 
[entitled Women and Law: Women's Legal and Constitutional Rights which was 
sponsored by Suzanne Mubarak] and there was a lot of media work, we invited 
those female MPs and others and used live testimonies. At the beginning, people 
made fun of us and of that tactic. But when those female MPs listened to those 
live testimonies, they cried and decided to help them out. The media went crazy 
over the live testimonies of the women and children. We used the discourse of 
survival and protection. Nobody has rights [in Egypt], men are oppressed. So 
women‘s rights discourse does not work. But when you use the discourse of 
survival and protection, we are an emotional people. Why not make use of this 
and bring children to tell their own stories and say my blood is Egyptian and you 
treat me as a foreigner, it makes your heart ache. Getting them to tell their own 
stories is far more effective than me sitting there and talking about women‘s 
rights. ... If someone opposed changing the law, they would look bad because they 
would be perceived as cruel
62
. 
This implies that women‘s rights discourse does not bode well in Egyptian society and 
utilizing it is largely ineffective. In fact, the approach ADEW used was of focusing on the 
suffering of the children of an Egyptian mother and non-Egyptian father to argue for the 
need to amend the nationality law. This completely sidelined not only women‘s rights but 
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even women from the whole argument. Baibers‘ statements indicate that this approach 
was successful. But it is also important to note that the conference she is referring to was 
sponsored by the first lady. It is inconceivable that the first lady would have sponsored 
the conference if she did not approve of changing the law, which is something at her 
discretion given Baibers‘ statements which were cited in 5.1.3 and 5.1.4. So it is likely 
that the female MPs in question and the media were cooperative because they were aware 
that the first lady approved amending the nationality law.  
  
5.1.6 Media Exposure and Interaction:  
One of the tactics ADEW utilizes to secure media coverage of their events is asking a 
group of media professionals to help them out in designing a media campaign, deciding 
on a strategy for media coverage of that event and ensuring that its message is clearly 
conveyed in the media. All of this is done before the event takes place. They include 
journalists who work for government and privately owned newspapers, as well as radio 
and television stations
63
 (ADEW 2001: 13). 
ADEW also interacts with the media and engages in dialogue with media personnel. For  
example, they organized a roundtable discussion about media treatment of NGOs and the 
extent to which it resembles reality (ADEW 2006: 49). As previously stated, ADEW also 
trains journalists. Baibers is the one who does the training herself.  
I call it opening up people's minds. We first talk about a specific topic in general 
and I then present them with a case study and examples of how they reported on a 
specific problem, our critique of their coverage and the facts. The case study I 
present is usually about gender or important issues such as changing the 
nationality law. I shock the trainees I tell them that women are in the same 




All of this indicates that ADEW takes the media very seriously, reaches out to the media 
and tries to change media treatment of women‘s rights.  
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ADEW also provides some media outlets with data about women‘s issues. For example, 
they provided two televised programs with background information about and the legal 
justifications for amending the nationality law (ADEW 2001: 8). ―We also provide the 
media with women to interview when the need arises on the spot and in no time even if 
the program will be aired shortly and the journalists are desperate, as long as it is a 
reputable program
65‖. 
Providing the media with such information and people to interview could be a tactic to 
establish, maintain and sustain good relations with media personnel. This might then be 
reflected in media treatment of ADEW. This way of doing things is referred to in Egypt 
using the proverb ‗shayelni we ashayelak‘ i.e. you do me a favor, and I do you one.  
Baibers writes opinion columns in Al Ahram on a regular basis
66
 which indicates that she 
- and not just ADEW - is on good terms with the government. She is also frequently 
featured on television and quoted in stories in newspapers about women‘s issues67. In her 
words, ―journalists like to interview me on television because I speak well, I express 
moderate views and I do not quarrel with the other speakers
68‖. 
As previously stated, high-ranking government officials sponsor, attend and speak in 
ADEW events, Baibers related this to the media by saying: 
Their attendance changes journalists‘ perception [of our activities] because their 
attendance means that they believe in the cause you are advocating, that we are 
changing things along with the government. When government officials and 
ministers attend the conference it shows that the government approves of your 
work. … Their attendance gives us credibility and proves that we are in line with 
government policy. I do not have a problem with the government‘s policy, I 
disagree with the government‘s policy of torturing people but I agree with its 
policy if it furthers my cause. … these are two separate issues. And do we change 
laws or not? Yes, we do
69
. 
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This provides evidence to support several arguments that were made in previous sections; 
that ADEW is on good terms with the state. Also, it is possible that the widespread media 
coverage of ADEW‘s campaign to amend the nationality law is likely to have been 
caused by the state‘s intention to amend the law anyway. Again, Baibers‘ defensiveness 
implies that she is criticized for being on good terms with the state.  
I analyzed media treatment of ADEW and found that Al Ahram often covers ADEW‘s 
activities in the form of very brief news stories that mention that a particular event has 
taken or will take place, without going into the details of the event or mentioning the 
views that were expressed in that event
70
. Al Masry Al Youm use to cover ADEW‘s 
activities in greater detail
71
 and on some occasions it would also include some light 
criticism of government policies
72
.  As for the broadcast media, on the 6th of June 2009, 
90 Dekika aired on Al Mehwar channel featured three different women to discuss 
Egyptian women‘s status and views regarding the women‘s parliamentary quota (see 
Chapter 6 for details). One of them was a journalist, another was a French teacher and the 
last one was a woman who sells bread in the street. Baibers contributed to the episode 
with a phone call and her contribution was confined to calling upon the woman who sells 
bread to turn to ADEW for assistance because she happened to live and work in the area 
in which ADEW is active.  
Therefore, the privately owned print media seems to have allowed for more detailed 
coverage of the activities of women‘s NGOs, but that  does not seem to be the case when 
it comes to talk shows aired on privately owned satellite channels. 
   
5.2 Egyptian Center for Women’s Rights: 
The Egyptian Center for Women's Rights (ECWR) describes itself as an independent 
organization that is not affiliated to the government or to a political party. Its main 
concern is supporting Egyptian women in their struggle to obtain all of their rights and in 
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order to achieve equality. ECWR opposes all forms of discrimination against women and 
encourages the legislative authority to reconsider all of the laws that are not in line with 
the constitution and international conventions about women, (ECWR nd: 38) especially 
CEDAW. ECWR actively seeks to empower women politically and legally. Its aims 
include disseminating awareness of women‘s rights as part of human rights and political 
empowerment of women (ECWR nd: 97).  Therefore, ECWR is integrated in the 
international framework.  
 
5.2.1 NGO Management: 
The President of ECWR is Nehad Abu El-Komsan and she also chairs its Board of 
Directors. No information is available about the other board members on ECWR‘s 
website or in their publications. In addition, almost all of ECWR‘s publications have Abu 
El-Komsan‘s name on them73, and she is the only ECWR member featured on television 
and in the print media. Furthermore, when ECWR trains women who will contest 
elections, Abu El Komsan is the one who does most of the training herself
74
. All of this 





ECWR receives funding from various foreign organizations including the British 
Council
75
, the Embassy of the Netherlands, (ECWR nd: 2) the National Democratic 
Institute based in Washington (ECWR nd: 1) the EU, (ECWR nd: 3) UNDP, Global Fund 
for Women, the European Initiative to Support Democracy and Human Rights, Embassy 
of Finland,  the Swiss Fund for Development, Konrad Adenaur Foundation, Swiss 
Catholic Lenten Fund, Italian Association for Women in Development (AIDOS), Open 
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Society Institute, Middle East Partnership Initiative, Netherlands Development 
Cooperation Section and the African Women‘s Development Fund (ECWR website).  
ECWR‘s receipt of funding from a large number of donors could be taken as another 
indication of how it is integrated into the international framework.  
On the contentious issues of foreign funding and donors setting agendas, Abu El Komsan 
argued that there are numerous donors and so if one donor tries to impose an agenda, one 
can easily turn to another donor. She also argued that the donors themselves are not that 
powerful anyway, because they need state security permission to operate in Egypt
76
. 
Abu El Komsan‘s statement is rather contradictory. She indirectly acknowledges that 
some donors set agendas but then goes on to say that donors are not strong enough to set 
agendas.      
 
5.2.3 Relationship with the State Apparatus: 
There are some indications that ECWR is not on good terms with the state. One such 
indication is that ECWR experiences problems in dealing with state security, especially 
when their activities are political in nature. Another indication is that one of their 
employees spoke bitterly of how fifteen governmental organizations, including state 
security and MOSA, scrutinize any funding before they receive it, and it takes them four 
months to get back to ECWR about whether or not they can receive any funding. ―All of 
this wastes our time,‖ she added77.  
ECWR also criticizes some governmental institutions. For example, as part of their anti-
sexual harassment campaign, they criticized the Ministry of Interior by saying that the 
main concern of policemen is cracking down on the regime‘s political opponents and safe 
guarding government officials while citizens‘ well being is at the bottom of the list78. 
However, a report released by ECWR about the 2005 parliamentary elections seems to 
portray a rather different impression of ECWR‘s relationship with the state. The report 
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calls upon the President to fulfill one of the elements of his electoral program which 
entailed adopting a women‘s parliamentary quota (ECWR 2005: 48). 
In the words of Abu El Komsan: 
state security always takes forever to approve our receipt of any funding and they 
cancel some of our events. [But] cracking down on and shutting down an NGO is 
a political decision that is made at a much higher level, it is not made by state 
security personnel. But they would not get into that when it comes to a reputable 
NGO with which they have no political problems. … ECWR is very critical in 
some issues but we do not adopt a particular ideology, I am not in a battle with the 
government, I am not a member of the NDP or an opposition party, if the 
government achieves something regarding women I speak highly of it, if they 
falter, I harshly criticize them. Our stances are objective
79
. 
All of this indicates that ECWR experiences some problems and has some differences 
with the state. Abu El Komsan‘s statement is another indication of how state security 
tightly controls the activities of women‘s NGOs. But it also conveys that state security‘s 
powers are not unlimited and that cracking down on an NGO is a decision made by more 
senior government officials.  
 
5.2.4 Relationship with NCW: 
ECWR cooperates with NCW on various fronts and its publications include both praise 
for and criticism of NCW (ECWR nd: 45). One publication is actually dedicated to 
NCW. The dedication states ―to NCW which placed women‘s political participation at 
the very top of the list‖ (ECWR nd: 1). In addition, according to its publications, ECWR 
believes that NCW should focus on pressuring political parties to nominate large numbers 
of women and bringing the feminist movement together and cooperating with it. 
However, the same report includes criticism of NCW. In it NCW is criticized for failing 
to stand up for women who were sexually harassed by state security while they were on 
strike against the referendum at the Journalists‘ Syndicate on the grounds that they were 
not demonstrating for women‘s cause (ECWR 2005: 4). In addition, in the report NCW is 
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described as one of the tools of the NDP and it is accused of crippling NGOs and 
imitating their activities, such as training women on contesting elections. NCW is also 
criticized for providing the NDP with thousands of female voters, which are basically the 
women NCW helped out in obtaining national ID cards (ECWR 2005: 9-10). All of this 
indicates that ECWR‘s relationship with NCW is characterized by both cooperation and 
tension.  
Abu El Komsan described their relationship with NCW by saying: 
ECWR cooperates with NCW, not as much as we would like to. Some NGOs 
refuse to cooperate with NCW because it is a governmental organization, but we 
cooperate with anyone provided that such cooperation serves the causes we 
advocate, even if we are not going to receive any credit for it. Obviously, when 
you cooperate with NCW, all of the credit goes to NCW because the media will 
focus on it because the first lady is NCW‘s President, but that is alright. Our only 
concern is the outcome [of such cooperation]. The current form of cooperation 
with NCW  is one-way: we either send them information and never find out how 
it was used or they invite us to attend some meetings and we never find out what 
these meetings have led to. [For example,] we have come up with a draft law 
criminalizing sexual harassment [and] NCW has come up with another draft law. 
We want to discuss things with them so that only one draft law is around. But we 
are not decision makers, they are the ones who have the upper hand and decide 
whether or not to invite us. We send them the information and wait and see. NCW 
will meet up with female leaders and MPs to discuss the draft law, but we are not 
part of this process. … NCW has achieved a lot in a short period of time. … 
NCW is the one who changed the nationality law, NGOs worked on it for 10 
years but it was NCW that managed to change it, but not in the manner we were 
calling for. … NCW is skeptical about cooperating with some NGOs because of 
the discourse that they adopt. NCW wants things to work out, they want the 
policies they are working on to go through. That is why NCW personnel have told 
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us that they like us even though we are critical because we know when to be 
critical, while addressing which topics
80
. 
In addition, NCW decided to submit a joint report for the next CEDAW committee. They 
wrote a report and sent it to NGOs and asked them to provide them with their comments. 
ECWR wrote a twelve page report with their comments and will not participate in writing 
a shadow report. This is another example of the one way communication; the NGOs will 
not get to see the final report nor do they have any idea about whether or not it includes 
their comments. It is noteworthy that donors refused to fund efforts to write a shadow 
report on the grounds that a joint report will be submitted
81
.  
Abu El Komsan‘s statements indicate that NCW takes the work conducted by NGOs and 
attributes it to itself and in the end the first lady is the one who takes credit for it in the 
media. They also indicate that NCW – i.e. the first lady – and not women‘s NGOs is the 
one which posses decision making power when it comes to changing laws pertaining to 
women. In addition, her statements reveal that NCW is used to control the information 
about Egyptian women‘s status that is submitted to the CEDAW Committee.  
 
5.2.5 Co-operating with Other NGOs: 
Abu El Komsan said  
if another NGO engages in a particular task such as organizing meetings between 
various NGOs, ECWR does not approach this task, even if  we believe that we 
can do a better job or if that particular NGO will not engage in that activity that 
year. We are very sensitive in this regard and never engage in any activity that can 
lead to any problems between ECWR and any other NGO, such as another NGO 
perceiving ECWR as infringing on their work. We refrain from engaging in any 
such activity, even if doing so harms us
82
. 
This indirectly sheds light on some of the tensions and problems between women‘s 
NGOs. It gives the impression that each NGO engages in particular tasks which other 
NGOs are not allowed to approach. According to Abu El Komsan, this actually has a 
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negative impact on the work of ECWR, which could mean that it has a more profound 
negative impact on the women‘s movement as a whole.  
 
5.2.6 Discourse: 
The discourse, ECWR uses to address women‘s rights must be analyzed carefully. Abu 
El Komsan said that:  
Some NGOs adopt radical feminist discourse. I believe that such discourse poses 
a threat to Arab societies. Some [members of society] promote ideas that are 
backward and they are gaining momentum. Radical feminist discourse indirectly 
feeds these backward ideas because it allows for arguments such as cultural 
imperialism and undermining our culture. That is why strategic thinking is 
important and friendly discourse must be used to address women‘s issues. If you 
analyze the discourse we use, you are bound to find that it is not radical, 
especially in the anti-sexual harassment campaign. The point I am trying to make  
is not that  men are bad and mistreating women. We suffer from many social 
problems and this leads men to take it out on women. We can not adopt the same 
radical discourse that is used in America because the situation is different and the 
issues we address are different in nature. In the anti-sexual harassment campaign, 
we are not arguing that men are bad, for they are sexually harassing women but 
we are talking about society in a very friendly manner. We have acknowledged 
that a problem exists and have called upon all members of society to participate in 
solving it. We transformed the issue into an argument about safety; if sexual 
harassment is a widespread phenomenon then men will fear for their wives, sisters 
and daughters. This tactic proved to be very effective. For example, some young 
men have volunteered to take part in our campaign and a middle aged man who 




In other words, Abu El Komsan was arguing against using women‘s rights discourse and 
arguing that using it actually backfires. She also explained in great detail another 
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discourse all together that was used by ECWR to campaign for a specific women‘s right. 
She elaborated on how successful this tactic was.  
    
5.2.7 Media Exposure and Interaction: 
ECWR is particularly concerned with providing the media with information about 
women‘s performance during parliamentary elections. For example:  
In the 2000 parliamentary elections we were largely the only source of 
information for the media. We provided them with documented information such 
as the press briefings made by leaders of political parties [prior to the elections] 
about how many women they are going to nominate and how they are going to 
support them along with how many women they actually nominated and the 
extent to which they supported them
84
.  
Another example is how during the 2005 parliamentary elections, ECWR monitored 
women‘s performance in the elections and used to issue three press releases everyday and 
send them to newspapers. Those who published the press releases the most accurately 




Also, at the beginning of their anti-sexual harassment campaign, government owned 
television and radio stations did not cover their activities as often as they would have 




This indicates that ECWR exerts a lot of effort to have an impact on media treatment of 
women‘s political participation. It also shows that the privately owned media has allowed 
for more accurate coverage of women‘s political participation, as well as breaking taboos 
pertaining to women.  
Abu El Komsan described their relationship with all kinds of media - print and broadcast, 
government and privately owned - by saying: 
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Some NGOs create a media committee for every project or hire media personnel 
as consultants in order to  ensure that [their activities] receive extensive media 
coverage. We do not resort to this tactic. I look at it from the following 
perspective: I have information that benefits and interests viewers and journalists 
need such information to fill up space. Therefore, we cooperate with each other. 
In some cases, the relationship has even evolved into friendship. Sometimes I call 
journalists to notify them that I will hold a press conference on a particular day 
and they advise me to change the date because an important event will take place 
that day and so media coverage of my press conference will be minimal. It is in 
any journalist‘s interest to have access to a well-respected and trustworthy source. 
Many [print] journalists hold key positions in talk shows and other televised 
programs on satellite channels. Sometimes when I am featured as a speaker in any 
program, I chat with these journalists before the program begins. They often tell 
me about other topics that will be addressed in the program in other episodes, and 
these topics happen to be ones that I can help out with. So I ask them to turn to me 
for background information about it but they do not have to feature me in the 
program [in return]. Sometimes they call me up to ask for the contact information 
of someone they would like to feature in the program and I provide them with it, 
such as a woman who ran for parliament but did not win the elections. At other 
times, they call me up to interview me … about a particular topic which ECWR 
does not address so I refuse to be interviewed and recommend someone else. It is 
all about mutual respect rather than bribing people. … One of the producers of a 
program aired on terrestrial Channel Two said that he can not ask for permission 
to run an episode about sexual harassment so he asked for permission for an 
episode about misbehaving in public and in the episode itself I got to talk about 
sexual harassment. He did so because he believed in the cause not because I 
bribed him. …We appreciate journalists for covering our events regardless of the 
length of the story, especially when it comes to a government owned newspaper. I 
really appreciate it if a journalist in Al Ahram writes a very small piece about us 
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because their criteria, the issues that they have to take into consideration and the 
pressures that they experience are very different
87
.  
Abu El Komsan was probably referring to Baibers when she said that some NGOs create 
a media committee or hire journalists as consultants, which implies that they are not on 
good terms or at least are in disagreement regarding the approaches and tactics that they 
utilize. Her statements indicate that ECWR‘s relationship with the media can largely be 
described as one of cooperation and mutual respect. They also imply that the existence of 
privately owned media allowed for more detailed coverage of ECWR‘s activities, and 
probably those of women‘s NGO in general.  
I analyzed media treatment of ECWR and found that Al Ahram hardly ever covers 
ECWR‘s activities and the minimal coverage that it does receive consists of very brief 
news stories that mention that a particular event has taken or will take place, without 
going into the details of the event or mentioning the views that were expressed in that 
event. Meanwhile, Al Masry Al Youm covers such events in greater detail and the stories 
include the critical views that were expressed about the government or specific laws, 
none of which is to be found in Al Ahram‘s coverage of ECWR‘s activities. For example, 
Al Ahram covered a particular event in the following manner: 
The law regulating how often, when and where the parent who is not entitled to 
custody gets to see their child, the custody law and the interests of children of 
divorce is the title of a seminar organized by the Egyptian Center for Women's 
Rights in collaboration with the High Islamic Council at 11 am at Pyramisa 
[Hotel]. Nehad Abu El Komsan, President of ECWR, said that this is the first of a 
series of round table discussions that the center will organize about the Personal 
Status Law as part of its efforts in brining an end to familial violence, looking 
after the interests of all members of the family as well as their efforts to propose a 
new law regulating child custody in addition to how often, when and where the 
parent who is not entitled to custody gets to see their child and whether or not the 
child actually spends days, weeks or months with that parent.  
This was followed by the names of some of the attendees (El Sa'ati 27/1/2009).  
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While Al Masry Al Youm covered the same event in the following manner:  
During a seminar about the law regulating how often, when and where the parent 
who is not entitled to custody gets to see their child  and the child custody law 
which was co-organized by the ECWR and the High Islamic Council, divorced 
couples quarreled and men accused women of being unjust, while women accused 
men of being kidnappers. These quarrels escalated into shouting matches and each 
side cheered and clapped - just like people cheering in a football match - when a 
participant [from the same gender] talked about his/her experience and views. … 
Dr. Mohamed Al Shahat, the Secretary General of the High Islamic Council, 
criticized the law which extends mother's rights to child custody from the age of 
15 till girls get married and to the age of 21 in the case of boys [and argued that 
this], deprives fathers from overseeing their children's … upbringing and 
education (Rashwan 30/1/2009c). 
Also, Al Masry Al Youm reports on ECWR reports that address more sensitive issues and 
include harsh criticism of the government and laws among other issues. It also reports on 
them in greater detail. Even when Al Ahram runs a story about a sensitive issue, it seems 
to be selective and only mentions the less critical aspects of that issue. It is also 
noteworthy that the stories are much shorter than those of Al Masry Al Youm. 
For example, Al Masry Al Youm ran a very long piece about a report produced by ECWR 
entitled ‗An Absentee Government and Devastated Women‘. The story stated that the 
report included the following statement: "According to the report, the Egyptian Personnel 
Status Law is not favorable to women and the vehicles through which the law is 
implemented are complicated and costly" (na 8/3/2009). On the other hand, a story in Al 
Ahram about a report produced by ECWR about sexual harassment stated ECWR 
"released a booklet entitled 'How to Deal with Sexual Harassment' … The booklet 
includes advice addressed to women who are sexually harassed, such as: ―do not blame 
yourself, [if the harasser is a co-worker] talk to trustworthy colleagues about it and try to 
find out how you can file a complaint and try to avoid taking a taxi on your own. If you 
have no choice, take note of the car number and sit in the back seat and prevent the driver 
from changing the route" (El Mahdy 8/3/2009a). 
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As for the broadcast media, 90 Dekika featured Abu El Komsan once on the 15th of 
November 2008 while discussing how a teacher sexually assaulted one of his female 
students who was under the age of 10. It is noteworthy that in Egypt this is perceived as 
sexual assault and not child abuse. In addition, Abu El-Komsan was featured on Dream 
TV’s talkshow Al Ashera Masan to talk about the study it conducted about sexual 
harassment. She was also featured in 90 Dekika by a phone call on 6 October 2008 (see 
Chapter 6 for details about both 90 Dekika and Al Ashera Masan).  
  
 5.3 New Woman Foundation: 
New Woman Foundation (NWF) describes itself as a feminist NGO that was established 
in 1984 which strives to transform Egyptian society into a democratic one that is devoid 
of all forms of discrimination against all citizens in general and women in particular. Its 
aims include mainstreaming women‘s rights on political and social agendas, creating 
lobbying groups and supporting marginalized women and empowering them (NWF nd). 
NWF's points of reference are CEDAW and human rights in general but with an 
emphasis on those human rights which address social issues. According to Nawla 
Darwish, the President of NWF, they support fully equality between men and women and 
they focus on marginalized groups because they believe that poor women are the ones 




5.3.1 NGO Management: 
There are several indications that NWF is not run by just one of its board members. 
Firstly, among NWF board members, there are disagreements regarding whether or not 
they should accept governmental funding. Darwish is totally against receiving funding 
from any and all governments but she describes her stance as more extreme than those of 
other NWF board members. They are similarly divided on abortion, and that is why they 
recently organized a seminar to discuss this particular topic amongst themselves
89
. 
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Secondly, the names of different NWF members are cited in their publications
90
. In 
addition, different NWF members are interviewed by the media. For example, Nawla 
Darwish was quoted in stories about celebrating the anniversary of NWF‘s establishment, 
Amal Abdel Hadi was quoted in a story about a seminar about women‘s rights organized 
by NWF, while Lamia Lotfy was quoted in a story about the rights of children of urfi 
[secret and undocumented] marriage 
91
.  
All of this indicates that unlike ADEW and ECWR, NWF is not run like a one (wo)man 
show but is run in a manner that involves of cooperation between its members. Therefore, 
Darwish‘s title of President means something very different than in the cases of both 




NWF‘s main funder ever since 1994 is Oxfam. Darwish described their relationship as 
one of cooperation and stated that they do not impose an agenda on them. She also added 
that they contribute to NWF‘s core expenses, such as rent, lighting and the salaries of 
NWF's administrative staff rather than simply providing them with funding on a project 
basis. In addition, McArthur Foundation funds their website. They also receive funding 
from other donors on a project basis. For example, they use to receive funding from a 
magazine called Reproductive Health Issues so that they issued an Arabic version of it 
and at one point Ford Foundation funded one of their projects. Darwish stressed that they 
refuse to accept funding from the American government including USAID as well as the 
World Bank because their policies have led to a rise in poverty rates
92
.  
Darwish also said that some NGOs - both women's NGOs and other types of NGOs - 
tailor their work to the agenda of donors. ―Suddenly, an NGO that has never addressed 
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violence against women starts doing so, simply because funding for projects addressing 
this issue is available.‖93 
NWF‘s sources and nature of funding is very different from those of NWF and ECWR. 
This is likely to be related to the ideological background of its members. But like Baibers 
and Abu El Komsan, Darwish acknowledged that the whole notion of donors setting 
agendas does exist. Also, she seemed to be referring to ECWR when she said that 
suddenly an NGO that has never addressed violence against women does so due to the 
availability of funding. This is another indication of the antagonism between the 
women‘s activists. 
 
5.3.3 Relationship with Status Apparatus: 
NWF faced a lot of problems in order to register as an NGO and different governmental 
institutions give them a very hard time. According to Darwish, at the beginning they were 
registered as a non-commercial civil company in order to avoid MOSA‘s interference in 
their work and also because the law at the time did not allow for human rights NGOs to 
exist. In 2002, they applied for registration as an NGO after the new NGO law was 
introduced. They received a letter stating that their registration was rejected after the 
registration period ended. They filed a court case and a court ruling allowed NWF to 
temporarily register as an NGO
94
.  
In addition, NWF's headquarters are subject to periodical searches by governmental 
agencies and state security refuses to grant them permission for their activities, often at 
the very last minute
95
. They are also subject to regular inspections by various 
governmental agencies such as CAPMAS and MOSA. State security also pressures the 
owners/directors of premises in which NWF organizes seminars to disallow them from 
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Clearly, NWF‘s relationship with the state apparatus is extremely strained and the state 
uses a variety of coercive measures to give them a hard time.   
  
5.3.4 Relationship with NCW: 
Darwish described the relationship between NWF and NCW by saying ―we are neither on 
good nor bad terms with NCW,‖ but she also stated that ―they [NCW] do not like us97‖. 
Also, Lotfy said that NWF was not among the NGOs NCW invited for a meeting to 
discuss the joint CEDAW report, adding that they only invite NGOs which are in line 
with the government or those which will cause them trouble if they are not invited
98
. 
NWF members also criticize NCW on a regular basis. For example, Darwish stated that 
NCW receives very large amounts of funding from donors and it is not held accountable 
for it
99
. She added that    
NCW was established in 2000 and it attributes things that NGOs have been 
working on for a long time to itself. We have been working on changing the 
nationality law for a long time, other people have been working on the khula law. 
Some demands were even made by Huda Sharawi
100
 … but because we are 
Pharaohs
101
, of course things change when the first lady steps in
102
.   
Similarly, NWF‘s reports are very critical of NCW. This is an example of the language 
used in one of NWF‘s reports:  
Ever since NCW refrained from defending the Egyptian women who were 
[sexually] assaulted on the 25th of May 2005 on the grounds that they were not 
calling for women‘s rights, more evidence has emerged proving that this entity is 
fake. … this entity is an additional form of censorship on the freedom of feminist 
organizations who are truly concerned about the issues of women and the nation, 
and which are active in the most difficult conditions. This indication necessitates 
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 The historic figure, widely perceived as the pioneer of feminism in Egypt.  
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that civil society take a swift and firm stance against this council and similar ones 
which were established to bring an end to their [civil society] movement, smear 
their work and convey a fake civilized and modern impression to world public 
opinion (Darwish and Shukrala 2005: 14). 
Furthermore, NWF members believe that NCW is backfiring. Darwish said that  
NCW leads women to hate women's issues because its discourse is meaningless 
… and some male politicians are now calling for the establishment of a National 
Council for Men. Some people say things like 'what rights are women calling for? 




Similarly, the report referred to earlier by NWF included the following statement:  
the extensive coverage by the government owned media of this Council‘s [NCW] 
marvelous achievements under the leadership of Egypt‘s first lady, as well as this 
Council‘s message which is devoid of any truly empowering discourse to 
Egyptian women … has backfired among Egyptian laymen and women and has 
led to an increase in opposition for women‘s rights, not to mention making fun of 
women‘s rights (Darwish and Shukrala 2006: 16). 
 There is clearly no cooperation whatsoever between NWF and NCW. NWF is highly 
critical of NCW‘s existence, its approach, its activities, its leadership and the discourse it 
adopts. They believe that all of this is backfiring and turning the Egyptian people against 
women and their rights. They also believe that NCW is not truly interested in women‘s 
rights or their empowerment.  
 
5.3.5 Media Exposure and Interaction: 
Several private Egyptian satellite channels cover NWF‘s activities and interview them 
such as O TV, Al Hayat and Al Mehwar. In addition, the government owned Nile News 
Channels, and sometimes even terrestrial Channels One and Two cover their activities
104
. 
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Also, Darwish used to write an opinion column in the privately owned newspaper Al 
Badil (The Alternative)
105
. She use to send opinion columns to Al Masry Al Youm but not 
all of them would get published.
106
 
Nehad Saleh is a journalist in Al Ahram newspaper who covers NWF‘s activities on a 
regular basis. Saleh said:  
I do not write everything NWF members say, if I did, I would get fired. So I try to 
write in an objective manner without changing their statements, but there are 
things which I have to omit. For example, NWF issued a press release about a 
network that they have established to support women who press charges against 
men who sexually harass them. ... The head of the women's page would have 
refused to publish the press release as it is. So I went around it and wrote a story 
in which I stated that lately, more attention is being paid to women issues, [and 
gave the example of] how the man who harassed Noha Roshdy was sentenced to 
prison [see Chapter 8 for details about this incident] …so I called upon women to 
overcome their fear and press charges if they are sexually harassed and then 
included the information in the press release. But I omitted a part about the 
government and police stations
107
.  
In contrast, Hoda Rashwan, a journalist in Al Masry Al Youm who covers NWF‘s 
activities, said that she does not edit or downplay news about NWF or the views of its 
members, but clearly attributes any views to the specific people who express them and 
includes the other side of the argument
108
. 
All of this indicates that there is some room in the government owned media for agents to 
cover some of the activities of an NGO which has a strained relationship with the state, 
although some of their views need to be omitted or downplayed in order to allow for this. 
In contrast, the privately owned media has allowed for coverage of activities which are 
not on good terms with the state without any alteration.  
I analyzed media treatment of NWF and found that Al Masry Al Youm covers some of 
NWF‘s activities which break taboos and address sensitive issues. These are not be found 
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in Al Ahram‘s coverage of NWF‘s activities. For example, Al Masry Al Youm ran a story 
which stated that New Woman Foundation organized a roundtable discussion entitled 'Is 
Abortion a [Woman's] Right or is it Murder?' According to the story, the participants 
recommended allowing women who were impregnated as a result of rape to be entitled to 
abortion," (Rashwan 24/4/2008h) while the story about the same event in Al Ahram read 
"Female police officers should be the ones dealing with rape victims. This is what New 
Woman Foundation called for in a roundtable discussion which discussed the proposed 
law that would entitle women who are impregnated through rape to abortion (10/5/2008). 
Also, in Al Masry Al Youm, a letter to the editor by Darwish was published, (Darwish 
27/4/2007) which is something that is never to be found in Al Ahram.  
As for the broadcast media, during the last episode of the week, 90 Dekika features a 
group of speakers, to discuss various events that have taken place that week. On the 20th 
of June 2008, the program featured a journalist, a religious scholar and Amal Abdel Hadi, 
a member of NWF. One of the issues they addressed was sexual harassment. Abdel Hadi 
argued that sexual harassment has always taken place but in the past it was a taboo, 
women could not tell their families that they had been sexually harassed, nor did the 
media address the issue, let alone use the term sexual harassment (10/5/2008).  
   
5.4 National Council for Women: 
The National Council for Women (NCW) was established in accordance with the Beijing 
Platform for Action which stipulated that states should establish national women‘s 
machineries affiliated to ―the highest possible level in government.‖ Its main aim is to 
―support government-wide mainstreaming of a gender-equality perspective in all policy 
areas.‖ 
In addition, Article 18 of CEDAW stipulates that states party to CEDAW should submit 
periodical reports to the CEDAW Committee stipulating the steps that they have taken to 
implement CEDAW.   
Therefore, the National Council for Women (NCW) was established by a Presidential 
decree in the year 2000 and it is affiliated to the President of the Republic. It consists of 
30 members whose membership lasts for three years and is renewable thereafter. The 
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criteria that they must meet are being public figures who specialize in women‘s issues 
and are socially active (NCW 2006: 1). The members of NCW largely consist of 
members of the regime; members of the ruling party – some of whom are also MPs – as 
well as former ministers. Examples are Moushira Khatab, Amina Al-Gendi, Georgette 
Killini, Zeinab Radwan, Amal Othman and Ahmed Kamal Abo El Magd. NCW members 
also include a small number of judges, such as Judge Mahmoud Ghoneim, a judge in the 
High Constitutional Court. A very small number of NCW‘s members are members of 
opposition political parties. For example, Amina Shafik is a member of Tagammu Party 
and is a journalist in Al Ahram
109
. NCW‘s composition reflects that it is a governmental 
organization, and it is not in any way surprising that most of its members are affiliated to 
the regime. But the affiliation of a small number of its members suggests that NCW is 
used to coopt members of opposition parties who are interested in women‘s rights.   
According to its mandate, NCW‘s role includes suggesting general policies to society and 
its institutions pertaining to women‘s issues and means of empowering them 
economically and socially and integrating women‘s issues in development, following up 
on and evaluating general policies pertaining to women, expressing its opinion on 
proposed laws and decisions about women before they are approved, proposing laws and 
decisions that enhance women‘s status, expressing its views on all of the conventions 
about women and representing women in all international organizations and events to do 
with women. In addition, the mandate states that all governmental institutions must 
provide NCW and its Secretary General with all of the data and statistics that relate to the 
Council‘s work (NCW 2006: 1-2, 4).  
 
5.4.1 NCW Management:  
The following is the organizational chart of NCW
110
: 
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The first lady is the President of NCW. She is an acting President and follows the 
Council‘s work almost on a daily basis111. Her role includes 
nominat[ing] the Secretary General of the Council, 
approv[ing] the composition of the Standing Committees of the Council and 
nominat[ing] the coordinator and the alternate coordinator for each committee 
after the approval of the Board of the Council, supervise[ing] the … [council‘s] 
work with the assistance of the Secretary General [and any other member of her 
choosing], invit[ing] the Council to hold regular or exceptional meetings [and]  … 
invite[ing] any of the Committees to meet [at  a date and time of her choosing], … 
approv[ing] the composition of the Council's delegations abroad, … approv[ing] 
the proposed general budget and the final financial statement of the Council after 
approval by the Board of the Council, delegate[ing] anyone she chooses for 
conducting research … [related to] the objectives and mandate of the Council, … 
approv[ing] the composition of the Branches of the Council [and] approv[ing] the 
composition of the Ad-hoc Committees of the Council
112
. 
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Therefore, the first lady is almost fully in control of NCW and is involved in the intrinsic 
details of its work. Also, NCW is run like a one (wo)man show, just like ADEW and 
ECWR. 
In contrast, the Secretary General‘s role is rather limited. It includes  
representing the Council in its contacts with external parties and before the 
judiciary system, … monitor[ing] the implementation of the general policy 
adopted by the Council …, follow[ing]-up on the activities and recommendations 




In fact, much of her work consists of implementing the first lady‘s decisions. For 
example, she  
 invite[s] the Council to convene at the times and dates decided by the President 
of the Council, issue[s] the decrees for the composition of the Council's 
delegations abroad after approval by the President of the Council .... 
implement[s] all activities assigned by the Board of the Council and its President, 
issu[es] the decrees for the composition of the Council's Standing Committees, 
after approval by the President of the Council, issu[es] the decrees for the 
composition of the Council's Branches after approval by the President of the 
Council [and] issu[es] the decrees for the composition of the Council's Ad-hoc 
Committees after approval by the President of the Council
114
. 
NCW contains 10 Standing Committees. These include a Non-Governmental 
Organizations Committee which aims to propose policies and programs which activate 
NGOs‘ role and to follow-up on and assess the efforts and activities of women‘s NGOs 
and submit recommendations on means of supporting them
115
. This provides further 
evidence to support the argument made earlier that NCW is used to coopt women‘s 
NGOs. Another committee is the Political Participation Committee which aims to 
recommend policies that enhance women‘s political empowerment and propose programs 
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that promote women‘s political participation on all levels116. Also, the Legislative 
Committee aims   
to examine the laws, regulations and decrees related to women and propose any 
amendments deemed necessary, to express opinions on draft laws, regulations and 
decrees related to the objectives of NCW [and] to follow up on the enforcement of 
laws, regulations and decrees to ensure that [they live up to the principle of] 
gender equality, as stipulated in the Egyptian Constitution
117
. 
This substantiates the statements made earlier by Baibers and Abu El Komsan about how 
the first lady and/or NCW are the ones who change laws pertaining to women. These are 
powers accorded to NCW by virtue of its mandate. Since NCW is run like a one (wo)man 
show, then the first lady is entitled to change and amend laws.  
In addition, the Executive Committee reviews the final reports of the Standing 
Committees, reports on NCW conferences and reports produced by NCW‘s branches. It 
also provides the Secretary General with its views on grants and donations offered to 
NCW. The members of the Executive Committee include Amal Othman
118
. Meanwhile, 
the Committee of Coordinators‘ main function is coordination between the NCW‘s 
Standing Committees. Thus, its members are the Coordinators of the Standing 
Committees and it is chaired by the Secretary General
119
. Also, NCW has a branch in 




5.4.2 NCW Activities: 
Some of the laws NCW was involved in changing or introducing are the reintroduction 
of  a law that stipulates that a man can be sentenced to prison if he does not pay his ex-
wife the nafaka
121
 (NCW 2004 nd: 24), canceling the law that stated that women need 
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their husband's permission in order to travel, amending the nationality law to grant 
Egyptian women the right to pass on the Egyptian nationality to their children (Kandil 
2006: 47) and amending the pension law to allow men to receive the pension of their 
deceased wives
122
.   
NCW also plays a role in changing laws on the basis of the complaints it receives through 
its Ombudsman Office. An example is how the Ombudsman Office received complaints 
from women stating that they can not afford to pay the registration fees to sue their ex-
husbands for not paying the nafaka, so NCW's Legislative Committee played a role in 
canceling those fees
123
. Another example is how the office received a lot of complaints 
about how male members of the family steal women‘s share of inheritance. "We provided 
the Secretary General with a report about this and she passed it over to the legislative 
committee who then worked on a law to punish those who steal other people‘s fair share 
of inheritance, regardless of whether they are men or women‖124. 
 
5.4.3 Funding: 
NCW receives funding from and or its projects are in collaboration with the Government 
of the Netherlands (NCW nd: 3) USAID, (NCW 2003 nd: 10) UNDP, OUDA, the EU, 
UNICEF, UNIFEM, UNFPA, UNESCO, (NCW nd: 76) UNFPA and Ford Foundation 
(NCW nd). NCW‘s sources of funding indicate that it is embedded in the international 
framework which promotes a specific version of women‘s rights. It also clearly 
extensively collaborates with many UN bodies. Also, NCW‘s receipt of funding from the 
American government - as opposed to ADEW and NWF‘s refusal of such funding – is 
perhaps not surprising because NCW is a governmental organization and the Egyptian 
government receives aid from the American government on annual basis.   
  
                                                 
122
 Interview with Nagwa El Fawal, Head of the National Council for Women‘s Ombudsman Office, 
Cairo, 12 January, 2009  
123
 Interview with Mahmoud Ghoneim, Judge in High Constitutional Court and Member of NCW‘s 
Legislative Committee, Cairo, 10 September, 2008 
124




5.4.4 Relationship with NGOs: 
NCW perceives NGOs as important vehicles for achieving its goals and believes that 
getting through to women at the grassroots level is not possible without resorting to 
NGOs who are active at this level. Consequently, some of NCW‘s projects are 
implemented by NGOs and some NGOs are centers to activate NCW‘s activities. In 
addition, NGO activists and representatives participate in NCW conferences, seminars 
and workshops. Some NGO activists have also been appointed as NCW members while 
some NGOs in different governorates have been asked to function as NCW branches 
(Kandil nd: 2). NCW clearly perceives NGOs as GONGOs and as vehicles for 
implementing its vision, policies and activities. This implies that the statements made by 
Baibers and Abu El Komsan which indicated that NCW took some of the work conducted 
by ECWR and attributed it to itself, are merely examples of a self-professed NCW policy.  
 
5.4.5 Discourse: 
Some members of NCW or members of units affiliated to NCW talked at length about 
NCW‘s discourse and people‘s take on it. For example, one of the male members of 
NCW‘s Legislative Committee said:  
NCW believe me does not work for women's interest … but for that of the entire 
family … I always say that NCW stands up for the weaker party even if it is not a 
woman … [when the] nationality law [was changed] those who benefited were 
children. Even with the khula law, if my sister marries a terrible man … and she 
[uses the khula law to obtain a divorce] I - her brother - have benefited too. … 
Some people are now calling for a national council for men. … every time I 
switch on the TV set it‘s all about women, women, women. That's not the way it 
should be. Such direct discourse is wrong, this media policy is incorrect, one 
should use indirect discourse … the media policy has backfired, and the extensive 
pressure for women‘s rights in an inappropriate timing has truly lead to negative 
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Therefore, even senior members of NCW are aware that its existence, its approach and 
the extensive media coverage of its activities are backfiring and turning Egyptian society 
against women‘s rights.   
Similarly, the head – a woman - of one of the Equal Opportunity Units established by 
NCW within all of Egypt‘s ministries said that at the beginning, the objective of the Unit 
was  
to serve women. But we realized that if we serve only one member of the 
Egyptian family we will not achieve everything that can be achieved. So we serve 
those who require special attention - regardless of whether they are men or 
women - in order to attain equal opportunities. Indeed, we are more successful 
now that we are concerned about both sides. At first the unit was called women‘s 
unit and we received a lot of criticism on the grounds that we were concerned 
about one side and not the other. At first male employees in the Ministry harshly 
criticized us and called for the establishment of a national council for men and 
argued that women enjoy all of their rights while men do not. We organized 
workshops in which we asked men to list all of the tasks that they and their wives 
perform. This lead them to realize that we are not talking nonsense and that 
women truly engage in multi-tasking, are under a lot of pressure and are even 
victims of violence. As a result, they no longer criticize us. In fact, many of them 
are now eager to attend the events we organize and have started helping their 
wives out with household chores and child rearing. We are trying to change 
society to the better but it will take time
126
. 
In other words, they had to adopt an indirect approach and avoid using women‘s rights 
discourse. Yet it is very significant that their revised approach has led some men to help 
their wives out in household chores and childrearing.   
Also, the repeated reference to calls for the establishment of a national council for men, 
which was also expressed by one of the speakers in an episode of 90 Dekika quoted in 
Chapter 1, are a vivid indication of how NCW is backfiring.  
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5.4.6 Media Exposure and Interaction: 
News about NCW is published in the government's page and not the women's page of Al 
Ahram based on the first lady's request because she does not want her name to appear 
next to stories about make-up and fashion, but next to stories about ministries. This is the 
status she wants NCW to have
127
. Since stories about NCW are published next to stories 
about ministries, this is likely to lead readers to associate women‘s rights with 
government policy. Since much of government policy is deeply unpopular and 
unsuccessful, this is likely to lead an association between women‘s rights and all of these 
negative issues. In addition, publishing stories about NCW in this particular page is likely 
to strengthen the already existing sentiments that the government is biased for women 
and against men.  
The main role of NCW‘s Media Committee is to train media personnel on addressing 
women‘s issues in the media from various perspectives, such as political, human rights, 
humanitarian and gender perspectives. They place special emphasis on women and 
politics. They train journalists who work for government and privately owned media as 
well as newspapers affiliated to political parties. The Committee also plays a role in state 
owned media‘s treatment of women‘s issues by asking ERTU‘s media unit to feature 
women more often in mainstream programs, such as featuring qualified women in 
programs about economics, medicine and law
128
.  
In addition, NCW also plays a role in drama serials treatment of women. The head of the 
Ombudsman Office writes reports about some of the complaints that they receive and 
submits them to the Secretary General who in turn asks the President of ERTU to 
produce drama serials to be aired on both radio and television addressing these 
complaints. Examples are men stealing women's fair share of inheritance and the 
problems that result from failing to document marriage. In the words of the Head of the 
Ombudsman Office – a woman - ―this leads to societal discussions about it, people 
realize that that particular problem exists, what its causes are and how to go about solving 
it, such as whether or not it requires a legislative solution and can the media play a role in 
solving it.‖ They engage in these measures if they believe that drawing people's attention 
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to a particular problem is important or if they believe that it is important to ensure that 
public opinion is on their side
129
. Therefore, NCW personnel seem to believe that drama 
serials have an immense impact on viewers and can actually shape public opinion. Her 
statement also indicates that there is some room for people‘s complaints to shape some of 
NCW‘s policies rather than it being entirely a top-down institution. 
I analyzed media treatment of NCW and found that Al Ahram and to a lesser extent Al 
Masry Al Youm extensively cover NCW‘s activities. When the first lady attends and 
heads an NCW activity, it more often than not receives first page coverage. Al Ahram 
covers NCW more often than Al Masry Al Youm and in greater detail and the stories 
about NCW in Al Ahram are extremely long
130
. Al Ahram‘s coverage of NCW focuses 
primarily on the meetings Suzane Mubarak heads, the activities she attends and the 
reports she receives. This is followed by high level meetings and press briefings by 
NCW‘s Secretary General Farakhonda Hassan131. Al Masry Al Youm covers NCW's 
activities and issues related to it that are not covered by Al Ahram, such as rumors about 
NCW, slight differences between NCW and governmental institutions and NCW‘s 
meetings with women‘s NGOs132. Also, Al Masry Al Youm covers NCW activities that 
many readers can relate to more often than Al Ahram. An example is a story about the 
Ombudsman Office's annual report and a categorization of the different types of 
complaints it has received throughout the year (Rashwan 27/3/2009). Also, Al Ahram 
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extensively covers NCW‘s cooperation with international organizations such as the UN 
as well as foreigners praising NCW and/or the first lady, while Al Masry Al Youm does 
not cover such issues. An example is a story about a roundtable discussion co-organized 
by NCW, the Helsinki Institute and the Finish Ministry of Foreign Affairs about how to 
increase women's role in developing the national economy (El Baradi 21/2/2009)
133
. 
Thus, Al Masry Al Youm‘s treatment of NCW gives the reader the impression that NCW 
is involved in a variety of activities and exposes the reader to different personnel within 
NCW. Meanwhile, Al Ahram‘s treatment of NCW gives the reader the impression that it 
is all about the first lady, high level meetings and conferences. 
  
5.5 United Nations Development Fund for Women:  
Maya Morsi, UNIFEM‘s coordinator in Cairo described UNFIEM‘s role by saying: 
"UNIFEM‘s global plan and in the Arab world is to empower women economically, 
linking CEDAW with the laws of any given country and gender budgeting
134
. These are 
different forms of contribution but … [our activities] are driven by NCW, the government 
or NGOs. We do not impose things, our plan is very flexible‖135. Morsi‘s statements 
show the centrality of CEDAW in the international framework.  
  
5.5.1 Activities:  
Morsi described UNIFEM‘s activities by saying "during the last ten years, UNIFEM has 
been working on women's political empowerment because the laws that were in place did 
not allow for women's political empowerment," Morsi said. They have been working on 
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the policy level, updating laws and linking general social, economic and developmental 
policies to women's empowerment. However, UNIFEM does not work on changing laws 
but it plays a role in the logistical support to do so, such as providing NCW with research 
on how another Arab country changed a particular law and funding NCW studies on 
issues like the family law in Egypt. UNIFEM also played a role in the logistical support 




Morsi argued that this approach is not a top-down one because women's NGOs had 
already been calling for changing many of the laws that they played a role in changing, 
such as the nationality law, adding that NGOs convey the voices of the people at the 
grassroots level. However, she acknowledged that some of their activities, such as 
incorporating the notion of gender in the government's budget
137
, could be described as a 
top-down approach, because no NGO had been calling for something along those lines. 
UNIFEM is also playing a role in the efforts to combat sexual harassment.  
We are working on a model to provide women with the tools to press charges if 
they are sexually harassed. … A ‗safe city model‘ was implemented in Latin 
America. We will tailor it to the Egyptian context, introduce NCW and the 
government to it and if they are interested, they can take it. … UNIFEM creates 
the model and we give it to an organization along with the technical tools to 
implement it. Such a project requires partnership from the Ministry of Interior, 
NCW and NGOs which function in that geographic area
138
.  
Morsi‘s statements indicate that UNFIEM seems to be involved in almost all of the 
activities undertaken by most of the women‘s organizations examined in this 
chapter. Also, the ‗safe city model‘ indicates that UNIFEM promotes an agenda despite 
all of her statements about how its work is driven by NCW, the government or NGOs. 
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5.5.2 Relationship with NCW: 
Morsi described UNIFEM‘s relationship with NCW by saying that UNIFEM perceives 
NCW as its counterpart. The UNIFEM office in Egypt is based inside NCW's 
headquarters. UNFIEM played a role in creating the different NCW units and in 
interviewing those who later became NCW employees. "UNIFEM implements the 
government‘s needs and not the other way around. The UN does not interfere in NCW‘s 
agenda. They make decisions like this year we will work on the nationality law, next year 




This implies that NCW is enmeshed within UNIFEM and indicates that UNIFEM plays 




In contrast to the findings about Egypt‘s political parties presented in Chapter 4, this 
chapter has shown that most of the selected women‘s NGOs directly address women‘s 
political participation and, in doing so, they take the media very seriously and exert a lot 
of effort to secure media coverage of their activities. Based on evidence from this 
chapter, the explanation for this discrepancy between the activism of women‘s NGOs and 
political parties seems to lie in the much wider margin of freedom the government allows 
NGOs as compared to political parties. This in turn can be explained by reference to 
government perceptions of NGOs as being far less of a threat to its power. The activities 
of women‘s NGOs are political and in other contexts they would have been performed by 
political parties. For example, their activities include engaging in advocacy work and 
calling for changes to laws pertaining to women rather than things like promoting breast 
cancer research or establishing mother and toddler drop in clubs. Furthermore, as part of 
their campaigns to change laws they negotiate with the state using various methods, such 
as beseeching and/or calling upon the President to engage in particular policies, inviting 
high-ranking government officials to their events and cooperating with NCW . However, 





in the Egyptian context NGO activities are carried out in a manner that makes them seem 
apolitical because, as previously stated, law 84/2002 prohibits NGOs from engaging in 
political activity. But this freedom should not in any way be exaggerated. It is still 
extremely limited and coercion is used to crack down on NGOs that cross the red line. In 
light of this it can be said that NGOs like ADEW and ECWR, are a manifestation of what 
Bianchi (1989) has described as ―fake pluralism‖. That is to say: they are weak entities 
whose leaders are co-opted by the state and therefore do not pose any kind of threat to the 
regime. In this regard, only NWF stands out as different. It is a non-coopted NGO which 
conveys that Bianchi‘s (1989) notion of unruly corporatism is still valid. For there is 
some room for pluralistic entities to exist, albeit with a lot of difficulties. Moreover, the 
co-opted NGOs do not threaten the state in any way because they, as well as NCW, are 
embedded in the same international framework.  
But is important to note that a close analysis of the activities and discourses of all of the 
women‘s organizations examined in this chapter has revealed that they actually have 
rather different approaches to women‘s rights. Both ADEW and ECWR largely seek to 
improve women‘s lives by playing it safe and not even attempting to challenge the 
structures that disadvantage women. For they largely campaign to change, amend or 
introduce laws pertaining to women. But as argued by Murphy (2003), merely changing 
laws leaves the societal structures that disadvantage women unchanged. In fact, only 
NWF‘s approach is a transformatory one that seeks to challenge the structures that 
disadvantage Egyptian women. Meanwhile, NCW‘s approach is one of equity and not 
equality. For example, the amendment of the nationality law and the introduction of the 
khula law gave women more rights but did not grant them equal status to men.  
The evidence in this chapter shows that the manner in which the vast majority of 
women‘s organizations are run as well as the nature of the relationship between them is 
reflected in the way they are treated in the media. The vast majority of women‘s NGOs, 
such as ADEW and ECWR, are run like a one (wo)man show, as Abdel Rahman (2004) 
has previously noted in her study about non-women‘s NGOs. But NWF, as previously 
argued by Al Ali (2000: 186) is run in a rather democratic fashion in the sense that it is 
run in a manner that involves of cooperation between its members. As for NCW, as this 
chapter has shown, the first lady is an acting President of NCW who oversees its work 
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almost on a daily basis, by virtue of which she has an official title and is entitled to 
written powers - those stipulated in NCW‘s mandate. Drawing simultaneously on 
Joseph‘s (2001: 38) differentiation between formal and informal politics as an arena for 
first ladies, and on the working of NCW, we can conclude that Suzanne Mubarak is 
active in formal politics, and not informal politics. All of this is reflected in the media 
treatment of these organizations. Much of the stories about most women‘s NGOs in the 
print media consist of stories covering their activities, which include quotes from the 
President of that NGO, while reference to other members of the NGO is almost never to 
be found in the media. These stories are almost always to be found in the women‘s page 
of the government owned newspaper. Meanwhile, the government owned media focuses 
on NCW activities that are headed or events attended by the first lady. Such stories are 
almost always to be found in a page entitled ‗The State‘ along with news about various 
governmental institutions.  
Furthermore, the nature of the relationship between NCW and the vast majority of 
women‘s organizations is that NCW tries to co-opt the women‘s NGOs. This is similar to 
an argument previously put forward by Adams (2007) when she examined a national 
machinery in another country which is also ruled by an authoritarian regime. This chapter 
adds to that finding by showing that NCW also uses the work done by women‘s NGOs 
and attributes it to itself and to the first lady. This attribution is reflected via the media 
but is intertwined with how decisions regarding laws pertaining to women are changed. 
This must be examined first before delving into the media treatment of this aspect of 
NCW‘s relationship with women‘s NGOs.  
For as Abdel Rahman (2004) has previously noted, in some cases, the interests of some 
NGOs which are co-opted to some extent are rather similar to those of the state. Building 
on Abdel Rahman‘s argument, these interests tend to be similar but not identical. 
Examples include amending the nationality law in the case of ADEW and introducing a 
law penalizing sexual harassment in the case of ECWR. Not surprisingly, these NGOs 
co-operate with the state in this regard, but they play no role whatsoever in the decision 
making process. This is a critical point which will be elaborated on in Chapter 6. 
However, evidence in this chapter that supports this argument includes Baibers‘ 
arguments that the President, first lady and their son Gamal are the ones who change 
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laws. This is in addition to how she found it necessary to beseech the President on 
television to change the nationality law. Similarly, while Abu El Komsan addressed the 
efforts to introduce a law penalizing sexual harassment, she stated that ECWR provides 
NCW with information and their work and simply wait and see.  
This interaction then appears in the media in the form of a campaign by one of the 
women‘s NGOs to change, amend or introduce a law, but it is likely this ‗campaign‘ so to 
speak only received extensive media coverage because the state has allowed this to take 
place because it has already decided to change, amend or introduce the law in question 
anyway. For example, if the government had not decided to amend the nationality law, 
the first lady would not have sponsored ADEW‘s conference which addressed this issue 
and received extensive media coverage. When the law is changed, it is framed in the 
media as a decision by the President and/or first lady, who take full credit for all of this, 
which supports the argument made earlier about how the first lady uses the work done by 
women‘s NGOs and attributes it to herself. Meanwhile, the heads of the women‘s NGOs 
are merely quoted as thanking them for doing so and/or speaking highly of this move.  
Analysis of media coverage of NGOs shows that the heads of women‘s NGOs may often 
criticize some aspects of the law which came about. For example, in the case of 
amendments to the nationality law, they pointed out that it was amended to grant 
Egyptian nationality to the children of an Egyptian woman and her non—Egyptian 
husband but not to the children‘s father. That such criticism was ignored is further 
evidence to support my argument that women‘s NGOs are not decision makers, because 
laws are not introduced, changed or amended in the manner that they see fit. It can be 
concluded from this that NGOs are permitted to make minimal criticism via the media in 
order to maintain a system of fake pluralism. 
Based on Jad‘s analysis (2004) of the way NGOs are obliged to compete with each other 
for foreign funding and media coverage, the evidence in this chapter can be taken to show 
that these women‘s NGOs which are co-opted to various degrees by the state machinery 
do indeed compete with each other. But in this case, the prizes they are seen to compete 
for, besides funding and media exposure, is to be on more or less good terms with the 
state. It is natural that different NGOs should have different views on important issues. 
However, all of them - including the non-co-opted women‘s NGOs - constantly criticize 
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one another and work in a very individualistic manner. In other words, women‘s activists 
are fragmented and far from a unified women‘s movement. As was shown in this chapter, 
each NGO works on short-term projects to achieve short term goals, such as women 
being appointed in a particular profession previously denied to them.  
Media treatment of women‘s activism reflects this fragmentation and short-termism. It 
largely consists of separate stories covering the activities of individual women‘s NGOs, 
such as seminars and round table discussions that address a particular right as if it were 
divorced from those addressed by other women‘s NGOs. Fragmentation in coverage and 
thus in the representation of the struggle for gender equality undermines the quantitative 
increase in media attention to women‘s activism. Good media treatment of women‘s 
activism would entail more solidarity among the women‘s NGOs and less fragmentation. 
Having said this, it must also be noted that the privately owned newspapers have allowed 
all women‘s NGOs more detailed coverage of their activities. They have also allowed 
coverage of their events or statements which break taboos, address sensitive issues and 
harshly criticize the government and specific laws. Talk shows aired on privately owned 
channels have likewise given women‘s NGOs limited access to the broadcast media. But 
because of the way this access is split between competing organizations, the structural 
nature of activists‘ goals in the field of women‘s right is obscured.  
This finding can also be seen in the way almost all of the women‘s organizations, when 
engaging with the media, avoid using the phrase ―women‘s rights‖ and avoid framing 
their arguments in terms of women‘s rights discourse. Many heads and members of 
NGOs forcefully argued against using women‘s rights discourse, adding that doing so 
either gets them nowhere or backfires. In fact, much of the discourse that they utilize 
instead is paternalistic. An example is the discourse used by ECWR in its anti-sexual 
harassment campaign, which defined women in relation to their male relatives. It can also 
be seen in the argument put forward by an NCW member that the khula law benefits not 
only women but also men and the family as a whole on the grounds that a women‘s male 
family members usually bear the burden of helping her out in obtaining a divorce, rather 
than arguing that women should be entitled to swift unilateral divorce. Using paternalistic 
discourse is problematic is because it not only gives into but reinforces the idea that 
women are not independent human beings but are defined in relation to their male 
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relatives. Another type of discourse used instead of women‘s rights discourse was de-
gendered discourse, where the argument is presented as being totally unrelated to the way 
rights and responsibilities are assigned between women and men. An example is how 
ADEW focused on the suffering of the children of an Egyptian mother and a non-
Egyptian father in its campaign to amend the nationality law. Using de-gendered 
discourse is problematic because it gives into rather than challenges the way rights and 
responsibilities are assigned between women and men.   
The reasons behind this framing, as well as the resulting media treatment are investigated 
in Chapters 6 and 7. An important observation that must be made here is that these 
women‘s activists end up addressing women‘s rights on a one-by-one basis, as previously 
argued by Jad (2004) in isolation from the web of social, economic and political 
problems they are entangled with. Crucially, for the purposes of media treatment, it also 
means that activists campaigning for women‘s rights do not address the fact that there is a 
gender equality problem in Egypt, even though this is precisely the main reason why 
women do not have all of the different rights that they address on a one by one basis. 
Furthermore, this builds on Al Ali‘s (2000: 4-5) argument that some women‘s activists 
shy away from being called feminists, while others are unable to determine which Arabic 
equivalent to use because of their negative connotations. This chapter has built on her 
arguments by revealing that the media reinforces these negative connotations in addition 
to showing that the problem is not which feminist or women‘s rights discourse to use, but 





CASE STUDIES: MEDIA TREATMENT OF 
PARLIAMENTARY QUOTA AND PROVINCIAL 
GOVERNOR APPOINTMENTS IN TALK SHOWS 
AND THE PRESS 
Chapters 4 and 5 examined the aims and activities of political parties and women‟s 
organizations in the area of women‟s political empowerment. Although some light was 
shed on how these organizations try to reach out to the media, especially in the case of 
women‟s NGOs, there are several gaps in these two chapters regarding media treatment 
of these organizations and their media access. The current chapter will fill all of these 
gaps by using critical discourse analysis to examine Egyptian media‟s treatment of two 
recent events in Egypt that are emblematic of women‟s political empowerment. The first 
is the adoption of a women‟s parliamentary quota which took place in 2009, whereby an 
extra 64 seats were added to the 444 seats of the People‟s Assembly and only women are 
allowed to run for those additional seats. This secures a minimum female representation 
of 12.6% in parliament. The second is the appointment of new provincial governors in 
2008 who did not include a single woman. In fact, it is a post which no woman has ever 
attained in Egypt.  
The analysis will be conducted using a sample of print and broadcast media outlets, some 
of which are owned by the government, while others are privately owned. In the case of 
the print media, this includes the government owned Al Ahram (The Pyramids) 
newspaper and the privately owned Al Masry Al Youm (The Egyptian Today) newspaper, 
while in the case of the broadcast media the sample consists of three talk shows Al Beit 
Beitak (Make Yourself at Home) which is aired on two government owned channels, 
namely terrestrial Channel 2 and the Egyptian Satellite Channel, Al Ashera Masan (10 
PM) which is aired on the privately owned channel Dream TV and 90 Dekika (90 
Minutes) which is aired on the privately owned channel Al Mehwar.   
Also, some other programming is included for slightly different reasons. The first is that a 
particular political force, the Muslim Brotherhood, was never represented in any of the 
talk shows while they addressed women‟s political empowerment. Yet it was represented 
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once in another program called 48 Sa’a (48 Hours) which is aired on Al Mehwar during 
weekends. Therefore, this particular episode is included. In addition, a seminar organized 
by an NGO to discuss the women‟s parliamentary quota, in which all of the political 
forces were represented is examined. The seminar was not aired on any Egyptian 
channel, nor did it receive any coverage whatsoever in the Egyptian print media. 
However, it was aired on one of Al Jazeera’s channels, Al Jazeera Mobashera (Al 
Jazeera Live) which is how I obtained access to it. It is included in this chapter in order to 
investigate whether or not the views expressed by the various political forces vary in any 
way when expressed away from the Egyptian media. 
Studying the privately owned media is particularly significant because the privately 
owned media has only been re-introduced in Egypt in recent years. As stated in Chapter 
1, privately owned media use to exist in Egypt up until the early 1950s, when Nasser‟s 
socialist government came to power and nationalized all media outlets. Things only 
changed in 1977 when President Sadat reintroduced the multi-party system and allowed 
opposition parties to issue their own newspapers. However, privately owned newspapers, 
i.e. those owned by people other than political parties or the government, only emerged in 
the late 1990s and they were shortly followed by privately owned satellite television 
stations. Thus, it is important to examine whether or not these privately owned media 
outlets are free from government control and to what extent that is the case. That is why 
the chapter considers whether or not Albrecht‟s (2007) notion of liberalized 
authoritarianism, used to describe the political system in Egypt, can be used to explain 
the privately owned media environment in Egypt. It follows that the chapter also 
examines whether or not and to what extent opposition forces have access to the privately 
owned media and looks into whether or not Lust-Okar‟s (2007) notion of a divided level 
of contestation, whereby some opposition forces enjoy more freedom than others, is 
reflected in their access to the privately owned media.  
This chapter will also fill some of the other gaps in Chapters 4 and 5. Chapter 4, for 
example, showed that all those who support women‟s rights avoid framing their 
arguments in women‟s rights discourse. This chapter will look into whether or not and 
how this is reflected in the media.  Also, Chapter 4 focused on the female members of 
various political forces in Egypt. Whether or not and to what extent their voices are to be 
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found in the media is a gap that will be filled by the current chapter. In addition, Chapters 
4 and 5 examined the roles of the first lady and Gamal Mubarak in women‟s rights. Their 
roles will be explored even further in this chapter, and it will also look into how they 
relate to media treatment of women‟s rights. This will in turn lead to refining the 
arguments made in Chapters 4 and 5 about how decisions pertaining to women‟s rights 
are made in Egypt.      
The chapter is divided into two main sections. One is about media treatment of the 
adoption of the women‟s parliamentary quota and the other is about media treatment of 
how the newly appointed provincial governors did not include a single woman. Each 
section is then sub-divided into two main sub-sections one for the talk shows and one for 
the newspapers included in this study. These in-turn contain separate sections for each 
talk show and newspaper respectively. However, two additional sections are included 
prior to all of this. One provides some background information that is necessary to 
understand aspects of the main sections, and the other section looks into the relationship 
between the privately owned media and the state apparatus.  
 
6.1 Background Information to Parliamentary Quotas:  
Some background information is necessary prior to the analysis. This includes an 
overview of various types of parliamentary quotas that were implemented in different 
points in time in Egypt because some of those who commented on the women‟s 
parliamentary quota referred to these other types of quotas in their commentary. Also, the 
discussion about the women‟s parliamentary quota largely took place in two phases and 
the manner in which it was adopted was slightly changed during the course of this 
process. An overview of all of this is necessary because it was reflected in media 
treatment of the women‟s parliamentary quota. Finally, some of the commentators also 
referred to how the implementation of the women‟s parliamentary quota was in partial 
fulfilment of President Mubarak‟s electoral program, in addition to commentary on how 
he announced that a women‟s parliamentary quota would adopted. That is why I will go 
over both of these matters.  
The first time a parliamentary quota was adopted in Egypt was in the 1950s during the 
reign of the late President Gamal Abdel Nasser‟s socialist government. It adopted a 
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parliamentary quota for peasants and labourers, whereby 50% of parliament members had 
to fit into this category. This was incorporated into the constitution at the time and has 
not been changed to date, not because the Egyptian people or the government still believe 
in it, but due to the difficulties of changing the constitution. However, the system has 
become redundant because those who run for and win the seats for peasants and labourers 
nowadays are very privileged people who are completely detached from peasants and 
labourers and do not truly represent them.  
Many years later, in 1979, a women‟s parliamentary quota was adopted when late 
President Sadat introduced it using a Presidential decree. It entailed allowing only women 
to run for 30 seats in the People‟s Assembly and 20% of the seats in Local People 
Councils. This brought women‟s representation in parliament up to 8.93%. However, as 
soon as President Sadat was assassinated and the regime changed, the law was nullified 
on the grounds that setting aside seats for women favours women over men, while the 
Egyptian constitution equates both sexes (Hatem 1992: 234, 240-5).   
The women‟s parliamentary quota which is examined in this study was first brought to 
the for when the NDP started to discuss it in its annual conference in November 2008. 
Initially, the idea was to add 56 extra seats to the 444 existing parliamentary seats and to 
allow only women to run for those extra seats. The reasoning behind the number 56 was 
that there are 28 provincial governorates in Egypt and each one would be represented by 
two parliamentary seats. Later on the figure was changed to 64 seats in order to allow 
more densely populated governorates to be represented with a larger number of seats. 
That is why, as will be shown, on some occasions commentators in the media referred to 
56 seats, while others referred to 64 seats while commenting on the women‟s 
parliamentary quota.  
As will be shown during the course of this chapter, some people argued that adopting a 
women‟s parliamentary quota was in fulfilment of President Mubarak‟s electoral 
program. The first Presidential elections took place in Egypt in 2005. As the NDP 
candidate, Mubarak‟s electoral program included taking the necessary measures to 
increase women‟s parliamentary representation. In fact, it was the President himself who 
announced that a women‟s parliamentary quota would be considered in order to increase 
women‟s parliamentary representation during a joint session of the People‟s Assembly 
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and Shoura Council. As he read that part of the speech, he looked up and said to the 
members of both houses “do not you worry, we will not take anything away from you” 
before he made this announcement.   
  
6.2 Privately Owned Media and its Relationship with the State Apparatus: 
All of the privately owned satellite channels operate in studios based in Media Production 
City and they broadcast using the satellite Nilesat. The Egyptian Radio and Television 
Union (ERTU) owns 50% of Media Production City and 40% of Nilesat. ERTU is a 
consortium of television and radio stations that are accountable to the Minister of 
Information. Officially, it is a public enterprise. But in practice, the Minister of 
Information heads its board of trustees and it is a mouthpiece for the government. The 
other shareholders in Media Production City and Nilesat are largely banks and investment 
companies that are owned or controlled by the state. In addition, a state-owned 
enterprises - more often than not ERTU - owns a minority share in the channels 
themselves. Also, the channels must obtain a license from the state and those licenses 
may very well be withdrawn if these channels speak too freely on domestic politics (Sakr 
2008: 267, 270-3, 275). In addition, such licenses are only granted to people, mostly 
businessmen, who are closely affiliated to the regime. Some of them, such as Ahmed 
Bahgat the owner of Dream TV, are direct business partners of the President‟s son, Gamal 
Mubarak.  
Also, Bashir Hassan, the program editor of 90 Dekika, said that state security often calls 
them a few hours before the program is aired and orders them to drop one of the topics 
that they had intended to tackle in the program that day. He added that they abide by such 
orders, which clearly indicates that such programs only tackle topics that have obtained 
prior approval from state security
140
. Furthermore, the producer of a talk show aired on another channel once told me in an 
informal conversation that a member of state security often calls them up while the 
program is being aired live and orders them to tell the presenter to tone down. The 
director then passes the message on to the presenter through the ear piece.   
Hassan also said:  
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Egyptian talk shows have a very hard time getting government officials to appear 
on the shows because they are still not accustomed to the idea of responding to 
any criticism or concerns. … That is why we treat those who agree to appear on 
the show nicely. They are seated in the best spot, are the first to be given the floor 
and are given the longest time to express their views.  
Furthermore, in an informal conversation with a journalist in Al Masry Al Youm, she said 
that the newspaper is not in the least independent from government control. When asked 
how the government interferes in the newspaper‟s work, her reply was “using all of the 
means” in the world. She also said that when the newspaper launches a campaign against 
a particular problem or uncovers governmental wrong doings in a particular area, it is 
because the government has allowed them to address this particular topic but not others. 
She added that the owners of the newspaper have a say in the newspapers‟ editorial 
policies. The example she gave was that when Al Masry Al Youm uncovers allegations of 
corruption against a particular businessman, he is more often than not a rival of one of the 
newspaper‟s shareholders and even though the information that they report is indeed 




All of this shows that the privately owned print and broadcast media are controlled by the 
government in a subtle manner using several tactics that may not be apparent at first 
glance. It is also important to note Hassan‟s statement about government officials 
receiving rather preferential treatment on talk shows. If that is indeed the case, then this 
may mean that the government not only subtly controls the privately owned media, but 
also government officials and those affiliated to the regime dominate discussions on these 
talks shows. The analysis of several episodes of these talk shows will make it easier to 
determine whether or not this is the case.  
 
6.3 Women’s Parliamentary Quota: 
6.3.1 Al Beit Beitak: 
Al Beit Beitak addressed the women‟s parliamentary quota four times in four different 
episodes.   
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The NDP‟s annual conference was held in early November 2008. During the conference, 
one of the topics that the NDP members discussed was implementing a women‟s 
parliamentary quota by adding 56 extra seats to parliament and allowing only women to 
run for them. On the 4
th
 of November 2008, Mohamed Kamal, member of the General 
Secretariat of the NDP, was featured on Al Beit Beitak to talk about the NDP conference 
as a whole and he briefly touched upon the women‟s parliamentary quota. The interview 
was largely explanatory in which the presenter asked Kamal several questions about how 
the women‟s parliamentary quota would be implemented. There was hardly any 
questioning of why the women‟s parliamentary quota should be adopted in the first place. 
Kamal framed the reasoning behind adopting the women‟s parliamentary quota in the 
following manner:  
In order to address questions by people even within the party who are against 
positive discrimination, you have to take into consideration the history of 
Egyptian women‟s membership in parliament ... Only five women won the [2005] 
parliamentary elections … which does not live to up to the status of Egyptian 
women or Egypt‟s status. … in 1979 30 [parliamentary] seats were reserved for 
women and in 1984, 31 seats were reserved for women. Therefore, there were 35 
female MPs in 1979 and only 5 female MPs in 2005 … [also] when the 
International Parliamentary Union ranks different countries according to women's 
representation in parliament, Egypt is ranked at the bottom of the list. It is 
disappointing that some Arab countries who only established parliaments in 
recent years are ahead of us in this regard, [especially] when the Egyptian 
parliament dates back to 1866.  
Therefore, while the women‟s parliamentary quota was being discussed during the NDP‟s 
annual conference, Al Beit Beitak did not feel the need to devote a whole episode to 
address it, it was merely briefly touched upon in an episode about the conference as a 
whole. It was one of the male members of the party who addressed it,  probably because 
all of the senior members of the party are men and it only made sense that a senior 
member would be the one to represent the party and answer questions regarding its 
annual conference. No opposition force was represented in that episode and the presenter 
did not ask him any challenging questions. It is important to note that Kamal phrased his 
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arguments about the need for a women‟s parliamentary quota in discourse that was 
completely unrelated to women‟s rights. Furthermore, one of the arguments he used in 




 of May 2009, Al Beit Beitak featured Georgette Killini, member of the NDP 
and NCW and an appointed MP
142
, and Amani Al Tawil, head of the Women‟s Studies 
Program in Al Ahram Studies Center, i.e. a research center that is affiliated to the 
government. 
Al Tawil backed up her support for having a larger number of female MPs using several 
arguments. One was that women must be represented in parliament while laws pertaining 
to the family are being made because only women are capable of representing women's 
familial roles and the suffering of some women within the familial institution. She added 
that not having female MPs while familial issues are being discussed is a great loss. 
Another argument she used was that women's parliamentary representation should be 
equal to women's participation in the workforce, which currently amounts to 20%. She 
also stated that both developed and underdeveloped countries adopt some form of quota 
system, “are we any different from all of the other countries in the world?” she 
questioned.  
Equality between men and women was mentioned very briefly by both participants. 
Killini said “let us pretend that I am not interested in equality or justice”, while Al Tawil 
said “the idea of equality between men and women only emerged in the entire world two 
centuries ago.” 
The only criticism expressed was the following statement made by Al Tawil:  "NCW, the 
NDP and the government are seeking to adopt a specific type of quota that I do not 
support but I am not against the quota system in principle. This quota system is a „legal 
quota‟ we have bitter previous experience with this system." She was referring to the 
50% quota for peasants and laborers.  
In addition, the presenter, Tamer Amin, made several sarcastic comments such as “in ten 
years time, there will be calls for a [parliamentary] quota for men.” Also, at one point the 
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speakers kept interrupting one another and talking at the same time and Amin said “Do 
you see why women do not obtain their rights.”  
Another examples of Amin‟s sarcastic comments is:  
Presenter: This way we would be lucky if the Speaker is male. 
[All of them laughed.] 
Killini: Why not? As long as she is competent. 
Presenter: Oh, they are ambitious, they even want the Speaker to be a woman.    
Al Tawil: Men play a role in the workforce but women are engaged in multi-
tasking; women play a role in the workforce, within the marital institution, they 
replace services such as schools and hospitals … 
Killini: [interrupting] and they perform the functions of drivers and servants 
Presenter: You can not generalize and state that women play a greater role than 
men, men tafhan el kota [a proverb used to describe someone who is overworked] 
Killini and Al Tawil mostly laughed at Amin‟s sarcastic comments and did not challenge 
them. However, at the very end of the discussion he said that he is neither for nor against 
the women‟s parliamentary quota. 
Therefore, the second time Al Beit Beitak addressed the women‟s parliamentary quota, 
the interviewees were either direct members of or people affiliated to the regime. Again, 
no opposition force was represented. This time there was minimal criticism of the type of 
quota which would be adopted but there was no criticism of the principle itself. Unlike 
the first time around, this time both speakers were women. Again the speakers 
completely avoided using women‟s rights discourse to support the need to adopt a 
women‟s parliamentary quota. Also, it is ironic that the presenter of a talk show which is 
supposed to promote government policy made several sarcastic and sexist comments. In 
fact, one of his comments – the one about how there will be a need for a parliamentary 
quota for men in the future – seemed to directly contradict with government policy. One 
of his sexist comments was fueled by the use of the English term quota. He associated it 
with an Arabic term pronounced in a similar manner.  
 
The third time Al Beit Beitak addressed this topic was on the 1
st
 of June 2009. The 
speakers were Mohamed Kamal, member of the NDP‟s General Secretariat and Dr. 
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Mahmod Al Sharif, head of the Political Participation Committee in NCW and former 
governor and minister. The latter replaced Farakhonda Hassan, Secretary General of 
NCW, because she could not make it. 
While justifying the adoption of the women‟s parliamentary quota, Kamal talked about 
how elections are administered using violence and spending large sums of money on 
electoral campaigns, cultural aspects that pose obstacles for women and the fact that very 
few women won the 2005 parliamentary elections. He also said that adopting the 
women‟s parliamentary quota was part of President Mubarak‟s electoral program. 
Meanwhile, Al Sharif argued that women constitute 50% of society and women‟s voices, 
opinions and knowledge must be represented in parliament. 
Some of the questions and comments made by the presenter of that episode, Khairy 
Ramadan, were hostile to women. Examples include: 
“Is [Egyptian] society not sensible and does not realize the importance of women‟s 
political participation so that we have to impose it onto society?”  
“Did the former female MPs play a positive role?”  
“How will NCW … convince voters that women will be capable of opening an office to 
meet up with people, go to police stations to release people from jail and be available [to 
attend to people's needs] in the middle of the night?” 
Also, a male caller-in to the program argued that in some countries quotas for men have 
been introduced to protect men from women. The presenter said to him don‟t you worry, 
similar measures will eventually be necessary in Egypt. 
In this episode the speakers were both men. Again women‟s rights discourse was not 
used while expressing support for the women‟s parliamentary quota. It is important to 
note one of the arguments used by  Kamal in this regard. He justified the need to adopt 
the women‟s parliamentary quota on the grounds that it was part of the President‟s 
electoral program. This implies the importance of the President‟s approval of this move. 
This time, the presenter‟s sexist comments were even more hostile to women. His 
comments – and even the manner in which he phrased his questions – revolved around 
the idea that women are not capable of doing much which is an idea that stems from the 
sexist belief that women are less competent than men. In addition, one of his questions 
conveyed the sense that women‟s parliamentary representation is being imposed onto 
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society. This implies that the state‟s top-down approach to women‟s rights does not seem 
to be boding well among the Egyptian people.  
 
The fourth and last time Al Beit Beitak addressed women‟s parliamentary quota was on 
the 15
th
 of June 2009. The speakers were Farakhonda Hassan, Secretary General of 
NCW, Mona Abu Senna, Professor of English Literature at the government owned Cairo 
University and Georgette Killini, member of the NDP, NCW and an appointed MP. 
The arguments Hassan used to back up adopting the women‟s parliamentary quota were  
this system has been implemented all over the world … it is implemented in other 
Arab countries, such as Morocco and Iraq. … Women have not made it to 
parliament without the quota system because Egyptian society does not accept 
being represented by women. This is true of most other societies as well.  
Abu Sena initiated two sub-topics which the other speakers then addressed. She argued 
that Egyptian “women are not ready to join parliament because they are crippled by 
qualities society has instilled in them, such as not being brave and being scared of men.” 
In response Killini argued that  
similar arguments were made when it came to appointing women as judges but 
last month the Minister of Justice announced that female judges are doing very 
well. [Also,] … women have excelled in a variety of fields which proves that they 
are competent and qualified.  
Hassan responded by saying that not all “Egyptian women are ready to join parliament, 
but just like women received all of the necessary training that enabled them to become 
university professors, they can be trained on political activity.”    
The second sub-topic initiated by Abu Sena was her argument that "the current approach 
[to women‟s issues] is superficial. Figures mean absolutely nothing. Having 64 female 
MPs means nothing because Egyptian women are by and large experiencing a regression 
and we need to liberate women‟s minds." Killini responded by saying “there is indeed an 
enlightenment problem but its among both women and men. Even if the problem is more 
serious among women, it could not possibly amount to 99% of men being enlightened 
and only 1% of women being enlightened, which is the ratio of male to female MPs.” 
160 
  
Meanwhile, Hassan responded by questioning “should we post-pone having female MPs 
until enlightenment takes place?” 
During the discussion, Killini raised the idea that people argue that wanting women to 
join the judiciary and parliament is an American agenda that they are implementing. She 
denied all of this. Also, towards the end of the program she called upon men to support 
their qualified wives or sisters to run for parliament.  
In addition, Abu Sena criticized the Muslim Brotherhood without naming them and 
described them as being hostile to women. 
Again the presenter Amin made several sarcastic comments. An example is how while 
arguing that women can be trained on political activity, Hassan used the word tetahel or 
become qualified. Amin laughed and said tetahel is commonly used to refer to women 
getting married. In response, Hassan laughed and said “nowadays eta‟helt means 
something completely different.” Another example is how towards the end of the 
program Abu Sena said to Killini and Hassan “fine, go ahead and solve our 
overpopulation problems”, Amin said “when 64 women join parliament … they will not 
have children,” implying that when women join parliament, they will not have time for 
families and so will end up being childless which will bring the total population down. 
Another example of his sarcastic comments is that when Hassan argued that the women‟s 
parliamentary quota which will be adopted will lead to women representing around 12% 
of MPs which does not fulfill women‟s aspirations, Amin interrupted her and asked “Do 
you still want more?!” Hassan then went on to say that international conventions, i.e. 
CEDAW, stipulate that women should represent 30% of MPs.     
Therefore, this time all of the speakers were women who were either direct members of 
or affiliated to the regime and no opposition force was represented. Again women‟s rights 
discourse was not used to frame arguments  supporting the women‟s parliamentary quota. 
This was the very first time that opposition to the principle of quota and to the 
government‟s approach to women‟s empowerment was expressed on Al Beit Beitak. But 
this criticism was very mild. Also, some references to the international framework were 
made as a reason or an alleged one behind the adoption of the women‟s parliamentary 
quota. Finally, the presenter made several sarcastic and sexist comments, just like the 
ones he made in other episodes.  
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Overall Al Beit Beitak‟s treatment of the adoption of the women‟s parliamentary quota 
consisted of promoting it. The interviewees consisted of direct members of or people 
affiliated to the regime. Also, no opposition force of any kind – secular or Islamic – was 
represented. In addition, women‟s rights discourse was never used to frame arguments 
supporting the women‟s parliamentary quota. A reason behind this is likely to be the 
arguments made by women‟s activists in Chapter 5 that using women‟s rights discourse 
is ineffective or backfires. It must also be noted that in 3 out of 4 episodes the presenters 
made some very sarcastic comments and in one episode the presenter made some sexist 
comments. Sometimes their comments even ran against government policy. All of this is 
an indication for how the state‟s approach to women‟s rights is backfiring and turning 
many men – including some of those affiliated to the regime – against women and their 
rights.  
 
6.3.2 90 Dekika: 
Before analyzing the episodes of 90 Dekika which addressed the adoption of the 
women‟s parliamentary quota, a statement made by its program editor must be taken into 
consideration.  
Hassan said: 
We are always very careful in selecting our speakers so that none of the episodes 
are entirely patriarchal or feminine -  regardless of the topic being addressed - the 
speakers must consist of both men and women. We ensure that women are 
represented in the talk show because we believe in the importance of women‟s 
role in society, they must be represented across the board. … We do not face any 
difficulties in getting women on the show, there are many [competent] women out 
there. But …the political decision makers have appointed only men in decision 
making posts, that is why many of our speakers end up being men. All of the 
members of the People‟s Assembly, Shoura Council, executive and the legislative 
are men. This is reflected in our program and all of the other talk shows
143
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Hassan‟s statement implies that 90 Dekika is supportive of women‟s rights and their 
participation in the public sphere at large, including the political arena. The analysis of 
some of the program‟s episodes will reveal whether or not this is reflected on the show.  
90 Dekika addressed women‟s parliamentary quotas in four different episodes. However, 
on some occasions an entire segment of the episode was devoted to discussing this topic, 
while on other occasions, the discussion was primarily about another topic and the 
speakers very briefly touched upon the women‟s parliamentary quota.  
On the 3
rd
 of November 2008, 90 Dekika dedicated part of its episode to discussing the 
women‟s parliamentary quota. The speakers were Judge Samia Al Motayam and 
Georgette Killini, member of the People‟s Assembly and NCW. Both of them are also 
members of the NDP but they were not introduced as such. Nor was the fact that Killini is 
an appointed MP mentioned. Nahed Soliman, the head of the Women‟s Committee of the 
Egyptian Arab Socialist Party, i.e. an opposition party, was very briefly interviewed over 
the phone. The presenter of this segment was Motaz El Demerdash.   
The presenter asked Killini what she thinks are the reasons behind women‟s low level of 
political participation. Killini argued that: 
women have excelled in all fields that require doing well in studies, that are based 
on competence or that require appointment by the political decision makers 
including areas like Ambassadors, Ministers, deans and university professors. The 
only area in which women‟s participation is extremely low and does not live up to 
Egyptian women‟s history or level of participation in neighboring countries is 
politics because it is entirely dependent on cultural values upheld by society. 
These have been fuelled by the educational system which advocates that it is ok 
for a woman to head a household - 25% of Egyptian households are headed by 
women - it is ok for a woman to struggle to catch the bus to take her children to 
school and then go to work in a middle ranking profession and provide for her 
children but a woman should not even consider participating in politics. The 
educational system has instilled in people the idea that mom cooks whiled dad 
goes to work, a little girl helps mom out with housework, while a little boy helps 
dad out in reading the paper …  
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Presenter: [interrupting] when dad gets back from work, mom sits in the living 
room and does not utter a single word. 
Killini: Those [women] who run for parliament are similar to the characters of 
mom or the little girl and voters have been brought up to envision them in the 
kitchen.  
Presenter: Therefore, it is time [to adopt] the idea of [a women‟s parliamentary] 
quota.  
Al Motayam: The only solution to this problem is the one suggested by the NDP 
and the President himself: a women‟s parliamentary quota.  
The fact that both Killini and Al Motayam are NDP members was only mentioned by the 
presenter when he was about to introduce and interview Soliman over the phone “Let‟s 
hear from the opposition since both of you are NDP members,” he said.  
Soliman said “we are pleased with the quota and we would like to thank his Excellency 
the President but the type of quota which was adopted focuses on quantity not quality …  
female members of the NDP will end up wining all of the 56 seats." 
Soliman spoke for no more than three minutes, while the other two speakers spoke for a 
total of around 25 minutes.  
While arguing for the need to adopt a women‟s parliamentary quota, Al Motayam argued  
this system will not benefit women per se but society as a whole because women 
are represented in society but not in parliament ... a female MP does not only 
stand up for women in parliament but for society as a whole, for human beings, 
for Egyptians, men, women, youth, children - both male and female - parliament 
addresses issues that pertain to society as a whole.  
Similarly, Killini argued “adopting the quota is not being done for the sake of women, 
democracy nor because there are larger numbers of female MPs in other countries. We 
need a system which will allow Egyptian citizens to benefit from all competent women in 
society, given that the electoral system prevents them from joining parliament.”  
In this episode the two main speakers were direct members of the regime. Opposition 
forces received minimal representation consisting of a very brief telephone interview 
which lasted for a few minutes, which is nothing compared to the amount of time 
members of the regime spoke for. Also, the interviewee in question was a member of the 
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secular opposition and not the Islamic one. Therefore, the Islamic opposition was not 
represented. In addition, the presenter came across as rather supportive of the women‟s 
parliamentary quota. In stark contrast to the presenters of Al Beit Beitak, he did not make 
a single sexist or sarcastic comment. This provides further evidence to support the 
statements made by Hassan. Again, women‟s rights discourse was not used to frame 
arguments supporting the women‟s parliamentary quota. It is noteworthy that several 
references to the President were made by both those affiliated to the regime and the 
member of the opposition. This implies that he played an integral role in the adoption of 




 of November 2008, a segment of 90 Dekika featured two female members of 
the NDP who delivered speeches during the NDP‟s annual conference. The presenter of 
this segment was Reham El Sahly. The interview was largely about these two women, 
why they decided to become politically active, why they joined the NDP, their role within 
the party, the speeches that they delivered at the conference and what it felt like to shake 
hands with the President and first lady after delivering their speeches. The presenter 
greatly admired them and their efforts. The women‟s parliamentary quota was mentioned 
very briefly by one of the interviewees. She said that she will run for parliament by virtue 
of the women‟s parliamentary quota “my only dream was that the President would grant 
us this opportunity” of adopting a women‟s parliamentary quota.  
This episode provides further evidence to support the information provided by Hassan 
about 90 Dekika‟s policy on women. It was the only talk show to devote some of its air 
time to shed light on female members of the ruling party while it covered the NDP‟s 
annual conference. Not even Al Beit Beitak – a program which is supposed to promote 
government policy which allegedly includes seeking women‟s political empowerment – 




 of June 2009, 90 Dekika featured three women from various different 
backgrounds to address a variety of issues and they briefly touched upon the women‟s 
parliamentary quota. The presenter of this segment was Motaz El Demerdash. The main 
speaker was the writer and journalist Sahar Al Gaara who writes an opinion column in Al 
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Masry Al Youm. The other speakers were a French teacher, Nema Mahmod Ahmed and 
Mona Hussein, a woman who sells bread in the street. Iman Biabers, President of ADEW 
(see Chapter 5 for details about ADEW) and Moushira Khatab, Minister of Family and 
Population, were very briefly interviewed over the phone.  
Hussein did not even know what the term empowering women meant and she had not 
heard of the ongoing efforts to adopt a women‟s parliamentary quota. Baibers‟ asked 
Hussein to turn to ADEW for assistance because she happened to live in an area in which 
ADEW is active.  
Al Gaara argued that 
female MPs are not the issue but the political environment and the way elections 
are administered. If a woman wants to run for parliament, how will she finance 
her campaign? How will she deal with the violence that is in place during 
elections? How will she face the Muslim Brotherhood? How will she face her 
family? We need women who believe in change and democracy not those who are 
pro-regime. The aim behind the adoption of a women‟s parliamentary quota 
should not be representing women‟s issues only because they [female MPs] have 
to address all kinds of issues. We need an environment which supports women. 
Why are we starting off by changing and introducing laws? We have to change 
some societal issues … Having quotas for peasants, laborers and women 
fragments the movement to the advantage of the NDP and its media arsenal so 
that it [the NDP] ends up controlling every constituency.  
Ahmed said that she supports the women‟s parliamentary quota and added that she 
believes that women are the only ones who can represent women in parliament. She 
agreed with Al Gaara on the point that we need women who support change and not those 
who support the government. Ahmed also said: 
We have to address women‟s empowerment, positive discrimination is necessary 
and is not unfair for men because women are deprived of many of their rights due 
to social and practical reasons. If I consider running for parliament, my family 
may find that unacceptable. I support temporarily adopting a women‟s 
parliamentary quota until society finds it acceptable for women to attain decision 
making posts. Having only 13 female MPs is unacceptable. 
166 
  
Al Garaa also raised the issues of calls for women to return to the home and men taking 
precedence in job allocation because they provide for the family. She said that she is 
totally against both ideas.  
Khatab argued that “women constitute 50% of society and they are not represented in 
parliament. We introduced a women‟s parliamentary quota because political parties are 
reluctant to nominate women and voters are reluctant to vote for them.”  
This episode provided some women who usually have no media access whatsoever with 
an opportunity to express their views on a talk show. These included women who are not 
members of any political party or force who are not intellectuals, academics or 
journalists, who are largely the kind of people interviewed on Egyptian talk shows.  This 
episode also included the harshest criticism of the women‟s parliamentary quota, the 
regime and state policies expressed on any of the talk shows. Most of it was expressed by 
Al Gaara, a writer who writes an opinion column in Al Masry Al Youm and not a member 
of an opposition force. In fact, opposition forces were not represented in this episode. Yet 
the grounds on which she criticized the women‟s parliamentary quota were not very 
different from those used by Soliman, although they were expressed in far more detail 





 of June 2009, 90 Dekika featured two journalists to discuss various issues that 
had taken place in Egypt that week, one of which was adopting the women‟s 
parliamentary quota. The journalists were Jihan Al Gharabawi, a journalist in Al Ahram 
newspaper, and Mohamed Helmi, the editor in chief of Caricature magazine and a writer 
in the government owned Al Akhbar newspaper. The presenter of this segment was Motaz 
El Demerdash.   
Presenter: I will ask you [Gharabawi] to speak first because this is an issue that 
concerns you and believe me it also concerns me because I would like to see 
women in my country enjoy all of their rights, just like in developed countries.  
Gharabawi: Women do not trust or believe in other women, they resort to male 
doctors and lawyers and not female ones, they do not vote for women, and of 
course men vote for men and do not trust women. Women argue that female 
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candidates are not totally devoted to their careers because they are busy with their 
familial duties, and if a woman is totally devoted to her career they [other women]  
perceive her as unsuccessful, ugly and not very feminine. [i.e. she must be 
divorced or never married]. 
Helmi: Several women have previously won the parliamentary elections in a 
manner that I greatly admire, such as Shaniaz El Naggar … [Men do vote for 
women, for example] male journalists voted for the female ones who ran for  the 
journalists‟ syndicate.  
Gharabawi: [interrupting] Shahinaz El Naggar is a perfect example of how 
women give up, she resigned as soon as she got married. 
Presenter: What do you think of the women‟s parliamentary quota?  
Helmi: I may disagree with the issue of quota, women metfahina el kota [men are 
overworked because of women]. I do not think women can play a role in politics. 
They can play a role in other fields such as services, civil society, women 
metfahina el kota [men are overworked because of women], as if that were not 
enough. What do women want from parliament anyway? 
Presenter: Do you support an all male parliament? 
Helmi: No, I don‟t but I am against the women‟s parliamentary quota. 
In this episode, the presenter explicitly stated his support for women‟s rights. Yet it was 
the only episode of 90 Dekika to contain sexist comments, which largely revolved around 
the idea that women are less competent than men, as well as anti-women‟s discourse. 
Helmi‟s statements indicate that the state‟s approach to women‟s rights is backfiring and 
leading some men who believe that women should play a role in the public sphere to 
make sexist comments that suggest otherwise. But most of the anti-women‟s discourse 
was expressed by a woman. Given Hassan‟s statements about how the program‟s crew is 
fully aware of the stances of the interviewees prior to selecting them, it is ironic that this 
should take place in a program whose program editor clearly stated that the program 
supports women and there was ample evidence to support his statement in the other 
episodes. A possible explanation is that due to the hostility against women‟s rights in 
Egyptian society, the program‟s crew felt the need to give some air time to those who 
oppose women‟s rights in order to avoid alienating their views. Also, given that this 
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particular episode was not entirely about the women‟s parliamentary quota but was a 
recap of the main events that took place in Egypt that week, other criteria are likely to 
have been taken into consideration while selecting the interviewees. Another possible 
explanation is that this particular speaker was featured in order to abide by the 
journalistic principle of allowing dissenting voices to be heard. 
 
Therefore, overall 90 Dekika was rather supportive of women‟s rights and their 
empowerment. Its presenters did not make any sexist or sarcastic comments and were not 
in any way hostile to women. Despite this, it featured one speaker who was hostile to 
women‟s rights and another who was alienated by the state‟s approach to women‟s rights. 
Perhaps allowing such arguments to be voiced on the program was unavoidable and 
simply reflected the reality; not all women support women‟s rights and the state‟s 
approach to women‟s empowerment is backfiring and turning even those who do not 
oppose women‟s participation in the public sphere against such participation. But it is 
also possible that these speakers were featured in the program for the purposes of 
objectivity. 
Also, 90 Dekika provided some women who usually have no or hardly any access to the 
media with an opportunity to express their views on a talk show. These included a teacher 
and a woman who sells bread, in addition to low ranking female members of the NDP. 
No other talk show did anything like that. It is important to note that even though 
government officials did not dominate the discussions on 90 Dekika like in Al Beit 
Beitak, they were still readily represented. Furthermore, opposition forces have hardly 
any access to 90 Dekika. For out of 12 interviewees featured in 4 episodes only one was a 
member of an opposition force. Furthermore, she was interviewed on the phone very 
briefly and only spoke for around 5 minutes. Therefore, opposition forces received 
minimal representation. Also, she was a member of a secular opposition party and so the 
Islamic opposition was completely marginalized.  
 
6.3.3 Al Ashera Masan: 
This program did not devote any of its time to discussing the women‟s parliamentary 
quota. In one episode, the manner in which it was approved very quickly by parliament 
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was mentioned as one of the reasons behind the rumor that the President would call for 
parliamentary elections a year early. The reasoning was that the women‟s parliamentary 
quota had to be approved quickly in order to be implemented in the alleged early 
parliamentary elections.  
This is the only talk show which did not devote any of its time to addressing women‟s 
political participation. A possible explanation for this is a statement made by its 
presenter. She once said that she thinks that Egypt is one of those countries where 
citizens should obtain the most basic of rights before rights of specific groups in society – 
such as women‟s rights – can be addressed.  
 
6.3.4 48 Sa’a: 
The Muslim Brotherhood was not represented in any of the talk shows included in this 
study while they addressed the adoption of the women‟s parliamentary quota. However,  
they were represented on 48 Sa’a or 48 Hours, a program aired on Al Mehwar during 
weekends. Although 48 Sa’a is not included in this study, that particular discussion will 
be analyzed to shed light on the views of a group whose voice was not heard in the talk 
shows included in this study.  
On the 26
th
 of June 2009, 48 Sa’a featured Ibtissam Abo Rihab an NDP member and an 
elected member of the Shoura Council and Asmaa Abdel Ati a member of the Muslim 
Sisters. She was also one of their unsuccessful candidates for the Local People‟s 
Councils. Abo Rihab spoke first and for a longer period of time and she very often cut 
Abdel Ati short and expressed her views. Abdel Ati‟s voice was rather low, she was not 
very eloquent and struggled to express her views clearly. Overall, Abo Rihab dominated 
the discussion. This segment of the episode also included brief telephone interviews with 
Hamdi Hassan, a Muslim Brotherhood MP and Judge Mahmoud Amer, an NDP MP and 
head of the parliamentary human rights committee.  
Abo Rihab said  
the current number of female MPs is inappropriate given the status of Egyptian 
women, and even that of men because Egyptian men are wonderful and they have 
produced wonderful women - wives, daughters and sisters. I would like to thank 
the President for supporting women throughout and for adopting the women‟s 
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parliamentary quota … these seats are not for a specific party, [i.e. the NDP]. The 
women‟s parliamentary quota will lead to an increase in women‟s political 
participation. This is necessary and it must be similar to women‟s participation in 
other fields such as the media, the ministry of foreign affairs, governmental 
institutions and the public sphere at large.  
Abdel Ati said that the women‟s parliamentary quota is unconstitutional but since it has 
been approved by parliament, the Muslim Brotherhood respects it and its female 
members will run for parliament by virtue of it. She argued that only NDP members will 
be able to sustain electoral campaigns in an entire governorate and she brought up the 
issue of rigged elections and thus initiated a sub-topic which was largely addressed in the 
telephone interviews with the male members of the NDP and Muslim Brotherhood. 
The views expressed by the member of the Muslim Brotherhood – the voice which was 
completely marginalized in all of the talk shows included in the study – were not very 
different from the views expressed by Soliman - a member of the secular opposition – 
and Al Gaara – who was not a member of any opposition force but clearly opposed the 
regime.  
In the episode, the member of the regime did not use women‟s rights discourse to frame 
the arguments she used to support the women‟s parliamentary quota. She also went out of 
her way to thank the President for supporting women‟s rights in general and for the 
women‟s parliamentary quota in particular. This is an indication that the President‟s 
approval is necessary for any women‟s right to be addressed by the government.  
 
6.3.5 Al Ahram: 
Al Ahram‟s coverage of the adoption of the women‟s parliamentary quota largely 
consisted of promoting it. Much of it focused on the President‟s role in the process. Thus, 
there were several stories reporting on how the President held meetings with senior 
members of the regime to discuss various matters related to the necessary steps to adopt 
the women‟s parliamentary quota.  
An example is a news story entitled „Mubarak Reviews the proposed Law to Empower 
Women and [Ensure that they are] Represented in the People‟s Assembly: The Proposed 
[Law] Reflects the President‟s Concern for Women‟s Political and Economic Rights‟. It 
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was about a meeting between President Mubarak, Fathi Soror Speaker of the People‟s 
Assembly, and Prime Minister Ahmed Nazif. In it they discussed a draft law to increase 
women‟s representation in parliament. The story included long quotes from Ambassador 
Soliman Awad, the Presidential Spokesman (El Masry 1/6/2009). 
In addition, there were countless opinion columns which contained praise of the 
President. An example is an opinion column entitled „Egyptian Women‟s Parliamentary 
Representation‟ in which the writer argued “women remained underrepresented in 
parliament until President Mubarak placed increasing their representation at the top of his 
priorities” (Abo Imara 24/3/2009). In another opinion column entitled „Political Affairs‟ 
the writer described the adoption of the women‟s parliamentary quota “as a victory for 
Egyptian women which came about due to the will of the political leadership in 
fulfillment of its promise” (Shoukry 14/6/2009).  
Only one of the opinion columns which addressed the President‟s role in the matter 
contained some mild criticism. It was by Amina Shafik, member of the Tagammu Party 
and Head of NCW‟s Media Committee and it was entitled „Egyptian Women: Integration 
or Political Marginalization?‟ In it, she heavily criticized the idea that extra parliamentary 
seats had to be added in order to incorporate women into parliament. She added that she 
was surprised that as the President addressed the women‟s parliamentary quota in his 
speech to members of the People‟s Assembly and the Shoura Council, he said to them 
“don‟t you worry, we will not take away anything from you.” She described this 
approach as “extremely patriarchal and discriminatory” and accused male members of the 
NDP of perceiving any right that women obtain as been extracted from men‟s rights. She 
also criticized how apparently the NDP‟s approval of the women‟s parliamentary quota 
was conditional on them retaining „their‟ parliamentary seats. She also argued that the 
approach of both NCW and women‟s NGOs to women‟s rights revolves around 
integration while this kind of quota is not inline with all of this because it creates separate 
political spaces for men and women (Shafik 7/12/2008). But by focusing on the President 
it still conveys that the women‟s parliamentary quota would not have been adopted if it 
were not for him. This column also provides further evidence to support the argument 
made in Chapter 4 about how male politicians perceive women‟s rights as taking away 
some of their privileges and diminishing their power and giving them to women.  
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Also, it is noteworthy that women‟s rights discourse was not used in most of these 
opinion columns.  
Some of the coverage focused on the role played by Gamal Mubarak in the adoption of 
the women‟s parliamentary quota. An example is a news story entitled „In A Meeting of 
the NDP‟s Higher Policies Committee Al Sherif: Increasing Women‟s Parliamentary 
Representation is A Step Towards Political Reform and Fulfills the President‟s Promise‟. 
It was about an NDP Policies Committee meeting in which they discussed details 
pertaining to the women‟s parliamentary quota, such as how many seats would be 
allocated for women. The story included an extremely long quote from Gamal Mubarak, 
who was referred to as the Secretary of the NDP Policies Committee, as well as a much 
smaller one from Fathi Soror, the Speaker of Parlimanet (Shoukry 2/6/2009).  
On the very few occasions in which members of secular opposition parties were quoted in 
Al Ahram, they were overwhelmingly quoted as speaking highly of the women‟s 
parliamentary quota. This is very ironic given that members of the same parties were 
quoted in Al Masry Al Youm as criticizing the women‟s parliamentary quota. A possible 
explanation for this is that in Al Ahram the segments of their statements which were 
favorable to the women‟s parliamentary quota were the ones which were included in the 
story, while those which contained any form of criticism were completely disregarded.  
An example is a news story entitled „By Increasing Women‟s Representation in 
Parliament: Women‟s Dream of Being Politically Empowered Comes True.‟ It included 
long quotes from members of the regime, which were followed by quotes from members 
of opposition parties. The President of the Wafd Party, Mahmod Abaza who said “I 
totally agree with positive discrimination, parliament had to do something to increase 
women‟s parliamentary representation.” The Wafd Party has not yet decided on whether 
or not it will nominate women in the upcoming elections, he added. Another example is 
Mohamed Anwar Esmat Al Sadat, one of the founders of the Reform and Development 
Party which is still under construction. He was quoted describing the idea of increasing 
women‟s political participation as „good,‟ adding “I support it … it will provide Egyptian 
women with training in the field of politics” (Shoukry et. al 11/6/2009).  
Yet a very small number of stories contained quotes from members of opposition parties 
in which they expressed some criticism of the women‟s parliamentary quota. An example 
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is a story entitled „The People‟s Assembly Approves Adding an Extra 64 Seats for 
Women for the Next Parliamentary Elections‟. It included numerous quotes from 
members of the regime. Towards the very end of the story, Mahmoud Abaza, head of the 
Wafd Parliament members, was quoted as saying “I opposed the [women‟s 
parliamentary] quota because I believe that it is unconstitutional because it is not inline 
with the principles of citizenship and equality … the proposed law was secretly put 
together in no time and opposition parties and civil society did not get to see the proposed 
law or comment on it.” A member of the Tagammu Party was also quoted as opposing 
the law and calling for a public debate about it (Ali et. al 15/6/2009). 
It is noteworthy that the Islamic opposition was completely marginalized, its members 
were never quoted in any story in Al Ahram.  
 
6.3.6 Al Masry Al Youm: 
Opposition forces were quoted more often in Al Masry Al Youm than Al Ahram. Also, the 
Islamic opposition was sometimes quoted in Al Masry Al Youm, as opposed to being 
completely disregarded by Al Ahram. But the secular opposition was quoted in Al Masry 
Al Youm more often than the Islamic one; there were several stories in which various 
members of secular opposition parties were quoted but members of the Islamic 
opposition were not. An example is a story entitled „Politicians Differ Over the 
Amendments to the Electoral Law and Fear that the NDP will Take Over the Women‟s 
Seats‟. In it, members of the following secular opposition parties were quoted: the 
Democratic Front Party, Tagammu and Al Ghad, while no member of the Muslim 
Brotherhood was quoted. An example of the views expressed by the members of these 
parties in that story is the following statement by Farida Al Naqqash, editor in chief of Al 
Ahaly newspaper, which is affiliated to the Tagammu Party. She said “adopting the 
[women‟s parliamentary] quota is a step forward but an incomplete one because the 
electoral system has not been revised” (Gharib et. al 7/6/2009). Therefore, in such stories 
members of secular opposition parties were more critical of the adoption of the women‟s 
parliamentary quota and government policy as a whole than they were in Al Ahram.  
But in other stories, members of the opposition expressed much harsher criticism. An 
example are the statements made in a story about voting within the People‟s Assembly on 
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the adoption of the women‟s parliamentary quota. It was entitled „The Women‟s Seats are 
Approved by Parliament Thanks to the [Parliamentary] Majority while the Muslim 
Brotherhood, the Opposition and Independent [MPs] Object to the Law‟. The NDP 
members voted in favor of it while members of opposition parties, the Muslim 
Brotherhood and independent MPs all voted against it. The story included statements 
made by various people during the parliamentary session. This included a quote from a 
member of the Free Constitutional Party in which he stated “that the [women‟s 
parliamentary] quota is unconstitutional and it emanated  from the American terminology 
of „empowering women‟ which is adopted by American funded organizations such as 
NGOs and NCW” (Mosalam and Fouad 15/6/2009). This was one of the few stories in 
which the voice of the Islamic opposition was heard. A Muslim Brotherhood MP was 
quoted as saying that “the women‟s [parliamentary] quota is not in line with the principle 
of citizenship and he argued that the current political environment is hostile to women” 
(Mosalam and Fouad 15/6/2009). The story also included quotes from members of the 
regime, some of which were responses to points raised by members of the opposition. For 
example, Amal Othman, a former minister, NDP MP and NCW member stated that NCW 
does not receive foreign funding (Mosalam and Fouad 15/6/2009). Given that Othman is 
not only a member of NCW but a member of the Executive Committee which formulates 
views on grants and donations offered to NCW, as stated in Chapter 4, it is simply 
inconceivable that she could possibly be unaware that NCW receives foreign funding. 
The fact that she denied this shows how contentious the receipt of foreign funding is in 
general, but more so when it is related to women‟s rights. 
There was some emphasis on the first lady‟s role in the adoption of the women‟s 
parliamentary quota, which was not addressed in any other media outlet. For example, in 
opinion column entitled „A Women‟s Society‟, the writer argued 
„positive discrimination‟ is a meaningless and contradictory term … Egyptian 
women are not in the least interested in politics and they are the reason why 
Egyptian men are apolitical because they constantly tell their sons as they bring 
them up to have nothing to do with politics. What kind of rights is it that women 
have not got and how come people claim that women do not play a role in the 
decision making process when every single government official has to be very 
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hypocritical when it comes to women and has to speak very highly of women and 
their role all the time. … having a vision is very different form adopting policies 
to please important local figures or as a response to pressure from powerful 
groups in the international arena (Khalil 21/6/2009). 
Another example is an interview with Mohamed El Omda, member of the Free 
Constitutional Party. The story was entitled „El Omda: „Soror‟ is Going Against the 
Constitution and Misleading MPs and Public Opinion to Achieve the Interests of the 
NDP.‟ In the story he argued:  
the NDP will benefit greatly from the manner in which the constituencies for 
women were divided whereby an entire governorate amounts to just one 
constituency, for the larger a constituency is, the easier it is for the NDP to be in 
control and announce the results it pleases. … I support women‟s political 
participation in principle and I believe that it could be achieved by adopting 
electoral lists, however, the NDP refuses to do so because the current system 
allows NDP candidates to run as independents and then rejoin the party after they 
win the parliamentary elections. … NCW and the National Council for 
Motherhood and Childhood and the 16,000 [women‟s] NGOs which are foreign 
funded implement a foreign agenda under the banner of empowering women. … I 
will sue the law on the grounds that it is unconstitutional because … women now 
rule the country … through NCW, the Ministry of Family and Population and 
they now have [these] parliamentary seats … they incur illegal benefits from these 
posts while inflicting a lot of harm on society (El Deramali 16/6/2009). 
In both examples the first lady was not explicitly named but was referred to in a subtle 
and indirect manner. In the first example, the writer refers to how government officials 
tend to purport that they support women‟s rights as part and parcel of expressing praise of 
the first lady. Even though the writer is clearly not in the least supportive of women‟s 
rights, it can still be argued that if it were not for the state‟s approach to women‟s rights 
which is backfiring, he would not have expressed such hostile comments to women. But 
in the second example, the speaker was not against women‟s participation in the public 
sphere or their political participation, yet he ended up making several comments that 
were hostile to women. This is another example of how the state‟s approach to women‟s 
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rights is backfiring and leading those who do not oppose women‟s rights to express views 
that are critical of and even hostile to women. Also, in both cases, associations were 
made between women‟s rights and some sort of foreign interference into Egyptian affairs, 
which was perceived in a negative manner.    
Furthermore, views expressed in other opinion columns conveyed that the state‟s 
approach to women‟s rights is leading to an association between women‟s rights and 
failed government policies as well as abusive government measures. For example, in an 
opinion column entitled „The Real Reasons Are Kept Secret‟, the writer argued: 
The women‟s [parliamentary] quota will not solve the problem of women‟s low 
representation in parliament. I am concerned that this may end up being similar to 
the 50% quota for peasants and laborers and that is why I call for it to be 
implemented for a limited period of time only … an increase in  women‟s 
representation in parliament should come as a result of [societal progression] .. 
and not abusive governmental measures … and without favoring one sex over the 
other [or] using a top-down decision (Goda 19/3/2009b). 
Also, many of the views expressed in Al Masry Al Youm were rather similar to those 
expressed on 90 Dekika. They largely revolved around how adopting a women‟s 
parliamentary quota would not truly enhance women‟s representation in parliament, that 
the female members of the NDP would end up winning all of these seats and that the 
main problem was the manner in which elections are administered. For example, in an 
opinion column entitled „When will Egyptian Women Mature‟, the writer argued 
when it comes to political participation, the NDP presents an argument emanating 
from the idea that only women are denied their lawful rights of freedom, political 
participation, working and voting when in reality all Egyptians - both male and 
female - do not participate in politics because of the fake democratic system 
which is in place and because they are fully aware that the NDP will implement 
everything it pleases. Both men and women are victims of elections with pre-
determined results, specific people staying in power their entire lives, useless 
political parties, arresting candidates and their supporters, rigging elections, using 




Similarly, in an opinion column entitled „Women‟s Political Participation‟ – which was 
the only opinion column written by an Islamist – the writer argued   
it is not questionable that the main reason behind the low level of political 
participation among both women and men in Egypt is the political environment 
which includes the failure of the political party system and the lack of democracy 
within political parties and decision makers‟ support of hegemony by one party. 
All of this has led people to believe that participating in politics is pointless (Al 
Zayat 5/8/2009). 
The fact that only one opinion column was written by an Islamist is further evidence to 
support the argument made previously that Islamist views were represented far less 
frequently than those of seculars Al Masry Al Youm.  
Finally, Al Masry Al Youm allowed some women‟s activists to express their views on the 
women‟s parliamentary quota. Even though this only took place in just one story, it is 
significant because their views were not voiced in any other media outlet. They were 
quoted in a  story entitled „Leading Female Figures Praise the Government‟s Decision to 
Increase Women‟s Parliamentary Representation and are Concerned that Money and 
Violence Could Determine [the Election‟s Results].‟ It included quotes from Nehad Abu 
El Komsan, the President of the Egyptian Center for Women‟s Rights (ECWR) [see 
Chapter 5 for details about Abu El Komsan and ECWR] and Hoda Badran, President of 
the Arab Women‟s Alliance. Abu El Komsan was quoted as saying “the women‟s 
parliamentary quota should have been adopted 20 years ago” and she called for adopting 
electoral lists.   
The individual system is the worst type of quota because it allows for using 
violence during elections and buying votes. She added that the NDP only 
approved the [women‟s parliamentary] quota because it was part of the 
President‟s electoral campaign. … the form of quota which was adopted will 
isolate women from society (Rashwan 13/6/2009b).  
Her statement indicates that the President‟s approval was a crucial pre-requisite for the 






The NGO Sawaseya Human Rights and Anti-Discrimination Center organized an event 
entitled „A Seminar About a Quota for Women: Is it a Lawful Right or a Discriminatory 
Measure?‟ As previously stated, it did not receive any coverage whatsoever by the 
Egyptian media, but it was aired live on Al Jazeera Mobasher, which is how I obtained 
access to it. It is included because some of the speakers in the seminar represent 
opposition forces that were not represented in the talk shows. But the main reason why 
this section is included is in order to determine whether the views expressed away from 
the Egyptian media differ in any way from those expressed in the Egyptian print and 
broadcast media. 
 The speakers in the seminar were Amina Al Naqqash, vice-President of the Tagammu 
Party, Karima Al Hifnawi, an activist in the Kefaya (Enough) Movement, Manal Abo El 
Hassan, Professor of Media in 6
th
 of October University and Ahmed Abo Baraka, Muslim 
Brotherhood MP. One of the seminar‟s organizers said that they tried to secure an NDP 
member to participate in the seminar but failed.  
Kefaya is movement that seeks to bring an end to Mubarak‟s rule of Egypt and halt 
efforts to pass on power to Gamal in a hereditary manner. It is an informal movement that 
has no legal status and is categorized by scholars as street politics. It first came to the fore 
in 2004 and has staged several demonstrations in key locations and venues, such as 
Tahrir Square and the book fair. The members of Kefaya include leftist politicians, liberal 
human right activists, Islamists – some of whom are members of the Muslim Brotherhood 
- and intellectuals who are not affiliated to any political party or force. However, it has 
failed to appeal to or mobilize people at the grassroots level (Albrecht 2007:66-7).     
In the seminar, Al Naqqash argued that  
the NDP is the only one which will benefit from adopting the [women‟s 
parliamentary] quota because it is merely a measure to help it to continue to 
monopolize Egyptian politics. The idea that [the women‟s parliamentary] quota 
will be implemented temporarily in order to enable women to obtain experience 
and then will no longer be necessary is incorrect, because when the quota [that 
was adopted under President Sadat] was cancelled, women did not excel in 
parliament. … having a [parliamentary] quota for women will lead to calls for 
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quotas for other segments of society on social or religious basis, such as a quota 
for Christians. The 50% quota for peasants and laborers is still in place in theory 
only because those who represent them in parliament are former police and 
military officers … both men and women are denied their right to participate in 
politics in Egypt. 
Al Hifnawi argued that  
adopting a quota and empowering women is not the issue, for ever since the NDP 
and organizations which claim that they stand up for women‟s rights have 
emerged, Egyptian women‟s status has been deteriorating: violence against 
women and rape are on the rise, female illiteracy is rising and there are many 
female headed households. Adopting a [parliamentary] quota for women will not 
solve any of these problems. The electoral system is not free, democratic or 
transparent and does not allow Egyptians - men and women - to chose those who 
represent them in parliament. People do not believe in the electoral system. The 
constitution was amended to allow the President‟s son to succeed him. The NDP 
is empowering itself and its female members and not women who will benefit 
society, the poor or call for educating women. The NDP is trying to secure 
another 64 parliamentary seats and is presenting them in the form of empowering 
women. The entire Egyptian society is in dire need of a quota ... What is taking 
place are changes that will make things look better but it is a big lie.”  
Abo El Hassan argued that the women‟s parliamentary quota will be implemented in 
theory only in order to please „the women‟s committee in the UN‟, i.e. the CEDAW 
Committee. "They are interested in quantity not quality and changing laws and 
implementing them in theory only and then sending an annual report to the women‟s 
committee in the UN [CEDAW] so that it gives them a round of applause."  
Abo Baraka argued that the idea of a women‟s parliamentary quota emanates from the 
incorrect premise that women are incapable of contesting elections because they are weak 
and do not possess certain qualities, all of which is nonsense. He gave the example of the 
two female Muslim Brotherhood candidates, Makarem El Deyari and Jihan Al Halafawi 
who ran for parliament and argued that one of them actually won the elections but the 
regime rigged the results, while the other was given a very hard time by the regime. He 
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also argued that the regime is denying all Egyptian citizens the right to contest elections 
or vote.  
There are 20,000 court cases by people who were denied their right to contest 
elections. These are the main reasons behind low levels of women‟s 
representation in parliament, and indeed the representation of all Egyptians in all 
elected bodies. … an entire governorate constitutes one or two constituencies for 
women by virtue of the [women‟s parliamentary] quota, and the same geographic 
area is divided up into 16 different constituencies for men. This burdens women 
and does not empower them, it even contradicts with the principle of 
empowerment. All of this is being done to achieve an illegal end … to strengthen 
dictatorship.  
This seminar shows that the views expressed by opposition forces away from the media 
revolve around more or less the same ideas as the ones expressed in media outlets. But 
here they have expressed them in far more detail, in a much harsher manner and using 
stronger terms. It also shows that the views of the various opposition forces - the leftist 
Tagammu, the Islamic Muslim Brotherhood and the Kefaya movement which is a 
coalition of people with various different ideological backgrounds – are very similar.  
 
6.4 Provincial Governor: 
Egypt is divided into 28 provincial governorates each of which is run by a provincial 
governor who is appointed by the President. In April of 2008, two additional provincial 
governorates were created and several new provincial governors were appointed. They 
did not include a single woman and it is noteworthy that no woman has ever been 
appointed as provincial governor. Only the privately owned media - both print and 
broadcast - addressed this issue, while the government owned media completely 
disregarded it. 
 
6.4.1 90 Dekika: 
90 Dekika is the only talk show that ran a discussion about all of this as part of its episode 
aired on the 20
th
 of April 2008. The presenter of this segment was Motaz El Demerdash. 
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The speakers included  Hoda Badran, President of the Arab Women‟s Alliance and 
Farida Al Naqqash, who was introduced as the editor in chief of Al Ahaly newspaper. Al 
Ahaly is affiliated to the Tagammu Party and Al Naqqash is deputy president of that 
party, but none of this was mentioned. The final speaker was Jihan Al Gharabawi, a 
journalist in Al Ahram newspaper. 
Before looking into the details of that episode, some of the statements made by the 
program editor of 90 Dekika, must be taken into consideration. Hassan said: 
We selected the speakers [of that episode] on the following grounds: Farida Al 
Naqqash is a well known writer and the editor in chief of Al Ahaly newspaper and 
so she represented a particular perspective. Hoda Badran is the President of the 
Arab Women‟s Alliance, a former head of NCW and she has been active in 
women‟s issues and women‟s rights for a very long time. Jihan Al Gharabawi is 
young and represents views that are different from the leftist views Al Naqqash 
represents and the slightly pro-government views that Badran represents. They 
were a good combination; Al Gharabawi was rather sarcastic, Al Naqqash was 
rather pessimistic and Badran was rather optimistic. … We addressed this topic 
because we would like women to be represented in all fields. We addressed it by 
featuring speakers who represent diverse perspectives and discussed the issue 
from all of the various angles. … Each speaker expressed a particular line of 
thought. Hoda Badran talked about why women ought to attain the post of 
governor from a governmental perspective, Farida Al Naqqash talked about 
women who were around in the past and others who are around now and are 
qualified for this post, while Jihan Al Gharabawi represents the dilemmas women 
face and why they should not attain the post of governor, in addition to some of 
the sarcasm she expressed. Each one of them knew exactly what they were here to 
do and we [the program‟s crew] are fully aware of the stance of each speaker and 
we take this into consideration while selecting them. … The most important 
speaker is seated in the best spot. The most important speaker in this case was 
Hoda Badran and so she was seated in the best spot and she spoke first. Partly 
because she was the eldest, followed by Farida Al Naqqash and then Jihan Al 
Gharabwi. If the speakers consist of two men and one woman, the woman speaks 
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first. Badran was the most important speaker because she used to hold a 
governmental post, she is involved in women‟s issues [more than the other 
speakers], since she is the President of the Arab Women‟s Alliance, she has 
conducted a lot of research in this area and can talk about successful female 
figures more than the other speakers. 
In the discussion, Badran used three arguments to back up women's appointment as 
governor. The first argument was that women are qualified to attain the post of governor 
because many women are well educated, experienced and strong. The second argument 
was that women have attained this post in other Arab countries such as Sudan. She added 
that other Arab women are not any better than Egyptian women. The third argument was 
that refraining from appointing women as governors is harmful to Egyptian society on the 
grounds that exceptional and qualified women are not even being considered for this post. 
The fourth argument was that the Omda
144
 of a village in Upper Egypt is a woman, which 
should have been a far greater challenge than being appointed as governor because a 
Omda presides over a rural area and represents the minister of interior. Also, at one point 
the presenter asked Badran the following question:    
Presenter: What if the female governor is pregnant or breastfeeding or is in her  
husband's arms?  
Badran: A male governor could also be in his wife's arms. …  Any governor is 
usually around 50 years-old. A woman who is aspiring to become governor is 
likely to be one that is well educated and well read. Such women tend to have a 
small number of children. Therefore, by the time she is 50 - and can be appointed 
governor - her children will have grown-up and she will be beyond this phase. 
Some of the speakers beseeched high ranking government officials to appoint women to 
this post. Badran said that she is disappointed that President Mubarak did not appoint a 
single woman among the newly appointed governors. She also said “Many women work 
closely with Mrs. Mubarak, she chose them carefully and they are exceptional and 
experienced women who have been working in civil society. Why not appoint one of 
                                                 
144
 A government representative to every Egyptian village who is appointed by the Minister of Interior. 
His/her main role is to solve problems, disputes and quarrels that arise between the villagers. He/she also 
heads a group of lightly armed men who safeguard the village and coordinates with the policemen in 
security matters.   
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them as governor?” Also, Al Naqqash said “the ruling elite must realize that we are in 
dire need for it to take steps to empower women and to allow them to attain such posts.” 
Al Naqqash argued that  
the current approach to appointing women in decision making posts is a symbolic 
one, such as appointing two female ministers out of 40 ministers, appointing one 
female marriage registrar and appointing 30 female judges out of 6,000 judges, 
rather than opening the door for women to join the judicial establishment as 
juniors and make their way through the system just like men. A significant 
number of women must be appointed to such posts.  
Al Naqqash also argued  
Egyptian society‟s perception of women‟s status is rapidly deteriorating due to 
two reasons. The first is the economic problems caused by the economic and 
social approach the government has adopted which has led to a rise in poverty and 
unemployment. In such an environment there is less support for women‟s 
liberation at the grassroots level. The second is that the rise in poverty has led to 
the emergence of „political Islamic groups‟ which are hostile to women. They 
managed to impose these ideas onto Egyptian society and culture. 
She was referring to the Muslim Brotherhood but she did not name them. Badran and 
Gharabawi agreed with her on this point. 
There were several references to the idea that having female governors would reflect 
positively on Egypt‟s image in the international arena. In his introduction to the segment 
the presenter said “having women in decision making positions would make us look 
really good abroad.” He also said that appointing female governors will market a good 
image of Egypt abroad. Gharabawi also argued that having female governors would 
reflect a much better image of Egypt in the international arena.  
In addition, Gharabawi argued  
many laywomen mistrust women. For example, a woman told me that her female 
gynecologist did a very good job through out her pregnancy, but she let her down 
when she went into labour at 3 o'clock in the morning. That is why women are 
skeptical about having a female governor because she may not be able to attend to 
people's needs if there is an emergency in the middle of the night. 
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Thus, Gharabawi initiated a sub-topic which the other two speakers addressed and argued 
against. Badran said that several women are in decision-making positions in various 
governorates and villages and are trusted by women. She gave the example of a female 
deputy president of a specific local council and described how women resort to her to 
solve their problems at any time and she goes to all of the villages she is responsible for 
and attends to their needs. Meanwhile, Al Naqqash said that female doctors and nurses 
spend the whole night working in hospitals and so a female governor attending to 
people‟s needs in the middle of the night is not a problem. She also said that women‟s 
mistrust of women is fueled by many long years of socializing women into believing that 
they are incapable of doing much which does away with their self-esteem and leads them 
to mistrust other women.    
Gharabawi also initiated another sub-topic. She said that there is a lot of talk about 
“women, women‟s rights, women‟s role and women‟s representation” but, she then said 
in a sarcastic tone: “I use to interview feminists who would say this society is classist, 
patriarchal and rotten.” She then laughed. This was followed by the presenter insisting on 
writing down all of these terms so that she had to repeat them over and over again to 
enable him to do so, while Badran interrupted her and asked her who that particular 
feminist. All of this took place with several intervals of laughter and this lasted for quite 
some time. 
 
In this episode, two of the speakers were affiliated to the regime. The one which was 
closest to the regime spoke first and for the longest period of time. Yet a member of an 
opposition force was given far more time to express her views than on any other occasion 
on 90 Dekika. But she was a member of a tame and co-opted opposition party. Therefore, 
the voices of the strong secular as well as the Islamic opposition were marginalized. This 
is further evidence to support the argument made previously about how members of the 
regime are readily represented but do not dominate the discussion on 90 Dekika. In 
addition, there was a lot of emphasis on the President and first lady in a manner that 
indicated that they have the upper hand in deciding whether or not women are appointed 
as provincial governors.  
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This episode included sexist comments, anti-women‟s discourse and hostility towards 
women‟s rights more than any other episode of 90 Dekika which addressed women‟s 
political participation, largely thanks to Gharabawi – the same woman who expressed 
anti-women discourse the fourth time 90 Dekika addressed the adoption of the women‟s 
parliamentary quota. Again, the sexist comments largely revolved around the idea that 
women are not very competent due to their sex. Repeatedly featuring her as an 
interviewee to address topics pertaining to women cannot be mistaken as a coincidence 
and could be taken to mean that despite supporting women‟s rights, the program‟s crew 
feels the need to allow for such discourse to be expressed on 90 Dekika. Again a possible 
explanation is to avoid alienating viewers who are likely to include people who are 
hostile to women‟s rights and/or people who have turned against them due to the state‟s 
approach to women‟s rights. But an alternative explanation is that she was featured for 
the purposes of objectivity. 
 
6.4.2 Al Masry Al Youm:  
Al Masry Al Youm covered the lack of female governors using one story entitled „Leading 
Female Figures: The Newly Appointed Provincial Governors did not Include Women 
because They [the provincial governors] were Appointed to Crack Down on People After 
the Government‟s Failure.‟ The story‟s lead read as follows: “not a single woman was 
appointed as female provincial governor despite the promises by [government] officials 
and the decisions pertaining to women‟s political empowerment,” the latest of which 
were expressed during the 8
th
 NCW conference. This was followed by a long quote from 
Farakhonda Hassan in which she said “I am extremely upset that the newly appointed 
provincial governors do not include a single woman, this the only political post that 
women have not attained despite attaining posts like ministers, ambassadors and MPs.” 
All of the other quotes in the story were much shorter. The first of these was from Nehad 
Abu El Komsan, President of ECWR [see Chapter 5 for details about Abu El Komsan 
and ECWR] in which she argued “the newly appointed provincial governors were 
selected primarily on the basis of their ability to crack down on people because of the 
direct impact of the failure of government policies on people. Women have no place in 





, who argued “people perceive provincial governors as 
equivalent to head of state and therefore, women will never attain this post as long as 
they have not attained the post of head of state.” The next quote was from Hoda Badran 
in which she said “the governor of Khartoum is a woman but in Egypt people are selected 
to hold decision making posts using criteria such as gender and patriarchal ideas and not 
based on competence or qualifications, … female deputy provincial governors have 
proven that women are up to it.” The final quote was from Mofid Shehab and it was 
longer than the ones preceding it. He said “during the last 10 years women have attained 
many unprecedented posts. We should look at the bigger picture and not perceive women 
attaining the post of provincial governor as an outstanding achievement but what matters 
is that the entire society works towards women‟s empowerment so that competence 
becomes the criteria for choosing between people” (Rashwan 20/4/2008b).  
The criticism expressed in Al Masry Al Youm was harsher than that expressed on 90 
Dekika. The interviewees also included people who were slightly more distant from the 
regime; Nehad Abu El Komsan heads a semi-coopted women‟s NGO, as argued in 
Chapter 5, as opposed to Hoda Badran who heads a semi-official one. They also included 
a representative of a Western organization, a group which was never represented in any 
other media outlet. 
 
6.5 Conclusion: 
It is clear from the evidence in this chapter that the privately owned media in Egypt is 
fully controlled by the government through a combination of co-optation and coercion. 
For all of the privately owned media outlets are owned by businessmen affiliated to the 
regime and state security directly interferes in their work and approves the topics that 
they address and how they address them. Therefore, Albrecht‟s (2007) notion of 
liberalized authoritarianism is not only useful in explaining the political scene in Egypt 
but it is relevant to the media environment as well. For these privately owned media 
outlets give the impression that media that is free from government control is to be found 
in Egypt. Also, because they contain more criticism of the government than the 
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 A German organization founded by the first President of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1958. It 
promotes liberalism and individual freedom. It has been represented in Egypt since the 1970s and its 
projects include training journalists.   
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government owned media, it looks as if these outlets are a manifestation of an 
unprecedented level of freedom of expression in the Egyptian media. But in reality, they 
are merely yet another manifestation of what Bianchi (1989: 8, 20, 23-4) has described as 
fake pluralistic entities. Any criticism expressed in them has been approved by the 
government in order to maintain this fake pluralistic media system.  
The evidence gathered here shows that one must delve in deeper and examine the matter 
far more closely to obtain a thorough understanding of the media scene in Egypt. All 
opposition forces have more access to the privately owned media than they do to the 
government owned media. However, this access is extremely limited and should not in 
any way be exaggerated. For example, out of the eleven speakers who addressed subjects 
related to women and politics on 90 Dekika, three were representatives of the regime, 
three worked for government owned institutions or semi-official organizations and only 
two were members of opposition political parties. At the same time, opposition forces are 
allowed far more access to the privately owned print media than the privately owned 
broadcast media. It follows that criticism of the government is expressed more frequently 
in the privately owned print media than the privately owned broadcast media, and the 
criticism expressed in the former is harsher than that expressed in the latter. However, it 
is still rather mild compared to the criticism that is expressed in non-media outlets, as 
shown during the course of this chapter.  
Furthermore, the secular opposition has more access to the privately owned media than is 
the case for the Islamic opposition. For example, members of various secular opposition 
parties were among the interviewees in two episodes of 90 Dekika which addressed 
women and politics, while not a single member of the Muslim Brotherhood was ever 
featured on 90 Dekika. But even within the secular opposition there is a discrepancy in 
media access. The weaker and more co-opted secular opposition parties have more access 
to the privately owned media as a whole, and more access to the privately owned 
broadcast media in particular than the stronger and less co-opted secular opposition 
parties. For example, the only member of an opposition party who was one of the main 
speakers in an episode of 90 Dekika which addressed women and politics was a member 
of the co-opted opposition party Tagammu, while in Al Masry Al Youm the voices of 
stronger and less co-opted opposition parties such as Al Ghad are occasionally to be 
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found. This discrepancy in the privately owned media scene seems to bear out Lust-
Okar‟s (2007) theory of a divided level of contestation because there is a differential in 
the level of criticism that is permissible in different types of media outlets. Opposition 
forces are allowed different levels of access to the different types of privately owned 
media as a whole and some opposition forces are allowed more access to the privately 
owned media than others. State security is largely - although not solely - in control of all 
of this. 
This chapter builds on many of the findings arrived at in Chapter 4 and fills many of the 
gaps in it. Chapter 4 revealed the minimal role played by female members of political 
parties and the difficulties that they face within those parties. But it did not address 
whether or not these women have access to the media. The evidence in this chapter shows 
that the privately owned media gave female members of all political forces - the ruling 
party and the secular opposition parties and even female members of the Muslim 
Brotherhood - an opportunity to express their views in the media. The government owned 
media largely interviews leading members of the ruling party and presidents of 
opposition parties, all of whom are men even when the issue at stake is one to do with 
women. On the other hand, the privately owned media interviewed female members of 
the various political parties while addressing topics pertaining to women and politics, in 
addition to interviewing leading male members of the various parties. 
The evidence in this chapter reinforces the finding in Chapter 4 that the government only 
addresses women‟s rights when the President and/or first lady approve of such a move 
and are more often than not are directly involved in the matter. For adopting the women‟s 
parliamentary quota was part of the President‟s electoral program and he was the one 
who announced in person that it would be adopted. This personalization of the 
President‟s power, which was identified by Kassem (2004), was reflected in the media on 
various fronts. Several members of the ruling party while being interviewed by the media 
justified the need to adopt the women‟s parliamentary quota on the grounds that it was 
part of the President‟s electoral program. Even some members of opposition political 
parties ended up thanking the President for the adoption of the women‟s parliamentary 
quota while being interviewed by the privately owned media. In addition, the government 
owned print media‟s treatment of the adoption of the women‟s parliamentary quota 
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largely consisted of glorifying the President, dwelling on how he has always supported 
women‟s rights and it included statements about the President making Egyptian women‟s 
dream of being politically empowered come true.  
Close analysis of the media treatment of initiatives affecting women‟s political 
empowerment helps to clarify the argument made in Chapter 4 that NCW is a rather weak 
institution while the NDP is a rather powerful one. It was the NDP‟s vision of how to go 
about implementing the women‟s parliamentary quota that was implemented and not that 
of NCW, so that the NDP‟s interests were safeguarded. This adds an additional element 
to Abrahams‟ (1988: 77, 79, 81) analysis of how the divided institutions that constitute 
the state come together to come up with a unified stance to address a specific pressing 
issue. This chapter has pinpointed that when such a need arises the more powerful 
institution in that particular situation ensures that the final decision which is reached does 
not infringe upon its interests and privileges, while other weaker institutions do not have 
much of a say in the matter. This dichotomy is reflected in the print media through 
several stories about the meetings held and decisions reached by the NDP Policies‟ 
Committee, while there are not that many stories about NCW.  
Another important finding is that the President‟s power is not unlimited. For he found it 
necessary to deviate from his prepared speech and reassure the NDP members by saying 
“don‟t you worry, we will not take anything away from you,” while announcing the 
adoption of a women‟s parliamentary quota. Therefore, it seems that Kassem (2004) has 
underestimated the power of the NDP and exaggerated the power of the President. A very 
small number of commentators criticized Presidnet Mubarak‟s statement as part and 
parcel of criticizing the idea that the women‟s parliamentary quota was implemented by 
adding extra seats to parliament. These commentators then went  on to criticize how any 
rights granted to women are perceived as rights that are taken away from men.  
Additional evidence was provided in this chapter to support the argument made in 
Chapter 4 that Gamal is involved in formal politics. He clearly played a crucial role in the 
decision to adopt the women‟s parliamentary quota because the idea of implementing it 
using extra parliamentary seats emanated from the NDP Policies Committee which he 
heads. Media treatment of his involvement largely consisted of news stories in the print 
media about meetings held by the NDP Secretariat to decide on the women‟s 
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parliamentary quota. Some of these stories, especially those in the government owned 
newspaper, included quotes from Gamal.  
The evidence in this chapter shows that the Egyptian government‟s approach to women‟s 
rights is one of making cosmetic changes that make things look better and in theory grant 
women rights but in practice women do not truly benefit from any of this. For example, 
although the number of female MPs will indeed increase by virtue of the women‟s 
parliamentary quota, given the way elections are administered in Egypt, they will 
overwhelmingly be occupied by female members of the NDP. This was reflected in the 
privately owned media by numerous columnists and several members of opposition 
political parties who argued that female members of the NDP would end up winning all 
of the women‟s seats created by virtue of the women‟s parliamentary quota. Some of 
them also added that the adoption of the women‟s parliamentary quota would not truly 
lead to a better representation for women in parliament.  
The chapter builds on Hatem‟s (1992) argument that when an authoritarian regime 
addresses women‟s rights, this leads to an association between women‟s rights and 
authoritarianism by showing that it also leads to an association between women‟s rights 
and many of the authoritarian regime‟s policies which have failed miserably. 
Furthermore, it is fueling the idea that women‟s rights are being imposed on society using 
abusive measures. For example, several columnists in Al Masry Al Youm drew 
comparisons between the women‟s parliamentary quota and the failed parliamentary 
quotas for peasants and laborers. Many others argued that women‟s parliamentary 
representation should increase as a result of a natural progression in women‟s status and 
role in society and should not be imposed from above using abusive measures.     
More importantly, the cosmetic changes approach is backfiring against women within 
Egyptian society by fueling negative sentiments towards and turning people against 
women‟s rights and women per se. This is reflected in the privately owned print and 
broadcast media and even in the government owned broadcast media through comments 
such as women metafhina el kota, how the women who will join parliament by virtue of 
the women‟s parliamentary quota will not have time to have families and so will be 
childless and therefore will contribute to solving Egypt‟s overpopulation problem and 
how quotas for men will be necessary in the near future to protect men from women. 
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Thus, not only does the state‟s approach leave the societal structures that disadvantage 
women unchanged, as argued by Murphy (2003), it is strengthening the structures that 
disadvantage women by fueling support for the idea that women‟s activity should be 
confined to the private sphere.    
This chapter also provides additional evidence to support the argument made in Chapter 
5 that those who support women‟s rights avoid framing their arguments in women‟s 
rights discourse or gender equality discourse. Again paternalistic discourse was used, 
such as the argument that women should be represented in parliament while discussions 
that lead to laws pertaining to the family take place. This is problematic because it 
reinforces the idea that women‟s realm is the private sphere. It also builds on Tucker‟s 
(1993: xiii) argument of the blurring between the distinction between the private and 
public spheres and their implications for women. In this case, the implication is that that 
women should play minimal roles in the public sphere, namely ones which are an 
extension to or similar to their roles in the private sphere. In addition, de-gendered 
discourse was used in a similar manner to the one highlighted in Chapter 5. For example, 
some speakers argued that adopting the women‟s parliamentary quota was necessary 
because it is a system which will enable society as a whole to benefit from competent and 
qualified citizens by enabling them to join parliament. Using such discourse is 
problematic because, drawing on Sakr‟s (2004a: 1) argument that the media reflects and 
reinforces societal perceptions of women, if women‟s rights are justified using de-
gendered discourse, this reflects and reinforces the societal view that the notion of 
women‟s rights is unacceptable. Yet in this chapter another type of discourse was used, 
other than the ones used in Chapter 5, namely pan-Arabism. For example, some people 
argued that other Arab countries have adopted women‟s parliamentary quotas. This 
particular discourse must be interpreted in light of post-colonialism and the association 
between women‟s rights and the efforts of the colonizers to undermine Egyptian culture, 
noted in Chapter 2. by referring to other Arab countries the speakers were attempting to 
indirectly negate the idea that the women‟s parliamentary quota is an alien measure 










For example, some of the arguments used by the government representatives interviewed 
in the various media outlets to justify the need to adopt the women‟s parliamentary quota  
 







Having examined the stances and/or efforts of institutions like political parties and NGOs 
on women‟s rights as well as examining media treatment of these efforts in addition to 
female drama serials reception of political drama, it is time to look into initiatives by a 
variety of individuals and organizations in the area of women, media and politics.  
These include an unprecedented move by a young woman as well as examining media 
content that focuses on women, which is a type of media content that has not been 
addressed in previous chapters. While doing so, it adds another elements to the argument 
made in Chapters 5 and 6 about how the state‟s approach to women‟s rights is not only 
leaving the societal structures that disadvantage women unchanged, as argued by Murphy 
(2003), but is strengthening the structures that disadvantage women. This new element is 
examining whether or not the strengthening of these structures is being reflected in media 
content focused on women. The chapter also builds on Chapter 7 by providing some 
insight into the ideas and approaches of the screenwriter of the drama serial which was 
used in that chapter. In addition, the chapter examines efforts to foster co-operation 
between members of political parties, which in turn is likely to provide an explanation for 
why women‟s political participation is hardly ever addressed by the media. Finally, the 
chapter investigates the media monitoring efforts of three women‟s organizations, which 
monitor drama serials‟ treatment of women. Their efforts will be examined in light of 
Lotz‟s (2006) arguments about how problematic the „role model framework‟ is.  
The chapter is divided into three main sections. The first examines media monitoring 
initiatives by several women‟s organizations, namely NCW and the women‟s NGOs 
ADEW and NWF [see Chapter 5 for details about all of these organizations]. The second 
section examines media content initiatives in both the broadcast and print media. These 
include programs focusing on women which are aired on both government and privately 
owned satellite channels, as well as a magazine supplement focusing on women. The 
third section is about initiatives by citizens. These include attempts to foster co-operation 
between female members of various political parties, which sheds light on why women‟s 
political participation is hardly ever addressed by the media. Other initiatives by citizens 
which are examined are a screenwriter who frequently addresses women‟s rights in her 
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drama serials and a woman who stood up against sexual harassment and assault, and 
who‟s action received very extensive media coverage.   
 
8.1 Media Monitoring Initiatives: 
Several women‟s organizations engage in media monitoring. They are NCW, the NGOs 
ADEW and NWF.  
  
8.1.1 NCW’s Media Watch Unit: 
NCW established a Media Watch Unit in order to investigate the extent to which the 
messages advocated by the media convey a realistic image of Egyptian women. It was 
established in co-operation with UNICEF
147
 and it also co-operates with UNIFEM. The objective of the Media Watch Unit is to 
play a role in NCW‟s efforts to change Egyptian society‟s perceptions of women and 
encourage the media to focus on positive images of women. Its activities are monitoring, 
analyzing and evaluating all media content which addresses anything to do with women, 
with particular emphasis on drama serials. The results of these studies are then discussed 
with representatives of media institutions in seminars and roundtable discussions (NCW 
nd: 1). 
According to reports produced by the Media Watch Unit, the Unit monitors a sample of 
print and broadcast media outlets, including both government and privately owned ones 
on a regular basis. The conclusions and recommendations of the reports are rather 
similar. For example, these reports tend to conclude that most Egyptian newspapers‟ 
coverage of women‟s issues takes the form of news stories and not stories that contain in-
depth analysis of women‟s achievements, the problems that they encounter and the 
challenges that they face. Thus, the reports repeatedly recommend training journalists 
who cover women‟s issues and talking to decision-makers in newspapers in an attempt to 
ensure that investigative journalists and columnists address women issues (NCW nd: 2, 4, 
28-29). Other monitored media content were female characters in drama serials. In this 
regard, the reports tend to recommend reconsidering drama serials‟ treatment of women 
                                                 
147 Interview with Amina Shafik, Head of NCW‟s Media Committee, Cairo, 17 December, 2007 
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and the topics pertaining to women that they address so that they convey a realistic image 
of Egyptian women (NCW c2007: 7).  
When NCW personnel discuss the media monitoring results with journalists many of 
them are offended
148
. However, when they draw decision makers' attention to these 
results they respond positively. These decisions makers include the Minister of 
Information and the President of Television
149
.  
It is not surprising that the President of ERTU responds positively to NCW‟s demands 
because the first lady is the President of NCW. As argued in Chapter 5, she is active in 
formal politics when it comes to women‟s rights. But given the authoritarian nature of the 
Egyptian regime, it is likely that she is active in other arenas of formal politics. 
Therefore, any government official must take the requests of an organization she heads 
very seriously.  
  
8.1.2 ADEW’s Analysis of Print Media: 
ADEW engages in media monitoring on a regular basis. The long-term aim of media 
monitoring is improving media treatment of women and getting journalists to stand up 
against discrimination against women in the media outlet that they work for (ADEW 
2003: 3, 4). The motivation behind their media monitoring projects is the belief that 
portraying women in the media as role models promotes the idea of women‟s success, 
encourages women to succeed and convinces readers that women can excel in any field 
(ADEW 2004: 2). Another motivation is the belief that the media plays an important and 
influential role in shaping public opinion in all issues, but more so in women‟s issues. 
Thus, it is the media‟s responsibility to play an integral role in enhancing women‟s role in 
society (ADEW 2003: 4). 
An example of ADEW‟s media monitoring projects is an analytical study which 
monitored several newspapers and magazines during the period between September 2002 
and February 2003. It investigated whether or not the media‟s treatment of women‟s 
issues is in line with feminist ideas. This culminated in recommendations for women‟s 
NGOs and other women‟s organizations, decision makers, journalists and academics. 
                                                 
148 Interview with Amina Shafik, 17 December, 2007 
149 Interview with Maya Morsi, UNIFEM Coordinatior in Cairo, Cairo, 11 January. 2009  
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(ADEW 2003: 3, 6, 9, 25-6). Another example is a study about the women‟s page of Al 
Ahram and the weekly women‟s supplement of the government owned newspaper Al 
Gomhoria (The Republic) entitled Mahbobati (My Lover). The criteria used in the 
analysis included the amount of space allocated to women‟s issues, the photos published 
in the women‟s pages, the writing style and whether or not they shed light on women 
who have excelled in their careers. The report ends with results and recommendations 
such as calling upon Al Ahram to issue a weekly women‟s supplement, training 
journalists on media treatment of women‟s issues, calling upon the newspaper to use 
photos of Egyptian and not Western women and cover rural women‟s issues more often 
(ADEW 2004: 1-14). 
ADEW distributes the results of its media monitoring projects to media decision makers, 
such as heads of different television channels and the editors in chief of newspapers. 




8.1.3 NWF’s Media Monitoring: 
NWF has conducted two studies monitoring drama serials aired during aired Ramadan in 
collaboration with other organizations, including Media House and Appropriate 
Communication Techniques for Development (ACT). These studies aimed to detect 
violence against women, any discrimination against women and stereotypical images of 
women. They analyzed them using content analysis. Some of the conclusions they arrived 
at were that although many of the drama serials contained unconventional female 
characters such as strong and confrontational women, and women who played influential 
roles in society, other drama serials contained female characters confined to stereotypical 
roles (NWF 2003: 6). Other findings included that the number of male characters 
exceeded the number of female ones, that around 30% of the female characters were 
housewives and male characters were four times more likely to be university professors 
than female ones. When it comes to violence against women, they concluded that the vast 
majority of violence against women was psychological and most of the violence was 
familial and took place within households (Kamel and Darwish c. 2004: 6, 23, 25, 27-29). 
                                                 
150 Interview with Rasha Raslan, member of ADEW, Cairo, 11 September 2008 
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NWF also conducted media monitoring projects about other issues, namely the print 
media‟s treatment of sexual harassment (NWF 2007: 2, 5) and its coverage of women 
who ran for parliament in 2005 (NWF 2005: 1). 
Darwish said that media personnel are offended by the media monitoring results. NWF‟s 
monitoring of drama serials is harshly criticized while some journalists even went as far 
as describing them as liars. Darwish said that she always stresses that the aim of these 
media monitoring efforts is not to infringe upon the freedom of journalists and those in 
the entertainment industry but to provide them with analysis of their work because some 
of them may unintentionally produce anti-women's discourse or present a negative image 
of women
151
. However, Darwish believes that these projects are effective. She gave an 
example of how, according to one of her acquaintances who watched that particular 
episode, Khairy Ramadan (who at the time used to work as) a presenter in a talk show 
aired on Orbit  asked the editor in chief of Al Masry Al Youm, Madgi Al Galad, about 
NWF‟s study that concluded that the newspaper is not doing enough in its coverage of 
sexual harassment. Al Galad acknowledged that that was the case. "I believe that if three 
years of work in this area leads 10 media personnel to get it," then we are getting 
somewhere
152
, Darwish added. 
    
8.2 Media Content Initiatives: 
8.2.1 Sa'et Zaman: 
Sae't Zaman  (An Hour) is a daily program that used to be aired on the government 
owned Egyptian Satellite Channel. On Thursdays it used to addresses women's rights but 
on other days of the week it used to address other topics all together. Every three months, 
some programming changes are made. As a consequence of one such change, the 
program disappeared all together - not just the weekly women's episode but the entire 
program. Despite this, I decided to include the program in the study because it is an 
indication of media content focusing on women aired on a government owned channel.   
The episodes of Sa’et Zaman aired on the 4th of December was devoted to discussing 
'NGOs and Laws Pertaining to Women' yet the speakers were not members of NGOs nor 
                                                 
151 Interview with Nawla Darwish, Cairo, Head of NWF‟s Board of Trustees, 17 Septmeber, 2008  
152 Ibid  
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were NGOs brought up at all during the discussion. The speakers were a lawyer called 
Somaya Darwish and a professor of sociology called Soheir Lotfy. Towards the end of 
her introduction to the program the presenter said "a lot of people say things like what 
else do women want? Haven't they had enough? Even the director of the program is 
telling me [in the earpiece] what else do you [women] want?"  
After that the presenter asked Lotfy: 
Presenter: When some members of society raise issues like what else do women 
want and that women have attained everything that there is to attain, so why seek 
more? Does that mean that [Egyptian] society still finds discussing women's 
rights unacceptable?  
Lotfy: Yes, to some extent. We should not forget that when people say what else 
do women want, that we are not depriving men of some of their rights and giving 
them to women ... these are rights that exist within Islamic Sharia, we are not 
inventing any rights ... [Also] I would like to say something so that the viewers do 
not perceive this conversation as [one about] women versus men, but it is about 
the well being of society ... Some men do not give their divorcee the money they 
are suppose to give them in order to provide for their children in order to punish 
their ex-wives, but in reality it is the children who suffer. Similarly, some women 
give their ex-husbands a hard time in meeting up with their children while they 
are in their custody. … when women obtain a particular right, this is not an 
absolute right but it is a right in order to ensure the well being of children … 
women must understand that they should not perceive this as a victory over their 
ex-husbands but a measure to ensure societal well being.  
Important points to be noted in this discussion are how the presenters started the episode 
by addressing arguments that women have obtained way too many rights rather than 
trying to highlight the importance of advancing women‟s status. One of the speakers 
came across as rather secular because she argued that when a couple get divorced, a 
woman should be entitled to half of everything her husband embezzled during their 
marriage. In contrast, in Sharia a divorced woman is entitled to money from her ex-
husband using very different criteria, which leads to her obtaining a rather different sum 
of money. Yet despite her secularity, she framed her argument about women‟s rights in 
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the private sphere in Islamic discourse. She also completely avoiding using women‟s 
rights discourse at all times. For example, she framed some of her arguments about 
divorced women‟s rights in discourse about the well being of children of divorce.  
The next episode aired on the 11
th
 of December 2008 featured the same speakers and 
addressed the proposed amendments regarding divorced men's right to see their children 
who are in their mother's custody. The presenter said that throughout the week she 
received countless phone calls and was stopped by passers-by in the streets who wanted 
to tell her about their problems or views regarding the existing law or the proposed 
amendments to it. Towards the end of the introduction she said: 
I would like to stress that when we address any issue we are not biased to one side 
over the other, even though the program is concerned with women's issues ... 
However, we are objective in presenting [different views]. We are not biased 
towards one side over the other, we are not biased towards women and against 
men, nor are we biased towards men against women. At the end of the day, we 
want to arrive at justice … regain lost rights and solve unprecedented societal 
problems. 
Thus, throughout the episode the presenter asked one question that addressed the 
concerns of women and then followed it by a question that addressed the concerns of 
men. For example, she raised women's concern that if children spend the weekend and 
some holidays with their fathers, this would make it easier for some of these men to 
kidnap the children and their mothers would never see them again. (This already takes 
place at present, the concern is that the proposed amendment would make it easier for 
fathers who already intend to do so to execute their plans). She followed this by a 
question regarding how some women could unjustly accuse their ex-husbands of being 
immoral in order to deprive them of having their children over during the weekend and 
some other holidays.  
Therefore, in this particular episode the idea that women‟s rights are perceived as a 
process of taking away rights from men and giving them to women, ended up being 
reflected in a governmental program on women.  
The following episode aired on the 18
th
 of December 2008 featured two female 
researchers in order to discuss whether the global economic crisis would have a negative 
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impact on Egyptian and Arab women. They argued that many women would lose their 
jobs because many of them work in the services sector and that foreign funding for 
women's NGOs will not be readily available and therefore, the services that these NGOs 
offer to help women out will decrease. Another argument put forward by them was that a 
larger number of poor families will force their young daughters to work as maids.  
Another episode aired on the 15
th
 of January 2009 was about a program administered by 
UNIFEM to foster equal opportunities within companies in Egypt. The speakers were a 
female media advisor to the UNIFEM project, an academic and NCW member as well as 
the head of the HR unit in one of the companies that implemented the project, both of 
whom were men. The project's main aim was to ensure that companies do not 
discriminate against employees while appointing or promoting them primarily on the 
basis of sex and to a lesser extent on the basis of other criteria such as religion, race or 
disabilities. The project also aimed to establish a system to enable employees to file 
anonymous complaints within the company if they are discriminated against.  
During the discussion, they mentioned that the male academic is the one who commences 
the training program in any company because they are concerned that if a woman does so 
the male employees would dismiss her and anything she says on the grounds that she is a 
woman who is there to provide women with rights at the expense of men.  
This indicates that men perceive women‟s rights as taking away rights from men and 
giving them to women, which ended up being reflected in a governmental program on 
women. 
A final episode aired on the 5
th
 of February 2009 addressed yet again the proposed 
amendments to divorced men's rights of spending time with their children who are in the 
custody of their ex-wives. The speakers were the journalist and writer Hosn Shah and a 
male religious scholar. Both of them were largely more supportive of women's rights in 
this regard and gave many examples of divorced women's suffering when it comes to 
obtaining their various rights from their ex-husbands.  
At one point, Shah said that  
Some people falsely accuse me of bias. I am biased towards the oppressed 
regardless of whether it is a man or a woman. I do not argue that women are better 
than men or vice versa because some women are awful and so are some men. My 
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argument is that both women and men should have legal rights to support them if 
they fall out with the opposite sex. … as a Muslim woman, I would not dare go 
against Sharia. In fact, I call for the implementation of Sharia because if it is 
implemented, women will not be subjected to injustice, children will not be 
subjected to injustice and even men will not be subjected to injustice.   
This is very similar to the very first episode of the program that was analyzed. Again, a 
rather secular writer ended up framing her argument about women‟s rights in the private 
sphere in Islamic discourse and she avoided using women‟s rights discourse. 
 
8.2.2 Anisati Sadati: 
Anisati Sadati  (Ladies and Gentlemen) is a weekly program aired on Dream TV. The 
program always contained a brief interview with an artist who presented some of her 
work, a journalist who commented on some articles published in several Egyptian or 
Arab magazines and a discussion about a specific topic with experts in that field. Other 
features of the program which were included in many but not all episodes were fashion 
shows, a nutritionist talking about the nutritional value of a specific fruit, an expert in 
etiquette talking about topics like the principles of inviting people and the number of 
accessories one ought to wear.     
The artists were always women and they included jewelry designers and painters, in 
addition to a home-accessories designer who actually demonstrated how she makes these 
accessories.   
The journalist featured to comment on the articles was almost always a woman and more 
often than not was one who worked for privately owned magazines or newspapers and 
not government owned ones. The articles addressed in each episode are selected from 
more or less the same magazines, some of which were women's magazines while others 
were general interest ones. The topics addressed can largely be divided into several sub-
topics, namely marital issues, household chores, career related issues, women's rights and 
childrearing.  
The discussion always took place towards the end of the program with one or two 
speakers, which included both men and women. They were very often medical doctors, 
academics or PhD holders. The topics addressed included birth control, how men entrap 
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their wives, marital problems, why traditional extended family gatherings during Eid are 
being replaced with traveling to sea resorts with nuclear family members or friends, 
moodiness and having a temper as well as difficulties in expressing emotions.      
In other words, this program was not one that was interested in advancing women‟s status 
or their empowerment. It addressed many stereotypical women‟s issues such as fashion 
and child rearing and at best addressed light topics that are more of a social nature.  
One of the marital problems discussed was how men entrap their wives. The speaker was 
a male psychiatrist and marriage consultant. A segment of the discussion went as follows: 
Consultant: Every human being possesses three kinds of power: physical power, 
mental power and emotional power. Throughout history, women have rarely used 
physical power and have therefore used emotional power more frequently. 
However, in recent years, due to calls of liberating women, as if they were 
occupied and colonized   
Presenter: [interrupting and laughing] Yes, these strong terms  
Consultant: women have attained freedom at the expense of men's rights. 
Therefore men are no longer capable of using their physical capabilities on a 
frequent basis and have resorted to their emotional power. Consequently, 
entrapment is no longer exclusive to women. This is a scientific analysis. If I ask 
my wife to do something and she does it … there will be no need for me to get 
uptight. But if I am in a situation in which my wife disobeys my orders, 
challenges me, oppresses me and if we do not get along she can leave the marital 
home, divorce me and use the khula law to get rid of me, this oppression that men 
are now subjected to due to mishandling the male - female relationship has led 
men to try and entrap wives. Consequently - and this is no secret - this era is 
witnessing the highest rate of women complaining from their husbands, despite all 
of the rights women have obtained. … most - if not all - of those seeking marital 
advisors and psychiatrists are women. Their complaints revolve around men 
neglecting them, spending their time in cafes with their friends [rather than with 
their wives], they [men] seem to have their own private lives through mobile 
phones, he does not talk to me, he is not romantic and I run the house on my own.  
And if you ask men [why they behave in that manner], they reply by saying let 
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them have it. Since you [women] over did it in obtaining some rights that should 
have been mine, and I was forced to give up these rights for you, then I will 
deprive you of other rights. That's how men started entrapping to their wives. All 
of this has ruined so many things and we will eventually realize that women score 
a goal but end up losing the entire match - the marital match.        
Presenter: So you are standing up for men. 
Consultant: Many people falsely accuse me of being biased towards men and 
against women. 
Presenter: On a previous occasion, you said that when you are featured in our 
program, you will be on women's side. 
Consultant: I will always be on women's side because I believe that they are the 
ones who can change our society to the better, that is if we are interested in 
changing it to the better [in the first place]. But the problem is that women are 
preoccupied with unimportant issues in order to obtain minimal rights. 
   
Another segment of the discussion went as follows: 
Presenter: You said that men are the victors while some people are calling for the 
establishment of a national council for men on the grounds that they are being 
discriminated against these days. 
Consultant: How do women benefit from stripping men of their rights on the 
grounds that they are protecting themselves even though at the end of the day all 
of this amounts to insecurity and not security because by nature women need men 
for protection. We all support women but my concern is that the euphoria that 
women are experiencing due to their consecutive victories, may lead them to lose 
men in the end, when by nature they are inclined towards falling in love with 
[men], being in a relationship with [men] and forming a family with [men].        
This excerpt of the conversation is another example of how men perceive women‟s rights 
as taking rights from men and giving them to women. It also indicates that the existence 
of NCW is not boding well among men. It is very significant that such sentiments end up 




8.2.3 Tahya Al Setat: 
Roze El Youssef is a general interest magazine that was established by the Lebanese 
migrant to Egypt Roze El Youssef in the early 1900s. It was nationalized along with all 
other media outlets by the Nasser regime in the 1950s. Today, it remains government 
owned and is famous for its secular leftist ideology.  
As of the end of January 2009, Roze El Youssef began running a section entitled Tahya Al 
Setat (Long Live Women). Its slogan was 'a section about women introduced along with 
efforts to allocate parliamentary seats for women.'  
The very first time this section was run, it featured a column with the byline Roze El 
Youssef explaining  
that this section was introduced not out of bias towards women but out of bias for 
the values of Egyptian society. … Roze El Youssef perceives women's freedom as 
an indication of societal freedom and it is the duty of any society to provide 
women with their rights. But [Egyptian] society has become accustomed to 
women's news being confined to the social sections [of publications] when they 
ought to be on their front pages and should have nothing to do with women's 
organizations which use women's issues to their advantage (Roze El Youssef 
30/1/2009: 80). 
Examples of some of the stories included in this section are an interview with a woman 
who ran against 15 men during the last parliamentary elections and lost. She was about to 
run again because the MP had passed away (Loay 20/2/2009b: 80-1). Another story was 
about seven female members of the People's Assembly or Shoura Council who talked 
about how engaging in political activity has had an impact on their dress code. Some of 
their statements were about how they have to dress more conservatively, refrain from 
wearing attractive colors and wear light make-up (Emara and Hosny 27/2/2009: 78-9). 
Another story was about women excelling in the field of academia. According to the 
story an average of 60% of teaching assistants in a large number of Egyptian universities 
are women (Abd Rabo 6/3/2009: 84-6).    
Examples of other stories include a story about how people perceive female judges. The 
story included quotes from male judges, lawyers - both male and female - and family 
members of people being persecuted (Abd El Rasol and Loay 6/3/2009: 86-7). Another 
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example is a story about how women dealt with the global financial crisis. Many of them 
described how they have cut down on some household expenses in co-operation with 
their husbands (Magdi 6/3/2009: 88-9). There was also a story about the first female 
marriage registrar. She said that she is doing very well, people have accepted her and that 
she has come to realize that it is an occupation that "suits women more than men" (Al 
Dabe' 20/3/2009: 84-5). Tahya El Setat also included the first two months' worth of diary 
entries of the very first female Omda in Egypt (Loay 30/1/2009a: 84). 
Therefore, most of the stories in Long Live Women were progressive and addressed 
women‟s participation in the public sphere, with particular emphasis on arenas in which 
women are under represented, such as politics. It also focused on women which worked 
in occupations which women were prevented from joining for a very long time, such as 
judges and marriage registrars.  
The section also always included an opinion column by a different woman every week. 
An example of an opinion column is one in which the writer argued: 
I am aware that many male and female readers will argue that a section for men 
should also be in place. Such arguments are justified because readers and the 
public at large have been bombarded with talk about women's rights, their 
empowerment and their oppression over and over again by the government, 
NGOs, the international community, satellite channels, terrestrial channels, men, 
youth and women so that people have become fed up with women who have 
attained so many rights and yet are still asking for more. The problem is that 
women's rights are framed as needs which men then have to produce laws to 
address and not as rights enshrined in all faiths, constitutions and laws. I 
acknowledge that many men are subjected to injustice in the Arab world. On 
behalf of women, I vow to help them out as soon as we are empowered (Hassona 
6/2/2009: 84).  
Another opinion column was by a medical doctor in which she recounted the societal 
pressure on women to join the faculty of medicine, but after they finish their studies, they 
are met with other kinds of pressures to specialize in particular fields and not others. In 
some cases, they are even discriminated against if they try to specialize in particular 
fields, according to her (Amer 13/2/2009: 84). On another occasion the column was 
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written by a female screenwriter. She harshly criticized an ad for a soft drink for focusing 
on women's bodies and disregarding their minds (Naom 30/1/2009: 83). Other women 
who wrote the column harshly criticized the treatment of a particular television program 
of the proposed law to constrain polygamy (Radwan 20/3/2009: 86-7) and how growing 
numbers of university educated women end up becoming housewives. The latter writer 
recounted how one of her female students said to her "Young men find it very difficult to 
find jobs, so what are the chances that I will find one?" (Thabet 20/2/2009: 82) 
The opinion columns by and large were progressive, however, they again reflected the 
growing sentiments against women‟s rights and the how supporters of women‟s rights 
deliberately avoid using women‟s rights discourse. They also brought to the fore an issue 
addressed in Chapter 7, namely women‟s return to the home.  
Another sub-section that was included in Tahya El Setat was an opinion column entitled 
Barakat Adow El Setat (Barakat [a male name] Women's Enemy) and it was always 
written by the same man. The following is an excerpt from one of these columns:  
Instead of trying to find out why men do not vote for women, it looks like we are 
going to treat women like people with disabilities, who must be allocated specific 
parking slots and seats on public transportation facilities. Of course, this is in line 
with how I perceive women … but I am pleasantly surprised that the government 
agrees with me and indirectly acknowledged that women are incapable of 
competing with men in any field (Mahfouz 13/2/2009c: 87). 
On another occasion, the column read as follows: 
Why do you want women to leave their natural place (prison, home or night club) 
in order to become heads of state, develop countries and utilize their skills and 
fulfill their dreams and such nonsense? Women are not rational like men … they 
are not fit for leadership … the evidence to support this is that women can't drive 
(Mahfouz 20/2/2009d: 85). 
In one of his columns, Barakat Adow El Setat questioned why Egyptian women are 
concerned with the rights Western women have attained and argued: 
Men over there have given in because they believe in the funny principle of 
equality … how can we equate women with men when women do not join the 
army or grow a beard. …  holding conferences and seminars will not have an 
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impact on us - men. You should be grateful that you have roofs over your heads 
during the economic crisis, and you should suffice yourselves with making tea for 
men after they have their meals instead of organizing conferences and such 
nonsense (Mahfouz 13/3/2009f: 82). 
This regular column was very ironic and the views it contains about women can not be 
taken seriously.  
 
8.3 Citizen’s Initiatives:  
8.3.1 Cooperation between Female Members of Political Parties:  
There was an attempt to form a committee encompassing members of the various 
women‟s units of political parties. Analyzing this attempt will reveal one of the main 
reasons why women‟s political participation is hardly ever addressed by the Egyptian 
media.  
The aim of this committee was to get female members of political parties to co-operate 
together in women‟s political participation. The first time I interviewed Saed, member of 
DFP [see Chapter 4], she told me that she was the one who came up with this idea 
because the small number of women who are members of political parties are largely 
confined to women‟s committees within those parties. She added that women must fight 
for their rights within political parties because the male members of the parties will not 




According to the minutes of their first meeting, 16 women representing eleven different 
political parties attended the meeting. They decided to form three sub-committees one to 
work on changing laws that hinder women‟s political participation, another to ensure that 
the media promotes women‟s  political participation and a third one to enhance women‟s 
role within political parties. Saed said that at the time, they had been working on the 
committee for three months and had met up four times. She added that most of the 
women were very passionate about it
154
.  
                                                 
153 Interview with Magda Saed, member of DFP, Cairo, 18 December, 2007  
154 Ibid   
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However, when I asked the other female members of political parties about this 
committee, I got a very different impression. Shoukry, member of the NDP [see Chapter 
4], addressed a similar but different issue. She talked about another activity all together in 
which the NDP used to invite female members of opposition political parties to work 
under its leadership. She said that she used to be a member of a committee that was 
established a long time ago in order to foster cooperation between women‟s secretariats 
in political parties. The NDP‟s Women‟s Secretariat was the one which organized these 
meetings and invited the female members of other parties to attend them
155
.  
But this was a long time ago and things did not work out and the committee did 
not last for long because the female members of other political parties were not 
very cooperative. The senior female members of various political parties were not 
passionate about it and lower ranking members were the ones who attended the 
meetings instead, so it was pointless. Things did not work out because of 
diverging and conflicting policies of the members of the different parties
156
.  
Eventually, the NDP‟s Women Secretariat simply stopped organizing the meetings, she 
added. In addition, when I told her about Saeed and her efforts, Shoukry said, "we are not 
in touch with her regarding this issue, there is no communication between the NDP and 
DFP. I have never even heard of her [Saed] or of that committee
157
".  
Meanwhile, Korashi member of the Wafd Party [see Chapter 4], said  
the institution „One World‟ was the one that came up with the idea of this 
committee and suggested it to the female members of various political parties 
during a meeting. Saed then suggested that they - [the women themselves] - 
establish this committee on their own and not in collaboration with „One World‟. 
This way things will not work out because the female members of the different 
political parties will refuse to work under her [Saed‟s] leadership, I will be the 
first to refuse to do so. She has no right to be a leader because all of the female 
members of political parties are on the same footing. There is a lot of competition 
between the female members of the different parties, things are very 
individualistic. Also, if she [Saed] leads such a committee, this may raise the 
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DFP‟s popularity, which is unacceptable. … Such a committee must be under the 
auspices of a neutral organization such as „One World‟ for female members of 
various political parties to join it
158
.   
 
8.3.2 Screenwriter Initiatives:  
Nadia Rashad is a drama serials writer and actress who frequently addresses women's 
rights in her drama serials. She is the author of Mobara Zawgeya (Marital Match), the 
drama serial used in Chapter 7. The drama serial was about six inter-related families 
through which different women's rights were addressed. One of the female characters in 
the drama serial was a woman who was verbally abused by her husband throughout their 
marriage and at the age of 50, decided to defy him and start a career and pursue her 
lifelong dreams which he had opposed all along. Other women‟s issues addressed in the 
drama serial were women's political participation, the problems sterile women faced in a 
society where having children is extremely important and a young woman who faced 
problems in her career and experienced difficulties in marrying her prince charming 
because he had to look after his aging and ill father. Another dilemma addressed in the 
drama serial was a woman who defied the societal taboo of marrying a man who is some 
fifteen years younger than her versus a woman who married a man who was twenty-five 
years her senior. The drama serial also depicted a young wealthy and spoiled woman who 
fell in love with and married a man who came from a much lower socio-economic 
background. Their marriage was very unstable.   
Rashad said that she decided to address women's political participation in the form of 
running for parliament in Mobara Zawgeya because she is perplexed by how there is such 
a discrepancy between the discourse of decision makers and the political elite and the 
reality on the ground if women run for parliament
159
. In her words: 
The ruling elite makes wonderful decisions such as the much publicized slogan 
'No to Female Genital Mutilation.' How come the government adopts such 
progressive statements while people are against it? How come they [the 
government] say 'No to Female Genital Mutilation' while people practice it? … 
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235 
  
So why is the [ruling elite's] decision regarding women's political participation so 
progressive, while people are so backward?  Why do political parties refrain from 
nominating women despite all of the calls for doing so [that are expressed] in 
newspapers and on televised programs? And the few women who dared [to run 
for parliament] had a miserable experience, and so are unlikely run again. I 
wanted to confront people with this discrepancy because art should raise issues, 
maybe someone can solve this one. The President and the ruling elite all 
encourage women to play a role in politics by running for parliament and voting. 
But when I talked to four women who ran for parliament and lost [the elections] 
as well as some potential voters, I realized that women have a very hard time - 
just like male candidates - but they suffer a lot more and encounter other 
problems, just because they are women
160
.  
Rashad interviewed four female members of political parties who had run for parliament 
in order to prepare for writing the drama serial. Much of the problems the character who 




From Rashad's experience, only intellectuals who are concerned about women's political 
participation commented on this role when the drama serial was aired. However, a very 
large number of people commented on the character Soad, played by Rashad, who was 
mistreated by her husband
162
.  
He used to boss her around, belittle her opinions, harshly criticize her and all of 
her actions, he would never say a nice word to her and he would perceive her as a 
second class citizen. He never hit her but the manner in which he treated her also 
falls under violence against women. … Apparently many men treat their wives in 
such a manner because I met so many women who told me that they lead lives 
that are very similar to Soad's. … Many men also told me that I made them realize 
that the manner in which they treat their wives is horrible and that they will stop 
treating them in that manner. … Some young men told me that after watching the 
drama serial their mothers decided to start working again, some women even 






revolted and insisted on having their own social lives and having some time to 
themselves away from their families. Instead of just moaning and groaning, they 
decided to do something about their lives
163
.  
The second most commented on topic addressed in the drama serial, according to Rashad, 
was the marriage of a woman and a man who was some 15 years younger than her.  
So many people objected to this, whereas not a single person objected to another 
marriage [in the same drama serial] of a woman and a man who was some 25 
years her senior. Yet many women told me that they had indeed fallen in love 
with men who were much younger than them but declined to marry them because 
they feared the societal perception of such a marriage. Even though Prophet 
Mohamed married a woman who was much older than him and another who was 
much younger than him in order to set an example for us that age difference either 
way is not a problem and does not necessarily lead to an unsuccessful marriage. 
… Both men and women objected to this marriage. … 'How can a man marry a 
woman who is many years older than him?' they would say. Despite all of the 
justifications that I made: he did not want to have children [because both of his 
children from a previous marriage were mentally retarded due to a medical 
condition that he suffered from], they came from the same socio-economic 
background, their educational levels and intellectual standing were similar - they 
were a perfect match - except for her being many years older than him
164
.  
Rashad said that she decided to address this issue because she met two women who 
married men who were several years younger than them and those marriages were far 
more successful than many marriages that Egyptian society tends to perceive as a match 
made in heaven. However, viewers' negative reaction has not discouraged Rashad from 




Rashad also said: 
I addressed the difficulties women face in playing these dual roles [being a wife 
and mother as well as having a career] in society in a televised movie. … The 






message that I was trying to send was that familial duties should be equally 
divided so that the family can go on. But we should not call for equality between 
men and women because this will only lead to an increase in the number of single 
and divorced women, because if men remain unchanged, women will start 
perceiving marriage as a burden. We need to appeal to men, they are the ones who 
have to be convinced that they have to do women justice. … I always try to 
appeal to both men and women, because I convey both sides - that of women that 
of men - because I want everybody to relate to the drama serial. As far as I know, 
my message does get through to both
166
.  
Rashad also argued that in the drama serials she writes she addresses "societal issues not 




8.3.3 Media Responses to Sexual Harassment and Assault:  
Sexual harassment and assault is widespread in Egypt. According to a recent study, 64% 
of Egyptian women are harassed on a daily basis (ECWR nd: 6). To take a publicized 
example, in the last two years, during the Eid holiday large groups of young men sexually 
assaulted several women. This took place in downtown Cairo in 2007 and in Gamet al 
Dewal Al Arabiya Street in the heart of Cairo in 2008. Both incidents were filmed by 
passersby using their mobile phone video recording facilities and were uploaded on 
Youtube. The first incident was heavily criticized in the media but it was the second 
incident that caused an outcry. Thirty-six young men were arrested but thirty-four of 
them were released shortly after that without pressing charges against them because not a 
single woman dared to attest that she had been sexually assaulted. As for the two men 
who were not immediately released, a male journalist who happened to be in the area that 
night, attested that he did not see one of them sexually assaulting women and so he was 
released. The other one was 17 years-old and was sentenced to one year in prison because 
a policeman arrested him while he was sexually harassing a girl. It is important to note 
that this topic is a taboo in Egypt that hardly anyone dares to address. It is regarded as 
shameful for a woman to have been sexually harassed or assaulted and that is largely why 





not a single woman has ever dared to do much about it and why not a single woman 
attested to being harassed or assaulted in the incident described above. In fact, in the 
survey mentioned above, 41.2% of the women and 33% of the men who were surveyed 
said that a woman who is sexually harassed should keep it to herself and do nothing about 
it. Only 5.6% of the women and 12.9% of the men who were surveyed said that a woman 
who is sexually harassed should press charges (ECWR nd: 9).  
Noha Roshdy, a 27 year-old director became the first woman in Egypt to press charges 
against a man who sexually assaulted her. The assaulter was sentenced to three years in 
prison as well as paying a fine amounting to 5,000 Egyptian Pounds (around £500). 
Roshdy's initiative received widespread media coverage. The rest of this section will 
provide an overview of that coverage. 
Roshdy was featured on Al Ashera Masa'n [see Chapter 6 for details about the program] 
along with one of her lawyers, Zeyad Al Alamy, and her father was briefly interviewed 
over the phone. Roshdy described the incident by saying:  
My friend Hind and I were walking towards a busy street in order to take a taxi 
when a man driving a truck sexually assaulted me, I consequently fell to the floor 
and he laughed. He then started to drive away but was forced to stop shortly due 
to traffic. I chased him and Hind I pulled him out of the car and asked passersby 
to help us out. Some people offered to beat him up, asked him to apologize to me, 
some of them said some nasty things to him but almost all of them perceived 
pressing charges as totally unnecessary. One woman standing in the balcony of a 
nearby building went as far as saying to me "That's enough, forgive him." Only a 
20 year-old man helped Hind and I  drag him [the assaulter] to the police station.  
On Al Ashera Mas’an Roshdy did not describe how he sexually assaulted her but on other 
occasions, such as newspaper interviews, she said that he stretched out his arm through 
the truck's window, held her breast and started driving away while still holding her 
breast, which caused her to fall to the floor. 
Five men called-in to that particular episode of the program. Almost all of them spoke 
highly of Roshdy and her actions and applauded her. Some of them also described her as 
brave. For example, one of them said "I applaud you [the presenter] for featuring Miss 
Noha [on your show] and I highly applaud her and her friend Hind and the 20 year-old 
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man she talked about, this is how young Egyptian men should behave. Any girl [who is 
sexually harassed] must do something about it." Another example is how another caller in 
said that he his proud of Roshdy and that she should be a role model for other girls. 
However, one caller in, after applauding Roshdy and describing her as a victim said that 
she may be partially to blame because of the way she may have been dressed. This led the 
presenter to ask her to describe the clothes that she and her friend were wearing when she 
was sexually assaulted, after noting that she does not have the right to do so but that this 
is a societal issue that must be addressed. Noha described the clothes that they were 
wearing that day in great detail but also said: 
I have a question for the caller-in and society at large, how do you perceive sexual 
harassment? I think of it as a crime just like any other crime, and all women 
should be protected from it. One of the reasons why this phenomenon has become 
so widespread is because society perceives a girl [who is sexually harassed] as 
partially to blame … those who harass women believe that their actions are 
justifiable. Such societal phenomenon are extremely difficult [to address] because 
those who commit them do not realize that their actions are wrong, but believe 
that they are perfectly alright. 
After that, the presenter said to her "you should join women's organizations and such 
things, directing is not the right field for you."  
The presenter asked Roshdy's father whether or not he hesitated in supporting his 
daughter's decision to press charges due to the societal perception of the whole issue. His 
response was “the assaulter is the one who should feel ashamed … Noha is only fighting 
for her rights.”  
Several direct calls upon women who are sexually harassed or assaulted to press charges 
were expressed by Roshdy, her father and the presenter. For example, towards the end of 
the program, Roshdy said “I call upon every woman to press charges if she is sexually 
harassed, I believe that if ever woman does so, this will bring an end to this phenomenon 
in a years' time.” Similarly, the presenter said that publicizing the verdict is beneficial for 
society as a whole because it sends a strong message that any harasser can be sentenced 
to three years in prison. She also said to Roshdy‟s father: "I greatly respect you. The 
media is supporting this case, not because the media is biased towards women and 
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against men, but it‟s supporting you because we believe that" Roshdy can become a role 
model.  Meanwhile, Roshdy's father said “all girls should do the same [press charges] and 
their parents should support them because sexual harassment has become very 
widespread.”  
Roshdy was also interviewed by Al Mary Al Youm on the 23
rd
 of October 2008. After the 
verdict was passed, she was quoted in Al Masry Al Youm as arguing   
the verdict will lead young men to think twice before they sexually harass a 
woman. I hope that the way I dealt with the incident will lead other girls to 
overcome their fears and react bravely if they are sexually harassed. I was heavily 
criticized for daring to press charges which led me to consider withdrawing the 
court case, but it was the phone calls that I received from several women whose 
daughters had been sexually harassed that led me to refrain from doing so. Those 
mothers and their daughters were either not brave enough to press charges or tried 
to do so but were advised against it by policemen in order to [protect the girls‟ 
reputation]. … They beseeched me not to back down (Azam and Farghali 2008).  
Furthermore, many speakers in the broadcast media and columnists in the print media 
spoke very highly of Roshdy. For example, a religious scholar featured on 90 Dekika [see 
Chapter 6 for details about the program] on the 22
nd
 of October 2008 said "I applaud 
Noha who pressed charges and defied Egyptian society. She was brave enough to talk 
about it and should be a role model for other girls who are [sexually] harassed. If more 
girls do the same, things will change." 
Another example is how a columnist in Al Masry Al Youm [see Chapter 6 for details 
about the newspaper] argued:  
Noha Roshdy who filed a court case was not the first [woman to be sexually 
harassed] but the bravest. She did not fear what people would say about her, even 
though she was told many things like 'the man is impoverished, don't be cruel, 
you are going to destroy his entire life.' I was so shocked at people's reaction. 
Instead of feeling for her, they accused her of throwing an impoverished man in 
prison. Have things turned upside down in our country? Have ethics become so 
unimportant? (Kharsa 29/10/2009)   
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Similarly, in an opinion column entitled 'Well Done Noha', another columnist applauded 
Noha for pressing charges because when crimes go unpunished other people are 
encouraged to commit them, she argued. She also criticized those who feel sorry for 
harassers (El Shobashi 30/10/2008b). 
This is an excerpt from another opinion column:  
the brave young woman, Noha Roshdy, who was sexually harassed and stated that 
she had the right to seek to punish the sick young man who violently and 
barbarically fiddled with her body. She succeeded in bringing him to justice so 
that he was sentenced to three years in prison. This will bring an end to this 
disgusting anarchy (Gaber 8/11/2008). 
Several women did indeed follow suit. During the few weeks following the media's 
extensive coverage of Roshdy's case, four other women reported that they had been 
sexually harassed or assaulted. On the 1
st
 of November 2008, a 28 year-old woman 
reported that she had been harassed by a microbus driver while she was on the microbus 
(El Badri and El Dosoki 1/11/2008). Also, on the 7
th
 of November 2008, a 23 year-old 
heavily veiled woman reported that she was sexually harassed by a laborer while she was 
walking in the street (Abdel Radi 7/11/2008). In addition, on the 15
th
 of December 2008, 
investigations were underway about a case where a female employee in the Ministry of 
Education had accused her boss of sexually harassing her inside the Ministry's premises 
(El Badri 15/12/2008). Furthermore, on the 7
th
 of December 2008, a 29 year-old woman 
accused a taxi driver of sexually harassing her and slapping her (Abdel Radi and El 




This chapter has examined several different initiatives in the area of women, media and 
politics. It is therefore important to conclude whether or not these initiatives achieved 
their goals, i.e. whether they succeeded or failed.   
The only initiative which partially succeeded is the one that urged women to press 
charges against men who sexually harass or assault them. It succeeded in the sense that 
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several women did indeed press charges and challenge the societal taboo of not doing 
anything about being sexually harassed or assaulted. But in terms of women‟s rights and 
their empowerment, this initiative was not in the least successful due to the manner in 
which the whole issue was framed in the media. It was not framed in women‟s rights 
discourse but using one of the discourse mentioned in Chapters 5 and 6, namely 
paternalism. This reinforces rather than challenges the idea that women need protection. 
This is not to mention how using paternalistic discourse failed to put forward the idea that 
women have the right to walk around freely.  
Another initiative examined in this chapter was the attempt to address numerous and 
diverse women‟s rights through the drama serial Mobara Zawgeya. In a sense, merely 
succeeding in addressing women‟s rights in a drama serial rather than portraying women 
in the stereotypical roles outlined in Chapter 7 is an achievement in itself.  
However, determining whether or not the media monitoring initiatives by NCW and 
ADEW and NWF succeeded is a bit more tricky. Their approach to media monitoring is 
clearly in line with what Lotz (2006) has described as the „role model framework‟. This is 
because they largely investigate whether drama serials convey a positive or negative 
image of women and largely call for drama serials to convey female role models. These 
organizations also encounter a problem that does not exist in the US context, namely how 
their findings are not well received when they publicize them. One explanation for this is 
that people are not used to criticism in Egypt, and therefore, they do not take it very well.   
All of the media content initiatives to specialize programming or magazine sections to 
address women‟s rights have failed miserably. Their failure must be analyzed in light of 
the arguments made in Chapter 6 about how the government‟s approach to women‟s 
rights is backfiring against women within society and turning people against women‟s 
rights. Consequently, media content that is suppose to celebrate women and promote 
women‟s rights is trapped in apologizing for and having to justify addressing women‟s 
rights, stressing that they are not biased for women and against men, having to address 
the idea that women have already obtained way too many rights and are still asking for 
more and arguing that when women obtain rights this does not entail taking away rights 
243 
  
from men. Furthermore, many of them include sexist comments, anti-women‟s rights and 
anti-women‟s discourse. In other words, this chapter has built on one of the arguments 
made in Chapters 5 and 6, namely that the state‟s approach to women‟s rights is not only 
leaving the societal structures that disadvantage women unchanged, as argued by Murphy 
(2003), but is strengthening them by reinforcing the idea that women‟s rights are 
unacceptable and increasing opposition to them. This chapter added a new element to this 
argument by showing that the strengthening of the structures that disadvantage women is 
being reflected even in media content focused on women.  
Also, the initiative to establish a committee to foster cooperation between female 
members of various political parties in Egypt has clearly failed miserably. The evidence 
presented in this chapter regarding the reasons behind its failure suggest that in an 
authoritarian context where political parties do not function properly, attempting to 
address women‟s rights through activism in the political party arena is not effective. 
These women are fragmented into being members of largely ineffective institutions in 
which the play negligible roles, as outlined in Chapter 4, and their membership of these 
different and competing political parties is one of the main – although not the sole – 
reason why they are unable to cooperate together on a matter that they largely agree on, 
namely enhancing women‟s political participation. It is also therefore not surprising that 
women‟s political participation is hardly ever addressed by the media, because there is no 
unified and coherent movement to work on media treatment of this issue.  
It is also important to note that anyone who attempted to defend women‟s rights in any of 
the media outlets examined in this chapter avoided framing their arguments in women‟s 
rights discourse and avoided uttering the phrase women‟s rights, as previously argued in 
Chapters 5 and 6. Again, de-gendered discourse was used, whereby the argument was 
framed in a manner that had nothing to do with women. This framing their arguments in 
the well being of society as a whole and framing arguments about divorced women‟s 
rights in the well being of children of divorce. As noted in Chapters 5 and 6, this is 
because, drawing on Sakr‟s () argument that the media reflects and reinforces societal 
perceptions of women, if women‟s rights are justified using de-gendered discourse, this 
reflects and reinforces the societal view that the notion of women‟s rights is 
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unacceptable. But when it came to women‟s rights within the private sphere, a discourse 
other than the ones mentioned in the previous chapters was used. More specifically, 
Islamic discourse was used even by speakers who came across as rather secular. For 
example, a secular academic on Saet Zaman argued that the women‟s rights being called 
for “are enshrined within Islamic Sharia, we are not inventing any rights.” Therefore, the 
evidence in this chapter suggests that the clear-cut distinctions between using secular and 
Islamic discourse to call for women‟s rights, which were outlined in Chapter 2, are no 












This study set out to investigate whether or not and how the media contributes to 
women’s empowerment. However, the evidence presented in the previous chapters 
has shown that in order to determine this, the efforts to politically empower Egyptian 
women must be analyzed first. Furthermore, examining the ramifications of these 
efforts in addition to investigating how Egyptian society perceives these efforts are 
also pre-requisites for finding out whether or not the Egyptian media plays a role in 
the political empowerment of women. Thus, the previous chapters have identified the 
different players in decisions pertaining to women’s political empowerment, namely 
the Presidential establishment, women’s NGOs and political parties. They have also 
investigated their roles separately in relation to the media. This chapter will build on 
the previous ones by synthesizing the roles of these players in a collective manner in 
order to provide a clear description of what this process leads to in terms of women’s 
political empowerment and the utilization of mass media in this regard. It will also 
provide a detailed analysis of the impact of this process on Egyptian society and its 
views on women, their status and their rights, much of which is reflected in and 
mediated through the media. Those views have led those calling for women’s rights to 
frame their arguments in a specific manner, an issue which will be elaborated on 
during the course of this chapter. The chapter also includes a section about various 
different agents who are genuinely interested in women’s rights and are trying to 
make a difference. The question of whether or not the media contributes to women’s 
political empowerment will be returned to at the very end of the chapter. But first the 
chapter will provide a summary of the links between the findings of the various 
chapters of this study. 
 
9.1 Links between Findings of Individual Chapters: 
9.1.1 The State’s Approach to Women’s Rights  and its Ramifications: 
The findings of Chapters 4, 5 and 6 built on one another to clarify the roles of the 
President, first lady and their son Gamal in state decisions pertaining to women’s 
rights. Chapter 4 showed that decisions pertaining to women’s empowerment are 
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made by the President and/or first lady and to a lesser extent their son Gamal. It also 
indicated that the first lady and Gamal both play a role in formal politics.  
Chapter 5 built on the findings of Chapter 4 and clarified the first lady’s role in this 
regard even further. Its findings showed that the first lady is indeed involved in formal 
politics and not informal politics. For in her capacity as president of NCW, she has an 
official title and its mandate entitles her to written powers and not unwritten ones. 
These observations are different from those of Joseph (2001) who examined other 
first ladies and argued that they tend to be active in informal politics and are usually 
entitled to unwritten powers. These written powers include suggesting the 
introduction of new laws and the amendment of existing ones which pertain to women. 
The same chapter also outlined how the government owned media focuses on NCW 
activities that are headed or events attended by the first lady. Such stories are almost 
always to be found in the page entitled ‘The State’ along with news about various 
governmental institutions. This led to the conclusion that Kassem’s (2004) notion of 
personal authoritarianism can be extended to the first lady in the area of women’s 
rights, whereby the issue is personalized around her.  
Meanwhile, Chapter 6 reinforced the finding of Chapter 4 that the government only 
addresses women’s rights when the President and/or first lady approve of such a move 
and are more often than not directly involved in the matter. In addition, it elaborated 
on the role of the President in addressing women’s rights. For adopting the women’s 
parliamentary quota was part of the President’s electoral program and he was the one 
who announced in person that it would be adopted. In fact, media treatment of the 
women’s parliamentary quota was personalized around the President’s role in the 
matter. For example, when interviewed on talk shows and in newspapers, one of the 
reasons used by members of the NDP to justify the need to adopt the women’s 
parliamentary quota was that it was part of the President’s electoral program. Even 
some members of opposition parties thanked the President for its adoption in the print 
and broadcast media. In addition, government owned newspapers glorified and 
praised the President’s role in supporting women’s rights. Furthermore, Chapter 6 
provided additional evidence to support the argument made in Chapter 4 about how 
Gamal is involved in formal politics. It showed that he played a crucial role in the 
adoption of the women’s parliamentary quota because the idea of implementing it 
using extra seats emanated from the NDP Policies Committee which he heads. In the 
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print media, especially government owned newspapers, quotes from Gamal were 
included in stories about the adoption of the women’s parliamentary quota.  
At the same time, Chapters 4 and 6 clarified the role of the NDP and NCW in the 
adoption of the women’s parliamentary quota. Chapter 4 suggested that the NDP is a 
rather powerful institution which apparently intervenes on some occasions in some 
key decisions pertaining to women’s political empowerment, while NCW is a rather 
weak institution because its vision regarding how to implement the women’s 
parliamentary quota seemed unlikely to be implemented. Chapter 6 solidified these 
arguments. It showed that the NDP is indeed a powerful institution because its vision 
regarding the women’s parliamentary quota was implemented in order to safeguard 
the interests of the NDP. Meanwhile, NCW’s vision was indeed disregarded, which 
proved that NCW is a rather weak institution. The discrepancy in the power of both 
institutions was reflected in the print media’s coverage of the adoption of the 
women’s parliamentary quota. There were several stories in both the government and 
privately owned newspapers about meetings held and decisions reached by the NDP 
Policies’ Committee regarding the women’s parliamentary quota, while there were 
hardly any similar stories about NCW’s role in this regard.  
The ramifications of the state addressing women’s rights was addressed in the 
findings of Chapters 5, 6 and 7. They provided cumulative evidence to show that it is 
backfiring among different groups of Egyptian society. Meanwhile, Chapters 6 and 8 
conveyed that this backfiring is being reflected in different media outlets. For 
example, Chapter 5 indicated that some women’s activists as well as some members 
of NCW believe that NCW’s existence, activities and its constant media presence is 
backfiring and turning people against women’s rights. Meanwhile, Chapter 6 provided 
numerous examples of how it is backfiring among intellectuals and television 
presenters who are affiliated to the regime, as well as demonstrating how all of this is 
reflected in the media. Several intellectuals wrote opinion columns in privately owned 
newspapers in which they ended up making comments hostile to women not because 
they are anti-women’s political participation but because they oppose the state’s 
cosmetic changes approach. In addition, the presenters of talk shows aired on 
government owned channels made several sarcastic and often sexist while addressing 
the adoption of the women’s parliamentary quota. Chapter 7 provided the views of 
middle class women who are largely denied media access. It included examples of 
criticism levelled at state feminism, the cosmetic changes approach, imposing female 
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MPs on society as well as the association between women’s rights and the 
neocolonizers in people’s minds. Furthermore, it provided a vivid example of how the 
state’s approach to women’s rights is not only leaving the societal structures that 
disadvantage women unchanged, as argued by Murphy (2003), but is actually 
strengthening them. For it conveyed that ideas like that women’s activity should be 
confined to the private sphere and/or that men should take precedence in job 
allocation because they are the ones who are expected to provide for the family are 
gaining momentum among some women. Another idea is some women are also 
starting to support is that women should temporarily withdraw from the workforce to 
allow men to take over their jobs. Finally, Chapter 8 outlined how the backfiring of 
the state’s approach to women’s rights and the strengthening of structures that 
disadvantage women that it is causing are reflected in media content that is suppose to 
promote women’s rights or celebrate women. Such programs and magazine sections 
are trapped in apologizing for and having to justify why they address women’s rights, 
stressing that they are not biased for women and against men and having to address 
the idea that women have already obtained way too many rights and are still asking 
for more.  
 
9.1.2 Discourse Used to Address Women’s Rights:  
Chapter 5 showed that women’s NGOs and NCW avoid using women’s rights 
discourse when addressing women’s rights. Instead, they use paternalistic or non-
gendered discourse. Chapter 6 built on this by showing that these two types of 
discourses are also used by members of the ruling party and people affiliated to the 
regime. In addition, it provided additional examples for its usage by NCW members. 
Unlike in Chapter 5 where the women’s activists explained their approaches away 
from the media, in Chapter 6 these discourses were expressed in talk shows aired on 
government and privately owned channels as well as in government owned 
newspapers. In addition, Chapter 6 revealed another type of discourse used to address 
women’s rights, namely pan-Arabism. Chapter 8 built on the findings of Chapters 5 
and 6 by showing that these discourses are also used in media content that is suppose 
to promote women’s rights and/or celebrate women. It also revealed another type of 
discourse used while addressing women’s rights in the private sphere, namely Islamic 
discourse. The same chapter also provided an example of how a bold initiative that 
challenges the structures that disadvantage women was downplayed by how the media 
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framed it using one of these discourses instead of women’s rights discourse. For the 
unprecedented move by Roshdy to challenge sexual harassment and assault was 
framed using paternalistic discourse rather than arguing that women have the right to 
walk around freely without being intimidated. 
 
9.1.3 Female Activism in the Political Party Arena in relation to the Media: 
The findings of Chapters 4, 6, 7 and 8 built on one another to provide an analysis of 
women’s activism in the political party in relation to the media. Chapter 4 showed 
that political parties and forces in general do not function properly in an authoritarian 
context, largely because they are crippled, harassed and coopted by the regime and 
they merely exist in order to maintain the system of fake pluralism previously 
addressed by Bianchi (1989). Chapter 6 extended this finding to the media arena by 
demonstrating how political parties have very limited access to the media. But in 
order to maintain the fake pluralistic system, the weaker and more coopted political 
parties have more media access than the stronger and less coopted ones, because the 
former do not pose any threat whatsoever to the regime. This extended Lust-Okar’s 
(2007) notion of a divided level of contestation from the political party arena to the 
media. When it comes to women, Chapter 4 showed that women are largely confined 
to the women’s unties of political parties in which they play negligible roles. 
Furthermore, the roles that they perform are can largely be categorized as social and 
community services activities and not political ones. Moreover, the same chapter 
outlined that female members of political parties have no decision making power. 
Chapter 8 built on this finding by putting forward the argument that addressing 
women’s rights through political parties does not work in an authoritarian context and 
is actually detrimental to women’s activism. This is because membership of these 
ineffectual institutions fragments women’s activists on the basis of party affiliations 
and makes it almost impossible for them to cooperate with each other in an area in 
which they all believe in, namely enhancing women’s political participation. That 
chapter therefore concluded that this fragmentation is a main reason why women’s 
political participation and empowerment are not addressed in the media. Despite this, 
Chapter 6 indicated that the privately owned media has allowed female members of 
political forces – both secular and Islamic – some access to the media, whereas their 
voices are never expressed in government owned media outlets. But it is important to 
note that that this media access is used to comment on the state policies on women, 
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such as the adoption of the women’s parliamentary quota,  and not to promote 
women’s political participation. Finally, Chapter 7 provided the views of non-activists 
on women’s political participation. Its findings revealed that most middle class 
educated Egyptian women would like to see a larger number of female MPs and that 
almost all of them believe that women are better at representing ‘women’s issues’. It 
also revealed that most women do not bother to vote or participate in politics in any 
other manner - such as political party membership – due to the authoritarian nature of 
the Egyptian regime and the rigging of elections and not because they are not 
interested in politics, nor because they believe that women should not participate in 
politics.   
 
9.1.4 Drama Serials:   
Four chapters in this study addressed different but related aspects of drama serials. 
Chapter 4 showed that the NDP believes that drama serials brainwash viewers, which 
extended Abu Lughod’s (2005) argument that those who control the drama serials 
industry  hold the same view. Yet Chapter 6 provided ample evidence to prove that 
middle class female audiences of drama serials are not in the least passive or 
brainwashed by drama serials. But rather, they come up with various different 
interpretations of the text which span all of the different types of readings in Stuart 
Hall’s encoding-decoding model (Ruddock 2001). This built on the findings of Abu 
Lughod’s study which concluded that less privileged women are not brainwashed by 
drama serials, by showing that the same is true of more educated women who are also 
better off.  
Meanwhile, Chapters 5, 7 and 8 addressed another element of drama serials, namely 
their treatment of women. Chapter 5 showed that NCW plays a direct role in drama 
serials treatment of women by asking the President of ERTU to produce drama serials 
based on the complaints that it receives in its Ombudsman Office. But at the same 
time, Chapter 8 showed that NCW’s media monitoring reports recommend 
reconsidering drama serials’ treatment of women and the topics pertaining to women 
that they address so that they convey a realistic image of Egyptian women. In fact, 
this recommendation is rather similar to one of the findings of Chapter 7, namely the 
one that showed that some middle class female audiences are critical of the female 
characters featured in Egyptian drama serials and deem them as unrealistic.  
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9.2 Lack of Structural Change: 
As stated in Chapter 2, this study contends that women can only be politically 
empowered if several structural changes take place in the arenas of politics, society 
and culture. This section will elaborate on the obstacles to women’s political 
empowerment within these structures in relation to the media. These include the 
internal political structure, which refers to problems within the Egyptian political 
structure, which has implications for both who controls the media and its treatment of 
women’s political empowerment. Another structure is the global political one, which 
encompasses relations between different sovereign states, where Egypt is situated in 
this structure and the implications of all of this on how the Egyptian regime addresses 
women’s political empowerment and media treatment of its approach. In addition, 
how the societal structure is disregarded and not included in any way, shape or form 
in the efforts to allegedly empower Egyptian women politically is also elaborated on 
in relation to the media. Finally, some of the obstacles in the cultural structure are also 
noted.  
 
9.2.1 Obstacles within the Internal Political Structure:  
The political structure of the Egyptian regime is authoritarian but it allows room for 
fake liberalism and pluralism not only in the political arena, as argued by Albrecht 
(2007) and the civil society one, as noted by Bianchi (1989), but also in the media 
arena. The Egyptian media system is a fake pluralistic one which at face value comes 
across as rather pluralistic due to the proliferation of privately owned media. However, 
these media outlets are controlled by the state through a combination of co-optation 
and coercion, as argued in Chapter 6.  
This study has shown that when it comes to women’s political empowerment and 
political decisions pertaining to women’s rights in relation to the media, the political 
structure of the Egyptian regime is personal authoritarian with power personalized 
around not only the President, as argued by Kassem (2004), but also around the first 
lady and to a lesser extent their son Gamal. As a result, the government owned 
media’s treatment of women’s rights largely consists of a glorification of the 
President and/or first lady, praising their wonderful efforts in the area of women’s 
alleged empowerment while the alleged women’s rights in question are simply very 
briefly mentioned. However, a critical analysis of how decisions pertaining to women 
are made has revealed that their powers are not unlimited and has also refined 
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Abrahms’ (1988) theorization of how the state functions, especially in an authoritarian 
context. Even though the President, first lady and/or Gamal are the ones who decide 
which women’s right will be addressed and when it will be addressed, how it is 
addressed is determined by a more complicated process. Some of the other divided 
and volatile institutions that constitute the state play a role in that process. These 
institutions reach a unified stance - a decision on how the women’s right in question 
will be implemented - by a process in which the more powerful institution imposes a 
decision which keeps its interests and privileges intact onto the weaker institution 
which has hardly any say in the matter. This was clearly illustrated when the women’s 
parliamentary quota was adopted: the President was the one who decided that 
women’s ill representation in parliament would be addressed at this particular point in 
time and the media widely covered the speech in which he made this announcement. 
The vision of NCW - a weak institution - that it should be implemented using some of 
the existing parliamentary seats was disregarded. It was the vision of the NDP - a 
powerful institution - that was implemented and received considerable media 
coverage, as demonstrated in Chapters 5 and 6. Thus, the women’s parliamentary 
quota was implemented by adding extra seats to parliament so that the NDP’s MPs 
could all maintain their parliamentary seats, i.e. their power and privileges.  
The analysis of how governmental decisions pertaining to women are made signified 
the need to problematize Hatem’s (1992) notion of state feminism. Clearly the state is 
not a unified and coherent structure and different individuals and institutions within 
the state play rather different roles in the process that eventually leads to state policy 
on women. This was reflected in the print media in the form of stories about meetings 
held by different governmental institutions to address the women’s parliamentary 
quota, as shown in Chapter 6. The study also demonstrated that authoritarianism is an 
integral element that must be taken into consideration while examining the 
politicization of the family and the blurring of the distinction between the private and 
public spheres, suggested by Singerman (2006) and Tucker (1993). Clearly because 
the Egyptian regime is authoritarian, this has enabled members of the President’s 
family, namely the first lady and his son Gamal, to move beyond the accepted notion 
of them playing a role in informal politics (Joseph 2001), such as influencing the 
President’s decisions or playing subtle political roles, to engaging openly and directly 
in formal political activity and having a say in state policy. This is reflected in the 
media in the form of stories about their formal political activity. In addition, it is 
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reflected in opinion columns which largely consist of hypocrisy for the first lady in 
the government owned newspapers and criticism of her in the privately owned ones. 
The latter tend to include criticism of women’s rights as part and parcel of critiquing 
the role played by the first lady. 
Both political parties and women’s NGOs are largely ineffectual co-opted institutions 
which are in place in order to maintain a system of fake pluralism as argued in 
Chapters 4 and 5. Not surprisingly, they play no role whatsoever in the decisions 
pertaining to women’s empowerment, nor do they have any impact on these decisions. 
They enjoy limited access to the media in order to maintain the system of fake 
pluralism and liberalism in the arenas of politics, civil society and media. That is why 
members of co-opted political parties are featured in the privately owned media from 
time to time to criticize the latest cosmetic change pertaining to women made by the 
state. But it is noteworthy that they are featured more often in the privately owned 
newspapers than the privately owned television stations, because the former enjoy 
more freedom than the latter. This demonstrates that the regime has extended one of 
the tactics it uses to contain its political opponents, namely a divided structure of 
contestation (Lust-Okar 2007), to controlling the media. Thus, some media outlets 
enjoy more freedom than others.  
 
9.2.2 Obstacles within the Global Political Structure:   
The main driving force behind the state’s decisions pertaining to women’s political 
empowerment is the international framework which the Egyptian government is 
embedded in. This international framework consists of an unbalanced global structure 
in which Egypt is in a weak position. Egyptian journalists and commentators in the 
media are alienated by Egypt’s position in this structure and the ramifications of this 
position. This is reflected in the Egyptian media’s treatment of the state’s approach to 
women’s political empowerment.  
The analysis of this particular factor has shown that the arguments of Armstrong 
(1998) as well as True and Mintron (2001) need to be reconsidered. They have 
respectively argued that states tend to imitate each other in a peer effect fashion and 
that through their membership of institutions like the UN states are socialized into 
methods of good governance. However, states are not peers and they are not on the 
same level. Some countries are more developed than others and the less developed 
ones tend to look up to, admire and try to imitate the policies and tactics of the more 
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developed ones. In addition, some countries are more powerful than others and tend to 
interfere in the internal affairs of the less powerful ones because they provide them 
with various forms of aid and assistance. Therefore, if the institutions or policies of a 
weak state are similar to those of a powerful state - which provides it with some form 
of aid - it may very well be that this is the case because the weaker state was obliged 
to adopt policies and/or institutions that are similar to those of the more powerful state. 
Also, when states join institutions like the UN and become party to an international 
bill of rights like CEDAW, they are not only socialized into methods of good 
governance, there is actually pressure to conform to and implement the bill of rights 
in question. An example of such pressure is that the names of states which have not 
become party to CEDAW are read out in the UN’s General Assembly which clearly 
embarrasses them and makes them seem like the odd ones out. Another form of 
pressure is that states which do become party to CEDAW are required to submit 
periodical reports to the CEDAW Committee in which they explain the steps and 
measures they have undertaken to implement CEDAW. In fact, almost all of the 
changes pertaining to women’s rights taking place in Egypt are a response to various 
clauses in CEDAW and feedback from the CEDAW Committee. However, it is 
unsuccessful and does not lead to women’s empowerment due to reasons that will be 
addressed shortly. Chapter 6 has shown that the sense that the Egyptian regime only 
addresses women’s political empowerment due to pressure from powerful Western 
countries is reflected in the media in the form of scepticism or outright rejection of 
women’s rights, as part and parcel of the scepticism and rejection of anything being 
imposed onto Egypt by powerful Western countries.  
In addition, media treatment of the actual measures taken by the state to allegedly 
empower women is shaped by the objectives behind and outcomes of these measures. 
While examining these outcomes, this study has extended Adams’ (2007) findings 
about how an authoritarian regime can establish a governmental women’s 
organization in order to obtain legitimacy in the international arena and not because it 
is genuinely interested in women’s empowerment. It has shown that the Egyptian 
regime has not only created NCW for this particular purpose, but its entire approach 
to women’s rights is designed to merely obtain legitimacy in the international arena 
and not to advance women’s status. More specifically, the state has opted for a 
cosmetic changes approach to women’s rights which entails making changes and 
granting women rights in theory only, but in practice, things largely remain 
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unchanged and women do not truly obtain any rights or benefit from these changes. A 
vivid example outlined in Chapters 5 and 6 is how the women’s parliamentary quota 
will lead to a numerical increase in women’s representation in parliament but it is the 
female members of the ruling party who will join parliament by virtue of it, while 
Egyptian women will not be truly politically empowered. Thus, when the media 
addresses women’s rights, in reality it merely addresses these cosmetic changes and 
not women’s rights per se. This has dire consequences on media treatment of 
women’s rights because much of it ends up consisting of commentators and 
columnists expressing their stances on the regime itself and not on women’s rights. 
More specifically, those who support the regime end up speaking very highly of the 
cosmetic changes as part and parcel of expressing hypocrisy for the President and/or 
first lady. Meanwhile, those who oppose the regime end up harshly criticizing the 
cosmetic change in question as part and parcel of criticizing the regime as a whole, as 
shown in Chapter 6. This often also includes making fun of women and their rights as 
well as sexist comments which are fuelled by hatred towards the regime and its 
policies and not women or their rights.  Hence the political system distorts even the 
privately owned media and prevents it from contributing to a balanced or well-
informed discussion of women’s political empowerment.  
 
9.2.3 Obstacles Pertaining to the Societal Structure:   
One of the main obstacles pertaining to the societal structure is that women at the 
grassroots level are far removed from all of the alleged attempts to empower women. 
The cosmetic changes approach as a whole as well as the meagre activities of 
women’s activists do not even attempt to appeal to women at the grassroots level, 
reach out to them, mobilize them or involve them in the alleged attempts to empower 
women. At best, and in some rare cases, they merely offer a small number of women 
with some services in a particular area. This is very problematic because, as Jad (2004) 
has previously noted, women’s empowerment can not be achieved without a mass 
women’s movement at the grassroots level. It is also perplexing given that many 
middle class women are interested in women’s rights in general and women’s 
participation in formal politics in particular, as shown in Chapter 7. For example, they 
would like to see a larger number of qualified and competent women who truly 
represent them play an effective and significant role in formal politics, especially in 
the form of parliament members.  
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9.2.4 Obstacles Pertaining to the Cultural Structure:  
Some obstacles pertaining to the cultural structure must also be noted. Chapter 7 has 
shown that many middle class women would like to see a drastic change in media 
treatment of women, especially the female characters featured in drama serials. This 
provided further evidence to support the different contributions made by various 
scholars such as Stuart Hall (Ruddock 2001), Abu Lughod (2005) and Lotz (2006) 
which discredit the idea that soap operas and drama serials have a massive impact on 
viewers. Furthermore, the same chapter has revealed that the politicization of the 
family and the blurring of the private and public spheres suggested by Singerman 
(2006) and Tucker (1993) have some rather different resonations among middle class 
women. It has shown that some of these women believe that this is a viable 
justification to confine women’s activity to the private sphere. Yet others used criteria 
emanating from the roles women play in the private sphere to support and justify 
women playing roles perceived as similar in the public sphere.   
  
9.3 How the Cosmetic Changes Approach is Backfiring: 
As previously stated, instead of adopting an approach that changes the structures that 
disadvantage women which then leads to their political empowerment, the state has 
opted for a cosmetic changes approach which can not be described as state feminism. 
While analyzing the ramifications of the cosmetic changes approach, this study has 
identified many factors that were not mentioned by Murphy (2003) that must be taken 
into consideration in order to determine the drawbacks of women’s rights being 
addressed by an authoritarian regime. These include the popularity of the regime in 
question, the popularity of the key figures within the regime who are associated with 
women’s rights as well as people’s take on governmental policies in other arenas. 
Other factors are how women’s rights are perceived and the factors that influence that 
perception. In fact, this study has conveyed that the state’s cosmetic changes approach 
is backfiring in a number of ways.  
Since the approach is a top-down one where the state is the one which decides which 
women’s rights are addressed as well as how and when they are addressed, there is a 
sense that women’s rights are being imposed onto society by a deeply unpopular 
regime. This is backfiring because people hate the idea that something is being 
imposed on them, and they hate it even more because it emanates from an oppressive 
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regime. This is fuelling resistance to women’s rights. As shown in Chapter 6, some 
commentators in the media who are supportive of women’s rights ended up arguing 
that women’s representation in parliament should increase due to a natural 
progression in societal perception of women and their rights, rather than being 
imposed from above. Others who apparently were less supportive of women’s rights 
ended up questioning whether Egyptian society was not sensible and did not realize 
the importance of women’s political participation so that it had to be imposed on to 
society.  
Also, since the first lady is the one sponsoring women’s rights and the whole issue is 
personalized around her and the institution that she heads, NCW, this is leading to an 
association between women’s rights and the deeply unpopular first lady. This is 
reflected in the privately owned media in which some columnists and members of 
opposition forces criticize how changes pertaining to women are made in order to 
please the first lady. Many of them ended up expressing anti-women discourse in the 
process, as shown in Chapter 6.  
In some cases, the cosmetic changes are made using measures very similar to other 
government policies which have failed miserably. This is leading to an association 
between women’s rights and failed government policies. A vivid example is the 
correlation made by several commentators between the women’s parliamentary quota 
and the quotas for peasants and labourers which have become a fiasco. This is leading 
to scepticism towards women’s rights.    
In addition, due to post-colonialism, many Egyptians perceive women’s rights as a 
Western colonial invention to undermine Egyptian culture. They also perceive those 
who call for them as agents of the colonizers. As stated previously, the main 
motivation behind the changes pertaining to women is the regime’s interest in gaining 
legitimacy in the international arena. This is strengthening the cultural structure which 
perceives women’s rights as part and parcel of a neo-colonialist project to colonize 
Egypt and change its culture. It so follows that the state is perceived as an agent of the 
neo-colonizers. All of this is tainting the whole notion of women’s rights and fuelling 
hatred and resistance towards it which is in turn strengthening the cultural structure 
that perceives women’s rights as unacceptable. Indeed, some columnists and 
commentators, especially in the privately owned print media, related the changes 
pertaining to women that are taking place to foreign influence. Many of them also 
ended up expressing negative comments about women and their rights which was 
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largely caused by their hatred of foreign interference in Egyptian affairs in general 
due to post-colonialism and not because they were against women or their rights in 
principle.     
One of the main tactics of the state’s cosmetic changes approach to women’s rights is 
changing, amending and introducing laws pertaining to women. Murphy (2003) has 
previously noted some of the problems related to the approach of changing laws 
pertaining to women while leaving the societal structures that disadvantage them 
unchanged. Meanwhile, Singerman (2006) has examined the politicized response to 
economic policies that threaten the marital institution. This study has shown that these 
two factors must be examined together. The state’s failed economic policies have led 
to high unemployment rates, inflation as well as an increase in poverty rates, all of 
which is leading people to despair. This in turn is threatening the marital institution 
because growing numbers of young men can not afford to get married and are 
therefore marrying at a very late age. This inevitably means that a growing number of 
women remain single for a very long time and end up marrying well into their thirties. 
This is leading to a lot of anxiety in society and fuelling support for the idea that all of 
the employed women should give up their jobs, which would enable the unemployed 
men to then take over these jobs. The men would then be able to afford all of the 
marriage expenses, women would get married at a younger age and everybody would 
live happily ever after. This scenario is voiced through the media. In addition, 
arguments to the effect of women are incapable of doing much are usually voiced at 
more or less the same point in time or by the same people. In others words, the state’s 
cosmetic changes approach which leaves the societal and cultural structures that 
disadvantage women unchanged, coupled with the politicized response to its failed 
economic policies are strengthening the cultural structures that disadvantage women 
by fuelling support for a gendered division of labour which involves women returning 
to their natural place - the home - and confining women’s activity to the private 
sphere. Chapter 7 indicated that this line of thought is gaining momentum among 
some women - both young and old.  
Another manner in which the state’s cosmetic changes approach is backfiring is that it 
is leading men to perceive women’s rights as a zero sum game in which only one sex 
and not the other can be powerful. So, men - both politicians as well as Egyptian men 
at large - have come to perceive women obtaining rights as a process in which rights 
are being taken away from men and given to women, so that men’s power within both 
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the public and private spheres is slowly being eroded to the advantage of women. This 
is reflected in the media in the form of male columnists, television presenters and 
callers-in putting forward arguments such as the idea that women have obtained way 
too many rights, how certain measures will be necessary in the near future to protect 
men from women and even arguments that men are now oppressed, as shown in 
Chapters 4, 6 and 8. Another reason why framing women’s rights in this particular 
manner is to be found quite often in the media, could be because it fits well with 
media narratives of reporting on winners and losers. Also, framing women’s rights in 
this manner is rather sensationalist and is likely to attract audiences. 
  
9.4 Discourse Used to Support Women’s Rights: 
Not surprisingly, in this environment even those defending women’s rights cannot 
even utter this term in the media, or anywhere else for that matter, because it simply 
alienates people. Instead they end up framing the women’s rights they are calling for 
in other discourses all together. One such discourse is what can be described as non-
gendered discourse, whereby the argument is framed as something that has nothing to 
do with women. Examples include arguing that the nationality law needs to be 
amended because the children of an Egyptian mother and a non-Egyptian father suffer 
dearly. Using this particular type of discourse is problematic because the argument is 
presented as being totally unrelated to the way rights and responsibilities are assigned 
between women and men. Thus, it gives into rather than challenges the way rights and 
responsibilities are assigned between women and men. Another type of discourse used 
to call for women’s rights is a paternalistic one in which women are defined in 
relation to their male relatives. An example is arguing that if sexual harassment and 
assault are widespread, then men will fear for their sisters, wives and daughters. 
Utilizing paternalistic discourse reinforces rather than challenges the idea that women 
are not independent human beings, but are defined in relation to their male relatives. 
The third type of discourse used was pan-Arabism. In this case, the argument was 
simply that other Arab countries have done the same, such as other Arab countries 
have adopted parliamentary quotas for women and appointed female governors. By 
referring to other Arab countries, the speakers were trying to discredit the idea that the 
women’s right they are calling for was invented or is being imposed by the Western 
neocolonizers. The fourth type of discourse was framing the argument in Islamic 
discourse. This was only used while referring to women’s rights within the private 
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sphere and the argument was basically that the right being called for is enshrined in 
Islamic Sharia. 
The main problem with all four discourses is that they give into rather than challenge 
the unacceptability of women’s rights. When they are voiced in the media, they reflect 
how women’s rights discourse is unacceptable in Egypt society. But by doing so, they 
also reinforce its unacceptability. In the long-run, this will make it even more difficult 
for women’s empowerment to occur.  
 
9.6 Is the Media Contributing to Women’s Political Empowerment?   
Therefore, the media in Egypt does not contribute to women’s political empowerment 
because there are no efforts to truly empower women politically in the first place. 
Instead, the state makes some cosmetic changes and purports that they empower 
women. The media then addresses these cosmetic changes and not women’s 
empowerment per se. This largely consists of people expressing their stances on the 
regime and not on women’s empowerment. The end result is that women’s political 
empowerment is hardly ever addressed in the media.  
Furthermore, those who try to address women’s rights in the media in this 
environment end up having to avoid using women’s rights discourse while doing so. 
The types of discourse that they utilize instead make it even more difficult for 
women’s empowerment to occur. In this regard, the media is not only failing to play 
an enabling role in empowering women, but is actually hampering it. But it is 
important to note that this should not be blamed solely on the media because the 
media is simply one component of an entire apparatus that determines the prospects 
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GLOSSARY 
ADEW                        Association for the Development and Enhancement of Women 
DFP                             Democratic Front Party 
ECWR                         Egyptian Center for Women’s Rights 
NCW                           National Council for Women  
NDP                            National Democratic Party 
NWF                           New Woman Foundation 
UN                              United Nations 
UNIFEM                    United Nations Development Fund for Women 
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